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In the introduction to Madness and Civilisation, Foucault sets out his project as follows:  
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the 
madman…The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has 
been established on the basis of such a silence. I have not tried to write the history of that 
language, but the archaeology of that silence (Foucault, 2001: xii).  
Through this dissertation, I excavate the archaeology of that silence a little more, uncovering 
its distinctly epistemic foundation. Drawing on the emerging field of epistemic injustice, I 
develop an underexplored form of epistemic silencing that I dub ‘hermeneutical silencing’. In 
a case of hermeneutical silencing, the oppressed individual is silenced by a lack of language 
to describe their marginalised experiences. I then proceed to demonstrate the true breadth and 
depth of the harm produced by hermeneutical silencing. The hermeneutically silenced 
individual not only suffers a cognitive disadvantage due to an inability to articulate their 
experiences; with recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of speech expression, I argue 
that they suffer a profound disruption to their embodied experience in the world.  
When the concept of ‘hermeneutical silencing’ is applied to the domain of psychiatry, a more 
complete picture of the ‘archaeology of that silence’ unfolds. Although an experience of 
alienation from the world is characteristic of psychiatric illness, the concept of hermeneutical 
silencing demonstrates how this experience can be exacerbated and perpetuated by gaps in 
the interpretive framework where words to describe the patient’s experience ought to be. If 
we hope to amplify such marginalised voices in the future, we must first address the unequal 
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‘Language realizes, by breaking the silence, what the silence wished and did not obtain’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 176).  
 
First-person reports play a critical role in the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric illness. 
This is particularly true in cases of psychiatric illness that cannot be identified neurologically. 
In these instances, the healthcare professional relies on the patient’s testimony in order to 
diagnose and treat the illness at hand. Despite the profound significance of the patient’s voice 
in psychiatric healthcare, there is a growing concern for the ‘epistemic injustice’ occurring 
within psychiatric practice (Crichton et al. 2016). Epistemic injustice is a term coined by 
Miranda Fricker to capture injustices that impact a person as a ‘knower’ (Fricker, 2017).  In 
the case of psychiatric illness, epistemic injustice occurs when a speaker’s testimony is given 
lower credibility than it ought to, either due to bias regarding the speaker’s cognitive and 
emotional condition (‘testimonial injustice’) or because their voice is excluded from the 
psychiatric interpretive framework (‘hermeneutical injustice’) (Crichton et al. 2016). 
Emerging research on epistemic injustice in psychiatric illness has done much to show that 
such unjust epistemic practices can lead to ignoring and even silencing those with psychiatric 
illness; this is doubly detrimental: not only to the medical task at hand but also to the person’s 
own sense-making of their psychiatric illness.  
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of speech expression, this dissertation shows 
that, in its most extreme form, epistemic injustice can have deeply destructive ramifications 
to the ill person’s embodied experience of the world. I argue that these phenomenological 
implications are most apparent in an underexplored and hitherto unarticulated form of 
epistemic harm that I call ‘hermeneutical silencing’, whereby the marginalised knower must 
remain silent about her experience due to a lack of appropriate hermeneutical resources in the 
interpretive framework. When this new concept of hermeneutical silencing is applied to 
psychiatric healthcare, it reveals that hermeneutical silencing not only impacts the patient’s 
diagnosis and treatment but it can also fuel the experience of alienation from the world that is 
characteristic of psychiatric illness. Hence, the specific and unique ramifications of 
hermeneutical silencing extend to the ill person’s entire being-in-the-world. One way out of 
this impasse, I suggest, is the implementation of therapeutic practices that help the patient 
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develop new and discursive ways of putting their illness into words. Through the 
encouragement and legitimisation of the patient’s own voice in healthcare discourse, they 
will be better equipped to effectively express their illness experience to the healthcare 
professional, thus alleviating the harms caused by epistemic injustice. Moreover, through 
such therapeutic practices they gain an expressive capacity that will re-animate their world 
and provide them with a means to overcome what Virginia Woolf calls the expressive 
‘poverty’ of illness (Woolf, 2012: 6).  
 
Silencing   
 
There are two ways in which the powerful in society can be described as silencing the 
oppressed. The first is through physically silencing dissonant voices. Historically, the 
oppressed have been rendered mute through gagging devices, like the ‘iron bit’, ‘brank’ or 
‘scold’s bridle’: a muzzle that slid into the mouth and kept down the tongue of the wearer, 
thus preventing the victim from speaking: 
The brank may be described simply as an iron framework which was placed on the head, 
enclosing it in a kind of cage; it had in front a plate of iron, which, either sharpened or 
covered with spikes, was so situated as to be placed in the mouth of the victim, and if she 
attempted to move her tongue in any way whatever, it was certain to be shockingly injured 
(Andrews, 1899: 277). 
Traditionally, these muzzles were inflicted in the eighteenth century upon enslaved people in 
the US and ‘unruly’ women in Britain from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.  A further 
example is that of the padded-cell, widely implemented in psychiatric institutions in the 
nineteenth century as an (ineffective) means of treatment, that had the advantage of ‘muffling 
and muting’ the patient within (Topp, 2018: 773). Today, physical silencing can be enacted 
simply via a strong hand placed over the mouth of the oppressed.  
Whether through a muzzle or a firm hand, there is a tragically long list of ways in which the 
powerless were and may still be physically prevented from speaking. However, there is a 
second, equally effective, means of silencing, where the powerful need not impose any 
physical restraint. The tongue of the oppressed can be kept down, not only by the iron plate 
of the brank but by structural, socially imposed mechanisms that inhibit dissonant voices. We 
can better understand this form of silencing through an analogous line of thought in 
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Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation (1961). Foucault observes a transition in the nineteenth 
century asylum, whereby chains and other instruments of restraint that bound those 
committed were swapped for the ‘abstract, faceless power’ of authority (Foucault, 2001: 
238). Physical chains were no longer necessary in the asylum because they had been 
internalised: ‘the absence of constraint in the nineteenth century is not unreason liberated, but 
madness long since mastered’ (Foucault, 2001: 239). According to Foucault, the god-like 
authority held by the doctor over the patient was restraint enough.  
So too, over time, devices like the iron bit or the scold’s bridle did not need to be 
implemented to exercise effective silencing. In a society where it was common to hear your 
husband, and the husbands of other women, proclaim, ‘If you don’t rest with your tongue I’ll 
send for the bridle and hook you up’, the mere presence of such a device in your community 
would likely be sufficient to ensure silence (Andrews, 1899: 280). Correspondingly, the 
looming threat of the iron bit would likely have been enough for an eighteenth-century slave 
to still their tongue. Eventually, it became no longer necessary for the powerful to physically 
restrict the powerless through such silencing devices, or even to uphold these devices as a 
symbolic threat. In contrast, as Foucault observes, ‘the physician could exercise his absolute 
authority in the world of the asylum only insofar as, from the beginning, he was Father and 
Judge, Family and Law’ (Foucault, 2001: 258). Like Foucault’s asylum detainee, the 
marginalised person’s minority status in the complex social structure, and the contrasting 
authority bestowed upon the dominantly situated, is restraint enough to still the tongue. In the 
words of bell hooks: ‘It was the silence of the oppressed - that profound silence engendered 
by resignation and acceptance of one’s lot’ (hooks, 1981: 1).   
While this second form of silencing cannot compare to the incomprehensible cruelty and 
violence of physical silencing, it does have an insidious and long-lasting effect. We can better 
understand the surreptitious nature of social silencing through Miranda Fricker’s distinction 
between active and passive power (Fricker, 2007: 9-10). The physical implementation of the 
iron-bit or the brank would be an example of power being performed actively. In contrast, the 
very fact that those in a dominant position could implement such a device may have altered 
the behaviour of those vulnerable to such abuse, in this instance, by curtailing their speech, 
even if the iron-bit is never in fact used. In this case, power operates passively.  
Without the need for physical constraint, passive silencing imposed by a system of power is 
far more difficult to detect. This covert form of silencing has recently become an object of 
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academic study, with the aim to assiduously expose cases embedded within our social 
structure. Although frequently attributed to feminist philosophers like Catharine MacKinnon 
(1979), Jennifer Hornsby (1980) and Rae Langton (1990), the study of this kind of silencing 
has deeper roots in the work of Anna Cooper (1892), W.E.B Dubois (1903), Frantz Fanon 
(1952), Dorothy Bolden (1965), Audre Lorde (1977), bell hooks (1981) and Patricia Hill 
Collins (1990).  
A recent contribution to the field is the concept of epistemic silencing as developed by 
Miranda Fricker, an extreme form of what she calls ‘epistemic injustice’ (2007). In coining 
the term ‘epistemic injustice’, Fricker set out to expose an area of social injustice that had 
hitherto been missing from the literature, whereby the voice of the powerless is afforded an 
unduly deflated level of credibility in virtue of an identity prejudice. In this instance, the 
injustice is epistemic because the powerless individual has been wronged in their capacity as 
someone who can participate in knowledge sharing activities. This epistemic injustice takes 
at least two forms: ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’.1 Testimonial 
injustice occurs when a person’s deflated credibility leads to their testimony being ignored or 
disregarded. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a person’s deflated credibility bars them 
from participating in knowledge-generating activities; as a result, there are gaps in the 
interpretive framework where resources to describe their experiences ought to be. Fricker 
reserves the term ‘epistemic silencing’ for a specific subset of epistemic injustice. For her, 
epistemic silencing emerges exclusively from an ‘extreme form of testimonial injustice, 
characterized by a radical communicative dysfunction’ (Fricker, 2007: 140).  
While Fricker has already done much to broaden the horizons within which we conceptualize 
and understand silencing, there is more work to be done on epistemic injustice. In particular, I 
argue that there is much more left to say about the role of hermeneutical injustice in epistemic 
silencing.  Building on Fricker’s distinction between testimonial injustice that leads to 
credibility deflation and the extreme form of testimonial injustice that silences the would-be 
speaker, I articulate a new distinction between two kinds of hermeneutical injustice: 
hermeneutical injustice that suppresses hermeneutical resources and hermeneutical injustice 
that forces the marginalised knower to pass over their experiences in silence. I dub the latter 
‘hermeneutical silencing’. This is an important contribution to the literature, not only because 
 
1 Further forms of epistemic injustice have been identified since the publication of Fricker’s book, which is 
explored throughout this dissertation. For a bibliography of the various forms of epistemic injustice that has 
emerged from the literature, see Kidd (2017).  
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this type of epistemic harm has been overlooked so far, but also because I identify it as the 
form of epistemic silencing that is especially difficult to detect, has life-altering 
phenomenological ramifications, and is the most challenging form of epistemic injustice to 
overcome.  The harm of hermeneutical silencing is twofold. First, hermeneutical silencing 
inflicts a cognitive disadvantage, whereby a significant area of the marginalised knower’s life 
is obscured. Consequently, their capacity for self-understanding is inhibited. By introducing a 
phenomenological method to the field of epistemic injustice, a second, arguably more 
devastating, harm of hermeneutical silencing is revealed. I characterise this second harm as 
embodied dissonance, as it targets the marginalised knower’s embodied experience of the 
world (their being-in-the-world).  
In the second half of the dissertation, I establish the far-reaching implications this type of 
silencing has for one particular group of marginalised knowers: those with psychiatric illness. 
Due to the powerful sanist attitudes embedded within Western culture, people with 
psychiatric illness are pushed to the very fringes of society. From these outskirts, they are 
rendered less likely to enter higher education or find employment and have an increased risk 
of crime victimisation, poverty, homelessness, poor physical health, and premature death 
(Mental Health Foundation, 2016). The emerging literature on epistemic injustice in 
psychiatric illness has demonstrated that such systematic stigmatisation (what Fricker calls 
‘tracker prejudices’) makes people with psychiatric illness especially vulnerable to credibility 
deflation, which contributes towards these social and economic risk factors in previously 
undetected ways (Crichton et al. 2016). I then offer a detailed account of the hermeneutical 
inequalities that permeate the lives of those with psychiatric illness. I argue that in its most 
extreme form, structurally imposed hermeneutical marginalisation in psychiatric healthcare 
can effectively silence the very people the healthcare system seeks to protect. In turn, 
applying this framework to psychiatry brings into focus the complex role hermeneutical 
silencing can play in the lives of those who already experience a drastically altered being-in-
the-world in virtue of their illness. Finally, I propose that this account of hermeneutical 
silencing can inform therapeutic strategies in psychiatric care, with a focus on re-examining 
communicative practices.  
 




In this dissertation, I develop a cumulative argument for the set of processes I dub 
hermeneutical silencing and its phenomenological impact. The dissertation is divided into 
two parts. Part One (chapters 1-3) develops a robust account of hermeneutical silencing and 
examines its phenomenological ramifications on marginalised knowers in a range of social 
contexts. Part Two (chapters 4-5) applies this framework to examine hermeneutical silencing 
specifically in the psychiatric healthcare system. Overall, by bringing a phenomenological 
method to the field of epistemic injustice, I hope to identify a distinct form of silencing, the 
impact of which is more profound than what has been described to date. 
To develop an account of silencing, we must begin by asking: what happens in a case of 
successful speech expression? As a fundamental aspect of our existence, speech expression 
is, for the most part, experientially invisible. Most of us rely on speech expression throughout 
our day. In the space of a few minutes, I might order a coffee, make small talk in a lift, and 
shout ‘ouch!’ when someone stands on my foot. For many of us, these expressions are 
effortless. We only reflect upon speech expression once it is interrupted. Perhaps I cannot 
remember the name of the type of coffee I want to order. Or the small talk I make in the lift is 
misunderstood. When a speech expression is successful, however, it escapes our attention or 
at least is performed effortlessly.  
Due to the taken for granted nature of successful speech expression, the mechanisms that 
drive it are difficult to observe. Only through a phenomenological method, the study of lived 
experience, can such taken-for-granted aspects of our lives be thoroughly examined. So, to 
answer the question ‘what happens in a case of successful speech expression?’, Chapter One 
recounts Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of speech expression (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). I 
start with a brief history of phenomenology. I then illustrate how Merleau-Ponty’s 
predecessors informed his work and how he remedied their shortcomings. From this section 
emerges Merleau-Ponty’s distinct phenomenological method that locates subjectivity not in 
the mind but in the body (ibid). After establishing Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
framework, the chapter explicates the function of speech expression and its role as a central 
theme in Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body. According to Merleau-Ponty, speech can be 
understood as a ‘bodily gesture’; a way in which the subject can employ their body to engage 
with the world (ibid). What Merleau-Ponty’s analysis achieves is an understanding of speech 
expression as underpinning the way we encounter the world.  
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Chapter Two explores how an oppressed individual can be robbed of this essential human 
capacity though epistemic silencing. I begin with Fricker’s account of ‘two kinds of silence’, 
where she identifies ‘pre-emptive testimonial injustice’ and ‘epistemic objectification’ as 
forms of silencing that can result from testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007). As an account of 
epistemic silencing unfolds, I show that ‘epistemic objectification’ is an ill-fitting concept 
within an epistemic account of silencing. I argue that if epistemic objectification is an 
epistemic harm, then it is unclear that it is a form of silencing, and if it is a form of silencing, 
then it is unclear that it ought to be framed epistemically. Consequently, I reject epistemic 
objectification as a form of epistemic silencing. After addressing the concerns raised by 
Fricker’s critics, I advance my own, stricter definition of epistemic silencing. Within this 
revised definition, I develop an account of hermeneutical silencing that I distinguish from 
non-silencing forms of hermeneutical injustice already present in the literature.  
Drawing on the two preceding chapters, Chapter Three articulates the phenomenological 
harm of hermeneutical silencing. The Chapter begins by devising a concept of ‘hermeneutical 
privilege’ and embedding it within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of speech expression 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Hermeneutical resources are created and sustained by members of 
privileged groups, and as such, are designed to express privileged experiences. Armed with 
hermeneutical resources, the privileged knower has the freedom to throw their body into an 
act of speech expression across all domains. This capacity for uninhibited speech expression 
underpins the body-world synthesis, and as such, the hermeneutically privileged can move 
through the world with a pre-reflective openness. Hermeneutical privilege is then contrasted 
with hermeneutical silencing, where the marginalised knower is structurally barred from 
employing their body in an act of speech expression in certain, crucial areas of their life. With 
a restricted capacity for speech expression, the marginalised knower’s patterns of 
embodiment are disrupted. Consequently, they are unable to engage with the world in the 
same way as their privileged counterparts. I argue that because speech expression is a 
fundamental aspect of embodiment, hermeneutical silencing constitutes a breakdown of the 
body-world synthesis for marginalised knowers.   
The final two chapters of the dissertation apply this account of hermeneutical silencing to 
psychiatric healthcare. Chapter Four brings into focus the systematic and insidious forms of 
epistemic injustice that are rife in Western mental health systems. I begin by tracing the 
historical development of the asymmetrical doctor-patient relationship in psychiatric 
healthcare, first by drawing on Foucault, then on more contemporary accounts (Foucault, 
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2001) (Greenberg, 2013). This analysis reveals the epistemic privilege afforded to the 
psychiatric professional, whereby their epistemic contributions are given undue credibility. 
This epistemic privilege bestows upon the clinician the authority to decide ‘what type of 
testimonies to receive and from whom’ (Carel & Kidd, 2014: 530). Consequently, the risk is 
that certain patient testimonies are not afforded the credibility they deserve. I put forward two 
examples of how such testimonial injustice can occur in the following domains: sexual abuse 
claims and suicide claims in psychiatric healthcare. Finally, I explore how positive, rather 
than negative, identity prejudice can elicit a distinct form of epistemic injustice, heretofore 
absent from the literature. Such positive identity prejudice can give rise to trivialisation, 
which in turn can cause further testimonial injustice, as well as a unique form of wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance. With an account of epistemic injustice in place, we can examine the 
complex and covert role of hermeneutical silencing in psychiatric healthcare next.  
Chapter Five applies the framework for hermeneutical silencing to psychiatric healthcare, 
demonstrating the full extent of its phenomenological ramifications. The chapter begins by 
acknowledging that something in the very nature of psychiatric illness makes it difficult to 
communicate, irrespective of epistemic injustice. The rich literature on the phenomenology of 
illness regards the communicative difficulties that accompany psychiatric illness to be a 
product of ‘unworlding’: the experience of a drastic change in one’s habitual field of 
experience (Sass, 1990). I argue that the relationship between speech expression and being-
in-the-world in psychiatric illness is more complex than previously assumed. As I 
demonstrate, not only does ‘unworlding’ cause a breakdown in speech expression, but a 
breakdown in speech expression can perpetuate, and even exacerbate, the experience of 
‘unworlding’ characteristic of psychiatric illness. In other words, I identify a two-way 
relationship between ‘unworlding’ and silencing. I then use Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
of speech expression to demonstrate how hermeneutical silencing can elicit a severing of the 
body-world synthesis for the person with psychiatric illness.  
The final section asks, ‘how can we overcome hermeneutical silencing in psychiatric 
healthcare?’ As Svenaeus observes, ‘the goal of medicine is to make the experienced body, 
world, and life story of the patient less alien’ (Svenaeus, 2018: xi). I propose that the 
therapeutic practices grounded in phenomenological psychopathology offer a means of 
moving towards this goal by alleviating the experience of ‘unworlding’ for the psychiatric 
patient (Svenaeus et al. 2019). At the core of phenomenology is an appreciation of the first-
person perspective for understanding complex lived world experiences. Consequently, 
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phenomenological psychopathology combats hermeneutical marginalisation by honouring the 
first-person perspective of the psychiatric patient. I demonstrate that phenomenology can help 
in the struggle to overcome hermeneutical silencing by allowing the patient to formulate 
alternative ways of interpreting their illness, thus filling the hermeneutical lacunas that 
silenced them. I understand this to be an act of what Medina calls ‘hermeneutical resistance’ 
(Medina, 2017). I do not propose that such therapeutic practices can eliminate the experience 
of ‘unworlding’ in psychiatric illness. However, I do suggest that insight-oriented and 
language-based methods can help alleviate it and aid the patient in making sense of their 
experience. 
A final note is needed before I begin. In this dissertation, I heed the following warning from 
Dotson: ‘When addressing and identifying forms of epistemic oppression one needs to 
endeavor not to perpetuate epistemic oppression’ (Dotson, 2012: 24). This caution arises 
from accusations against Fricker for unintentionally minimising, or altogether excluding, 
marginalised voices outside white feminist philosophy. It is true that the paradigmatic 
examples offered by Fricker, thereafter preserved in the field of epistemic injustice, fail to 
acknowledge the intersectionality of the identity prejudices that drive them. Berenstain makes 
this charge against Fricker, using her case-study of sexual harassment as an example: ‘Fricker 
focuses solely on how the gap in the shared hermeneutical resources harms “women” and 
ignores the intersection of sexism with racism, ableism, citizenship, and economic 
vulnerability under capitalism’ (Berenstain, 2020: 728). Thus, only by acknowledging the 
role intersectional, overlapping identity prejudices play in epistemic oppression can we get a 
complete picture of the epistemic harms inflicted upon marginalised groups.  
Moreover, Fricker does not fully recognise the contribution of other marginalised groups to 
the concept of epistemic injustice she develops. As previously noted, there is a wealth of 
research on silencing conducted by people of colour that has been essential for informing our 
understanding of epistemic oppression, yet it is not discussed in Fricker’s work. Due to the 
pathbreaking nature of Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing (2007), Fricker 
has successfully revived the philosophical study of epistemic oppression; but by only 
crediting her white feminist predecessors, much of the emerging literature on epistemic 
injustice takes its starting point from these philosophers.  
While I draw upon Fricker’s framework, I am thus cautious about inheriting a biased 
conceptual landscape. As previously established, my dissertation aims to construct an 
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understanding of hermeneutical silencing at the intersection of epistemic injustice and 
phenomenology. Through the construction of this concept in these first three chapters, I strive 
to include a wide variety of case studies that demonstrate the epistemic injustice that emerges 
from a large span of identity prejudices. In doing so, I hope to avoid privileging certain 
experiences over others. Moreover, in developing a more robust understanding of 
hermeneutical silencing, I acknowledge the voices that preceded the field of epistemic 
injustice, particularly those from the Black feminist tradition that influences my account. 
Through this ameliorative strategy, I hope to avoid further perpetuating the epistemic 


























Imagine immigrating to a foreign country without knowing the language. You arrive to find 
the environment around you appears strange and unfamiliar. You are struck by uncanny 
features of the landscape and objects in your vicinity that those at home in this country pass 
by unnoticed. While you are accustomed to confidently moving through your environment 
with ease, you move with caution and heightened attention in this foreign country as you 
navigate this unfamiliar terrain.  Initially, this observation may appear philosophically 
uninteresting: of course, you would be unable to identify certain objects due to their cultural 
signification.  Nor would you be able to communicate with others, thus restricting your 
ability to form interpersonal relationships. However, say these particular hurdles are 
overcome by acquiring a comprehensive guide to the culture and acquiring a book of 
translation; I suggest you would still be unable to fully belong to this world because ‘being-
in-the-world’ requires embodying the language of that world.    
The concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ was first introduced by Heidegger to denote the cohesive 
whole of subject and their environment. According to Heidegger, the subject (Dasein) does 
not merely ‘inhabit’ the world, like a person positioned in a space, but ‘dwells’ in the world, 
like a person belonging to a home and experiencing a ‘simple oneness’ with their 
surroundings: ‘ich bin, du bist mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, 
the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Bauen, dwelling’ (Heidegger, 1971: 147). 
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of speech expression, the purpose of this 
chapter is to show that this essential ‘dwelling’ in the world is underpinned by language. 
More specifically, it is underpinned by the capacity for speech expression.  
To unpack this idea further, let’s examine Searle’s ‘Chinese room argument’ through a 
phenomenological lens. Searle paints a picture of a subject alone in a room with a computer 
programme that translates Chinese characters. Although she cannot understand a word of 
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Chinese, when Chinese characters are slipped under the door, she can use the computer 
programme to reply appropriately. Consequently, the outside world is deceived into thinking 
that there is a Chinese speaker in the room (Searle, 1980). The purpose of this argument is to 
refute the existence of ‘Strong AI’, the claim that a computer could have the capacity to 
‘understand’ language. In 2010 Searle revisited the Chinese room argument to explore its 
wider implications:  ‘Computation is defined purely formally or syntactically, whereas minds 
have actual mental or semantic contents, and we cannot get from syntactical to the semantic 
just by having the syntactical operations and nothing else’ (Searle, 2010: 17). In other words, 
the meaning of language is not derived from syntax or linguistic rules. Rather, Searle argues 
that language ought to be treated as an inherited biological capacity. As such, Searle 
implicitly ties an understanding of language to consciousness, as the human being is an 
essentially linguistic creature.  
 Although not the intention of his argument, one can easily extend the broad strokes of 
Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ analogy to discussion on the phenomenological significance of 
language. If language is merely a matter of pointing to objects in the world and identifying 
them with names, we could claim that the person in the room can indeed speak Chinese. 
However, this claim would be false: ‘A system… would not acquire an understanding of 
Chinese just by going through the steps of a computer program that simulated the behaviour 
of a Chinese speaker’ (Searle, 2010: 17). So, what makes language meaningful? I believe we 
can find the answer in the following observation by Merleau-Ponty:  
 The full sense of a language is never translatable into another. We can speak several 
languages, but one of them always remains the one in which we live. In order to wholly 
assimilate a language, it would be necessary to take up the world it expresses, and we never 
belong to two worlds at the same time (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 193, my italics). 
In line with Merleau-Ponty, I propose that to ‘wholly assimilate’ (to truly live) a language 
requires a ‘taking up of the world’, a dwelling in the environment.  Language is the core 
structure of our being-in-the-world. It is a form of bodily comportment that discloses the 
meaning of the world and is therefore central to our ability to move through our environment 
with a pre-reflective openness.  For this reason, the meaning of one language can never be 
fully translatable to the meaning of another as this would require existing in two different 
worlds at the same time.  
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To argue that a person could, of course, be bilingual or multilingual, and therefore belong to 
more than one world due to their immersion in multiple languages, would be to 
misunderstand Merleau-Ponty. Rather, Merleau-Ponty argues that a person cannot 
simultaneously dwell in more than one world. This can be likened to the duck-rabbit illusion 
made famous by Wittgenstein: one can see the image of both a duck and a rabbit in the 
picture; however, one can never see a duck at the same time as seeing a rabbit, and vice versa 
(Wittgenstein, 2009: 400).  Similarly, a person can only be immersed in one linguistic world 
at a time.  Drawing on the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty has introduced a theme which 
will go on to play a central role in his phenomenology: our ‘being-in-the-world’ is essentially 
linguistic.   
‘The Body as Expression, and Speech’ in Phenomenology of Perception (1945) acts as a 
crescendo to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion on the embodied subject. This often-overlooked 
chapter not only ties together the preceding ideas on the relationship between subject, body 
and world but ultimately paints a fully formed portrait of the embodied subject.  Merleau-
Ponty opens the chapter with the objective to ‘leave behind, once and for all, the classical 
subject-object dichotomy’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 179). Through this chapter, Merleau-Ponty 
reveals not only that the speaking subject is fundamental to bridging the gap between mind 
and body but that speech expression underpins the embodied subject’s relationship with the 
world. The role of language in the embodied subject’s ‘being-in-the-world’ remained an 
overarching theme throughout Merleau-Ponty’s later work, most notably in Sense and Non-
Sense (1948), Signs (1960), Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language (1964) and The 
Visible and the Invisible (1964). The sudden surge of work on language toward the end of his 
life, and the unfinished, posthumously published The Prose of the World (1964), suggests the 
special place speech expression holds in his phenomenological theory. Yet, comparatively 
little attention is paid to the theme of language in the application of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology. The purpose of my first chapter is to redress this fundamental aspect of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, without which we cannot fully understand his conception of the 
embodied subject.  
Due to the evolving methodology and lack of static interpretation of the phenomenological 
tradition, I begin by outlining a brief history of phenomenology. I illustrate how Merleau-
Ponty’s predecessors inform his work and how he remedies their shortcomings. From this 
section emerges Merleau-Ponty’s distinct phenomenological method that locates subjectivity, 
not in the mind, but the body, as the ‘vehicle of being in the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
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84). After establishing Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological framework, the chapter will then 
explicate the function of speech expression and its role in the ‘body schema’; a blueprint of 
our bodily possibilities that determines how we can engage with the world. I then conduct a 
closer examination of the subject- world relationship that Merleau-Ponty constructs. Here I 
will consider the paradoxical nature of expression, as speech expression not only draws from 
the world but simultaneously shapes the world. The chapter concludes with a distinction 
between ‘spoken speech’ (the refuse of previously uttered speech expressions) and ‘speaking 
speech’ (a spontaneous and creative acts of ‘first-hand’ meaning-making). Ultimately, what 
Merleau-Ponty will help us achieve here is the grounds for an account of meaning, which will 
allow us to identify a case of meaning-breakdown in later chapters.  
 
1.1. The Phenomenological Method 
 
Phenomenology translates as the ‘logos’ (the science of) the ‘phenomena’ (appearances). The 
object of phenomenology, then, is the study of appearances. Naturally, appearances must 
appear to something, and phenomenologists identify this something as subjectivity. This 
prompts the question: what method should we employ to best examine these given 
phenomena? There is no fixed response to this question as phenomenology is an evolving 
methodology. As such, it is best to examine how the answer to this question takes shape over 
time through Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.  
1.1.1.  A Brief History of Phenomenology  
 
The phenomenological tradition has its roots in the philosophy of Husserl, who begins his 
line of enquiry with the first step of the Cartesian method of doubt:  
Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not 
completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently 
false. So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of 
them at least some reason for doubt (Descartes, 2013: 23).  
Stimulated by this line of thought, Husserl concludes that to conduct a successful 
philosophical investigation, we ought to cast aside our preconceptions about the external 
world.  Engaging broadly with Kantian philosophy, Husserl seeks an apriori truth: the ‘life-
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world’, which can be found by re-examining the phenomena that we take for granted. 
Through transcendental (rather than empirical) data, we can uncover new meanings beneath 
our habitual interactions with the world. 2 
It is here that Husserl diverges from the Cartesian method, as he claims ‘while it leads to the 
transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings the ego into view as apparently empty of 
content… so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it’ (Husserl, 1970: 
155).  In response, Husserl uses a phenomenological analysis to posit that consciousness is, in 
fact, full of content, using a first-person perspective to describe the external world as it is 
experienced. He establishes the object of phenomenology as a pure description of how 
phenomena appear to consciousness. In the words of Laverty, ‘Phenomenology… was seen 
as a movement away from the Cartesian dualism of reality being something ‘out there’ or 
completely separate from the individual’ (Laverty, 2003: 23). Instead, Husserl posits that the 
subject and the world are irrevocably intertwined.  
This line of reasoning led Husserl to introduce his phenomenological method of the ‘epoché’ 
or ‘bracketing’. The epoché requires a suspension of habitual assumptions about the external 
world or the ‘natural attitude’ in Husserlian terms. The natural attitude consists of ‘practical 
objects of every sort: streets with street lights, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools 
and so forth’ (Husserl, 1970: 78).  In adopting a ‘bracketed’ perspective of these objects, one 
can reflect upon the hidden structures of lived experience and how the world presents itself to 
us. We are confronted by just such bracketing when objects that were once part of our natural 
attitude become outdated relics, such as telephone boxes or fax machines. Outside the natural 
attitude, we experience ‘the things themselves’ (Husserl, 2001: 168).  
Husserl’s move away from Cartesian dualism was revelatory for the phenomenological 
tradition. The upshot was that, in trying to establish phenomenology as a scientific method, 
Husserl fell prey to the same pitfalls he recognised in other traditions that attempted to apply 
the natural sciences to human issues. In Husserl’s work, a conflict emerged between 
establishing phenomenology as a rigorous scientific method and successfully describing lived 
experience. For Husserl, we ought to suspend our intuitions regarding the world and our 
social, cultural and historical context as it impedes our access to phenomena.  Heidegger, on 
the other hand,  argues that such an approach provides only a narrow view of human 
 
2 Following the Kantian tradition, empirical data captures that which can be examined in the sensible world and 
is accessible to the intellect. Transcendental data captures that which is accessible to the senses. 
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existence. Rather, Heidegger asserts that consciousness is structured by historically lived 
experience and thus cannot be divorced from the world through a suspension of the natural 
attitude. The world itself is our source of meaning, and as such, Heidegger redirected the 
phenomenological tradition toward ‘the situated meaning of a human in the world’ 
(Heidegger, 1996: 40).  
To put it another way, Heidegger shifts the focus in phenomenology from phenomena in the 
world to the subject themselves, or ‘Dasein’: 
Dasein is never ‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which 
sometimes has the inclination to take up a ‘relationship’ towards the world. Taking up 
relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as 
it is. (Heidegger, 1996: 80).  
In this passage, Heidegger introduces a distinction between his and Husserl’s understanding 
of how the world appears meaningful to the subject. Husserl places emphasis on the manner 
in which the subject acts as a knower of the world and can come to understand it, whereas 
Heidegger posits that meaning is part of our very structure of ‘being-in-the-world’: ‘meaning 
is found as we are constructed by the world while at the same time we are constructing this 
world from our own background and experiences’ (Laverty, 2003: 24).  Heidegger rejected 
Husserl’s ‘epoché’ because the subject could never set aside their ‘life-world’. One’s social, 
cultural and historical context is inseparable from one’s understanding of the world; indeed, 
‘it is this “structure of the world”, as the purposive or instrumental whole in terms of which 
humans make sense of their environment and themselves’ (Inkpin, 2016: 28). Husserl’s 
epoché entails the impossible: an abstraction from subject and world.  
With the trajectory of Husserl and Heidegger briefly sketched, we are now making our way 
toward a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological method. According to Low, ‘Merleau-Ponty 
was among the most Heideggerian of the French philosophers of his generation since he 
adopts Heidegger's ekstasis characterization of human existence, i.e., the subject's active 
transcendence toward the world’ (Low, 2009: 273). Despite the close resemblance between 
the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, there was little fruitful dialogue between the two 
(Aho, 2005).  For this reason, there has been a keen interest amongst continental philosophers 
to uncover the relationship between Merleau-Pontian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The 
full scope of this discussion will not be covered here; rather, my aim in the following section 
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is to give a flavour of how Heidegger and Husserl influenced Merleau-Ponty, and how their 
work diverged.  
1.1.2.  Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
 
Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty finds a flaw in Husserl’s scientific approach. He argues 
‘perception is not a science of the world… it is the background against which all acts stand 
out and is thus presupposed by them’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxiv). Merleau-Ponty sets 
himself apart from Husserl from the offset by claiming in the preface of Phenomenology of 
Perception: ‘the most important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxvii). Echoing Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty identifies a 
contradiction at the heart of the epoché, since it proposes the examination of being-in-the-
world through a non-situated lens- a view from nowhere. After all, ‘Is not to see always to 
see from somewhere?’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 238). 3  
In line with this observation and calling back to the Cartesian method, Merleau-Ponty argues 
that ‘if I cannot equal in thought the concrete richness of the world and reabsorb facticity, 
then I am not a constituting thought and my ‘I think’ is not an ‘I am’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
394, n18). If we could indeed achieve some pure consciousness by bracketing our view of the 
world and suspending our natural assumptions, Husserl is proposing a form of general, non-
situated consciousness. Such a general consciousness would entail no clear distinction 
between an existence as myself from an existence of all other entities in the world, from an 
‘I’ to the existence of an ‘Other’: ‘I am neither here nor there, neither Pierre nor Paul; in no 
way do I distinguish myself from “another” consciousness’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxv). 
Such a view is impossible to imagine as the concept of ‘Other’, pertaining either to objects or 
other people, is not devoid of meaning. We have confidence in our existence as an ‘I’ and can 
clearly distinguish ourselves in the mirror from other objects and subjects in the world 
because our experience of ‘I’ is essentially embodied: 
 when I experience myself, and when I experience others, there is in fact a common 
denominator. In both cases I am dealing with embodiment and one of the features of my 
embodied subjectivity is that it, per definition, entails acting and living in the world. 
(Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012: 206). 
 
3 Although this remark was in response to Leibniz’s proposal for a view from nowhere rather than Husserl’s, the 
criticism applies just a well to the Husserlian phenomenological reduction.  
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 The ‘epoché’ misses the embodied, situated nature of consciousness not just as a being-in-
the-world (as Heidegger observes) but as a lived body.  
Through this focus on the lived body, Merleau-Ponty departs from Heideggerian 
phenomenology. By their very nature, direct phenomena must be experienced by an 
embodied subject situated in the world, for it is the body that perceives. In the words of 
Smith: ‘What is therefore at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception, in a way 
that is not in Husserl’s, is existence, or being-in-the-world, conceived in terms of motility’ 
(Smith, 2007: 17).  This, too, is how Merleau-Ponty distinguishes himself from Heidegger; 
while Heidegger erased the distinction between subject and world, Merleau-Ponty erased the 
distinction between body and world.4  
It is for this reason that a pure reduction, fully brought to consciousness, is impossible. 
However, that is not to say that Merleau-Ponty wholly rejects Husserl’s epoché. What he 
rejects is a complete transcendental reduction. Rather than attempting to divorce subjectivity 
from the body, Merleau-Ponty draws out the core purpose of the epoché: stepping back from 
our tacit and habitual understanding of the world. This ‘distancing’ allows the embodied 
subject to see beyond the habitual practices of meaning-making, turning a lens to direct 
phenomena. It is this form of reduction that Merleau-Ponty employs throughout his 
phenomenological method; a reduction that performs a vital function in uncovering the nature 
of expression:  
Husserl’s entire misunderstanding with his interpreters…and ultimately with himself, comes 
from the fact that we must-precisely in order to see the world and grasp it as a paradox- 
rupture our familiarity with it, and this rupture can teach us nothing but the unmotivated 
springing forth of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxvii).  
In this passage, Merleau-Ponty introduces a theme that will play a central role within his 
phenomenological analysis: the Merleau-Pontian form of phenomenological reduction gives 
rise to the paradoxical structures of expression that underscore our lived experience of the 
world. Landes defines the paradoxical logic of expression as ‘the endless movement of 
 
4 It has been argued in recent literature than Heidegger’s later work does consider the embodied subject: ‘It is 
now clear that Heidegger took seriously the criticism that Being and Time did not adequately address the human 
body. He addresses this criticism in the Zollikon Seminars and provides a brief outline of an existential theory of 
the body, one that bears a striking similarity to Merleau-Ponty's’ (Low, 2009: 273). Nevertheless, the role of the 
body is secondary in Heidegger’s phenomenology: an account of the traditional materialistic conception of the 
body (Körper) is irrelevant to Heidegger’s core concern, which is the ‘question of being’ (Seinsfrage)’ (Aho, 




philosophy itself, a hyper-dialectic that never comes to rest, the constant and forever abortive 
attempt to close the gap between what we live and what we say’ (Landes, 2013: 3). The 
paradoxes of expression will repeatedly emerge throughout this chapter, as paradoxical logic 
runs through all Merleau-Pontian discussions of the subject-world synthesis; none more so 
than in speech expression.  
From Husserl, Merleau-Ponty inherits a descriptive phenomenological method: ‘the relation 
to the world, such as it tirelessly announces itself within us, is not something that analysis 
might clarify: philosophy can simply place it before our eyes and invite us to take notice’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxxii). The object of the phenomenological method is a description, 
rather than explanation, of the unique embodied experience.  Husserl rejects an explanatory 
method that makes inferences and draws conclusions because it goes beyond the direct 
phenomena that phenomenology seeks to uncover.  Whereas from the Heideggerian 
framework, Merleau-Ponty draws out an implicit tie between subject and world: in virtue of 
being a subject, we are ‘destined to a world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxiv). The world 
presents itself with an implicit meaning-for-us; meaning structures immerse the embodied 
subject in the world and allow the subject to move through it with a pre-reflective openness. 
What’s more, the world does not present itself with an apriori meaning independent from the 
subject. On the contrary, we are the source of meaning in the world: ‘my existence does not 
come from my antecedents, nor from my physical and social surroundings; it moves out 
towards them and sustains them’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxiii).  
By introducing Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the essentially ‘embodied’ way we move through 
the world, we can conclude that every bodily expression, each word and gesture, is saturated 
with meaning. In being directed outward, our bodily expressions achieve a place in the world. 
We are both ‘condemned to meaning’ and the source of it, in virtue of our being-in-the-
world: ‘my body is made of the same flesh of the world…this flesh of my body is shared by 
the world, the world reflects it, encroaches upon it and encroaches upon the world,’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 248). The Merleau-Pontian conception of meaning-making requires 
further investigation, but first, let us take a closer look at the defining feature of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology: the embodied subject.   




As established in the previous section, Merleau-Ponty launches his phenomenological 
method by identifying ‘subject’ and ‘world’ as irrevocably bound together. Following this, he 
can make a radical move in the phenomenological tradition by locating subjectivity, not in 
consciousness, but the body. We are ‘destined’ to the world in virtue of being an embodied 
subject: ‘we experience our bodies as a “necessary condition” for perceiving things, as a vital, 
dynamic source before which things in the world surge up and recede’ (Hass, 2008: 76).  
Merleau-Ponty identifies two aspects of the body: on the one hand, I have a body, and on the 
other hand, I am a body. The former is the uncontroversial understanding of the body as an 
object: my body has size, weight, form, colour and spatial location. Like an object among 
other objects, my body can be encountered by other bodies. This understanding of the body is 
from a third-person perspective. As previously discussed, this objective understanding of the 
body is necessary to distinguish the ‘I’ of their own body and the body of Others. Unlike an 
object, however, my body is the source of my subjective existence: ‘the body, by 
withdrawing from the objective world, will carry with it intentional threads that unite it to its 
surroundings’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 74).  As a subject, we ‘transcend’ our objective body 
with an openness toward the world. When engaged in a task, the objective experience of the 
body is pushed to the periphery of one’s attention. Consider a tennis player who lunges 
toward the ball in a pure, fluid motion. She does not focus on herself as an objective body but 
as a subjective ‘I’ that can interact with the ball. This experience of transcendence is best 
captured by Iris Marion Young as she illuminates the transcendence of subjectivity in 
contrast to a failure to transcend one’s body. In this case, Young exemplifies a female body 
that is unable to achieve this subjective ‘I’:  
a woman typically refrains from throwing her whole body into a motion and rather 
concentrates motion in one part of the body alone, while the rest of the body remains 
relatively immobile. Only part of the body, that is, moves out toward a task, while the rest 
remains rooted in immanence (Young, 2005: 36). 
 Subjective existence, on the other hand, ‘is pure fluid action, the continuous calling-forth of 
capacities that are applied to the world’ (ibid.).  
It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty does not imply that we can experience either the 
body as objective or subjective. A state of full objectivity or full subjectivity can never be 
achieved; one experiences the world neither objectively through an observer’s point of view 
nor as a detached ‘I’. Rather, Merleau-Ponty overcomes the subject-object dichotomy to form 
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a ‘third way’, through which the subjective body and the objective body propel themselves 
toward the world in what Scheler refers to as an ‘expressive unity’ of the embodied subject 
(Scheler, 1954: 261). Beyond pure subjectivity or objectivity, this third dimension is known 
as the ‘lived-through world, which is prior to the objective one’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 69). 
This expressive unity organises our meaningful experience of the world and allows us to live 
in what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘an “open” situation’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 81).  
The ‘lived-through world’ is mediated by the ‘body schema’: ‘a sort of inner diaphragm’ that 
‘determines what our reflexes and our perceptions will be able to aim at in the world, the 
zone of our possible operations, and the scope of our life’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 81). 
Gallagher and Zahavi confront the interchangeability between the terms ‘body schema’ and 
‘body image’ in translations of Phenomenology of Perception and set out to distinguish 
between the two terms. Body image is a certain attitude toward one’s body and regards the 
subject’s ‘perceptual experience’, ‘conceptual understanding’ and ‘emotional attitude’ toward 
their body (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012: 164). This description does not reflect Merleau-
Ponty’s account of the body schema as a pre-reflective awareness of bodily constitution ‘in 
the inter-sensory world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 102). The body schema acts as a blueprint to 
a system of bodily skills needed to interact with the environment, adjusting almost 
automatically to the task at hand. The body schema predisposes the simplest of actions, such 
as sitting down on a chair. I do not need to attend to my body in preparation to take a seat 
because the body schema simply embraces objects in the environment spontaneously: ‘I 
engage myself with my body among things, they co-exist with me insofar as I am an 
embodied subject’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 191). As the body schema adapts to the new 
environment, the body and environment form an expressive unity. Given this ‘expressive 
unity’, the subject largely experiences their body as transparent. As we usually do not 
consciously attend to habitual tasks like crossing the room, opening the door or switching on 
a light, the body is hidden from our attention. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, ‘the bodily 
mediation most frequently escapes me’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1963: 188).  
For Merleau-Ponty, the intentional directedness of bodily activity is known as motor 
intentionality, which comes from the Latin ‘intendo’ meaning to extend, stretch or direct 
one’s course: ‘in these cases, there is a particular form of bodily understanding of objects and 
environments - as well as our situatedness within these environments - that allows us to be 
immediately open and responsive to the things happening around us’ (Krueger, 2018: 7). The 
objects in the world that motor intentionality is directed toward appear to the embodied 
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subject as offering certain opportunities for interaction- these are known as ‘affordances’ 
(Gibson, 1968). Gallagher and Zahavi provide the following example: 
In a particular instance I may see the [car] as a practical vehicle that I can use to get me to 
where I’m going. In another instance I may see the exact same object as something I have to 
clean, or as something I have to sell, or as something that is not working properly (Gallagher 
& Zahavi, 2012: 8). 
 The body schema is the body’s grasp of its possibilities to interact with the affordances, 
which underpins the harmonious engagement of body and world.  
The way objects appear to the subject is influenced by what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the 
embodied subject’s particular ‘style’: ‘my phenomena solidify in a thing and follow a certain 
constant style in their unfolding – that is, to this open unity of the world, an open and 
indefinite unity of subjectivity must correspond’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 429, my italics). 5 
For Merleau-Ponty, the world is coloured in a certain way for the subject, and their 
experience of the world unfolds according to this tone. The life of a superstitious person, for 
example, would take a unique hue. Certain things in the world would present themselves as 
unlucky, say, a black cat or stepping on pavement cracks. In contrast, other things would 
present themselves as lucky, like an upturned horseshoe. In turn, for the superstitious person, 
a crack in the pavement presents itself as something to be jumped over, and a black cat 
presents itself as something to be shooed away. The fact that these objects appear in this way 
to the superstitious person guides their actions (influencing them to jump over cracks and 
shoo away black cats). Through their unique coloured lens, the subject is encouraged to 
engage with the environment in a particular way and take up the possibilities the world offers 
them.  
It is important to note that the subject-world relationship Merleau-Ponty illustrates is not a 
unidirectional one: ‘neither [world nor self] would be what it is without the other’ (Priest, 
2003: 74).  On the one hand, the world offers the subject affordances that inform how the 
subject employs her body in the world. On the other hand, subjectivity is projected outward, 
toward the world, as an expression of existence: ‘expression…is Merleau-Ponty’s master 
term for a creative, productive cognitive power - a power that is rooted in the excess of 
embodied perceptual life’ (Hass, 2008: 172).  Just as the world offers meaningful affordances 
 
5 Merleau-Ponty refers to ‘style’ in a number of different capacities through-out his work and it is not limited to 
the manner in which the world appears to the subject. It denotes the manner in which a structure of expression is 
coloured, be it one’s bodily style, artistic style, philosophical style, temporal style etc.(Merleau-Ponty, 2012).   
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to the body, the body outputs meaningful bodily expression to the world. The following 
section will take a closer look at the form of bodily expression central to the body-world 
synthesis and fundamental to meaningful engagement with the world; that of speech 
expression.  
1.2.  Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of Speech Expression 
 
As we have seen, the body is the infrastructure of all expressive activity. I argue that the most 
fundamental of these bodily expressions is speech expression, and its significance in 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is vastly underestimated. Inkpin raises the objection that 
Merleau-Ponty ‘fails to distinguish linguistic sense from that of other embodied behaviour’ 
(Inkpin, 2016: 107). I hope it will become clear in this section how Merleau-Ponty sets 
speech expression apart from other bodily expressions as the means ‘for the human body to 
celebrate the world and finally live it’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 193). Characteristic of Merleau-
Ponty’s approach, he begins by targeting the empiricist and intellectualist position on 
language acquisition. According to Merleau-Ponty, both share the assumption that the spoken 
word has ‘no meaning’ in itself. Merleau-Ponty’s seeks to correct this assumption in order to 
clear the way for his claim: ‘the word has a sense’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 182). 
1.2.1.  Empiricism and Intellectualism 
 
Merleau-Ponty sketches an understanding of the empiricist position on speech expression as 
essentially behaviourist. He frames empiricism as positing a causal explanation of speech: a 
form of behaviour in reaction to a certain stimulus. Consider a person who responds to an 
instance of pain by either wincing or shouting the word ‘Ouch!’. For the empiricist, both the 
wince and the cry of ‘Ouch!’ is merely a meaningless behavioural response to the pain 
experience. Accordingly, all language is a behavioural reaction to some internal stimuli. 
Through this conception of empiricism, one could argue that a feeling of happiness acts as a 
catalyst for the subject to say ‘I am happy’: ‘the sense of the words is assumed to be given 
with the stimuli or with the states of consciousness to be named’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 180).  
To uncover the shortcomings of what Merleau-Ponty characterises as the empiricist view, one 
could compare the behaviourist reduction of speech to McDowell’s account of 
communication between ‘creatures to which we would not think of ascribing intentional 
action’ (McDowell, 1998: 40). Consider a bird that squawks in response to an approaching 
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predator. Other birds may act in response to this call by flying away. According to 
McDowell, ‘there is no risk of over-psychologizing our account of the birds – crediting them 
with an inner life – if we regard such behaviour as effecting the transmission of information, 
and hence as constituting a kind of communication’ (ibid). Yet, Merleau-Ponty observes that 
the empiricist view appears to under-psychologise humans, reducing their cognitive status to 
creatures that mindlessly act according to stimuli, like the birds described by McDowell: 
‘[empiricism] does not manifest the inner possibilities of the subject’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
180). In this case, there is no agent, let alone a speaking agent; the subject is redundant. 
Consequently, Merleau-Ponty summarises the empiricist view as follows: ‘there is no one 
who speaks, there is but a flow of words that occurs without any intention to speak governing 
it’ (ibid.).  
Merleau-Ponty sweeps empiricism aside fairly swiftly on the grounds that speech expression 
must be brought about by a speaking subject.  He then turns to his second, perhaps more 
formidable adversary - intellectualism. In contrast to empiricism, the ‘thinking subject’ is the 
locus of the intellectualist position. For the intellectualist, the thinking subject mediates 
meaningful, pre-expressed thought, which is then projected through speech. Language, then, 
acts as a mere vehicle for meaningful thought: ‘the word is no more than the envelope…of 
authentic speech, which is an inner operation’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 182). To illuminate the 
problem with this approach, Merleau-Ponty draws upon the case study of aphasia, a 
neurological impairment that inhibits the subject’s capacity for language comprehension and 
communication. Merleau-Ponty gives the example of a person with aphasia whose limited 
linguistic capacity is restricted to an ability to say ‘no’ as a ‘present and lived negation’ to a 
doctor’s question (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 180). However, the word ‘no’ in this context is a 
form of automatic language and is indeed a mere vehicle for negation. In contrast, the patient 
is unable to use the word ‘no’ in ‘spontaneous’ language, creatively and productively, such as 
to express a negative feeling: 
 there will also be difficulty in saying things in such a way that will bring clarity, accurately 
represent, fulfil and satisfy the lived level of meaning that the subject intends to bring forth 
…It is not so much an understanding prior to words (so that all he needs to say is such and 
such), but rather, an actual bringing things to thought by means of language (Johansson, 1986: 
119).  
Merleau-Ponty argues that the intellectualist conception of language would look like the case 
of aphasia above. The only ‘no’ the patient can articulate is one that acts as a mere container 
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for thought, a ‘raw thought’ (ibid). It is the creative element of speech expression that the 
person with aphasia lacks, which is vital for meaningful expression. By drawing this 
distinction, Merleau-Ponty can discard the intellectualist account as failing to appreciate the 
word as ‘an instrument for action’ with intrinsic meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 180).  
To fill the gap left behind in the linguistic account after we dispose of intellectualism and 
empiricism, Merleau-Ponty announces: ‘we move beyond intellectualism as much as 
empiricism through the simple observation that the word has a sense’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
182).  The meaning of the word is not hidden somewhere between the symbols or in the 
speaker’s mind but saturated in its very expression. The following section will outline how 
Merleau-Ponty arrives at this conclusion.  
 
1.2.2.  The Synthesis of Thought and Speech 
 
As established above, the intellectualist account rests on a misunderstanding of the 
relationship between thought and speech expression. In line with common assumption, the 
intellectualist adopts the mistaken idea that speech is internally pre-expressed through 
thought. It is assumed that within this inner realm meaning is made and then translated into 
speech. In Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of this account, he considers the experience of inner 
speech to be a possible culprit for this common assumption as it prompts the ‘illusion of an 
inner life’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189).6 Rather, Merleau-Ponty claims that there is no 
thought prior to speech expression, other than a ‘vague fever’ or ‘the muted language in 
which being murmurs to us’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 6). These ‘murmurs’ are made 
meaningful only when accomplished through speech expression. While the term ‘vague 
fever’ is vague in itself, Landes goes some way toward explicating it for us:  
 
6 I have explored how ‘inner speech’ can be accommodated in Merleau-Ponty’s account of speech expression 
elsewhere. I argue that while there is no thought prior to speech for Merleau-Ponty, this does not mean that there 
is no presence of words at all within the head. Afterall, the experience of inner speech is what has deluded the 
intellectualist.  I argue that ‘inner speech’ can best be understood by turning to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the 
‘mental image’ detailed in ‘Eye and Mind’.  Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that a ‘mental image’ can occur 
prior to perception; instead ‘mental image’ is ‘the inside of the outside' (Merleau-Ponty, 1993: 126). Mental 
images of things develop either through our experience of it in the world or through the body’s anticipation that 
it could experience it in the world (Romdenh-Romluc, 2015: 12). Only after interaction with the outside world 
can the mental image be internalised and made meaningful. I suggest that, on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding, 
inner speech then is internalised in the same way, as a response to (not prior to) speech expression. The fault of 
the intellectualist is not in recognising speech within the head; it is in identifying this entity as developing 
independent of and prior to speech expression.  
33 
 
 For a subject who can speak, the silence of thought is not a treasure chest of ideas complete 
in themselves and waiting merely to be transposed into arbitrary signs. Rather, there is a 
silence that haunts us as a metastable structure of tensions and possibilities, and this silence 
guides the creative act (Landes, 2013: 3).  
As this passage suggests, the as yet formless murmur, ‘buzzing with words’ lingers prior to 
speech as a pregnant source of potentiality (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189).  It is effectively the 
elusive traces of a forthcoming speech expression. This ‘vague fever’ urges towards 
expression and is accomplished externally. The vague fever is a kind of silence that underlies 
the creative act of speech, and it is from this vague fever speech expression is propelled and 
acquires an external existence in the world.  Thus, it follows that the word is no mere vessel 
for thought but the external accomplishment of thought. A thought prior to expression ‘would 
fall into the unconscious the moment it appears, which amounts to saying that it would not 
even exist for itself’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 183). There is a certain urgency in expression to 
make this ambiguous ‘buzz of words’ public. 
It is worth observing that thought is an act accomplished not only through speech expression 
but through all forms of bodily expression. Merleau-Ponty explores this further by asking the 
reader to consider the physical gesture. For Merleau-Ponty, a gesture is not superfluous to 
thought, or a mere additional flourish. Rather, gesture is thought: ‘the gesture does not make 
me think of anger, it is anger itself’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 190). No inference is necessary. 
This is not to be mistaken for the claim that to observe an instance of anger, through the 
shaking of a fist, for example, is equivalent to having a first-person experience of another 
person’s anger. That would result in an inability to distinguish between the subjective ‘I’ and 
the ‘Other’. In the words of Gallagher and Zahavi, the gesture is ‘saturated with the meaning 
of the mind; it reveals the mind to us’, and in this sense, we experience the emotion as 
directly as we can without first-person access (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012: 207). Therefore, 
gesture does not merely signify meaning but is meaning itself. Prior to the gestural 
expression, the gesture lingered in the subject’s mind as a vague fever and only through 
expression can it achieve reality.  
With a Merleau-Pontian account of gesture established, we can make our way toward an 
understanding of speech expression as a form of bodily gesture. Initially, it may appear trivial 
to identify speech as a facet of the body schema. Speaking is, of course, a corporal act as it 
requires vocal cords amongst other bodily functions to be carried out. More significantly, 
however, speech expression is a manner in which I can employ my body to engage with the 
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world: ‘I relate to the word just as my hand reaches for the place on my body being stung’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 186).  Speech expression is part of the body schema: the possibilities 
of my body, through which I can interact with the complex tapestry of meaning in the world.  
By uttering its name, we reach toward objects in the world, bring them to life and make them 
tangible. Thus, as a form of bodily expression, speech holds gestural meaning: ‘speech is a 
gesture, and its signification is a world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 190).  
At this point, I will register an objection raised by Inkpin. Inkpin argues that Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of language as a bodily gesture is problematic because it is grounded in a tension 
between the individuated character of language as part of one’s body schema, and language 
as ‘distributed, or transindividual’ in nature (Inkpin, 2016: 107). This apparent tension leads 
him to accuse Merleau-Ponty of failing to ‘characterize the linguistic horizon specifically’ 
(ibid). In other words, how can language be both a part of my bodily equipment and an 
institution out there in the world? An answer to this worry lies in Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
‘speaking’ and ‘spoken’ speech expression, where he not only justifies this tension but 
illustrates its central role in meaning-making.   
1.2.3.  Speaking Speech and Spoken Speech  
 
Following his discussion on speech as a bodily gesture, Merleau-Ponty moves on to divide 
the phenomenon of speech expression into two distinct forms: ‘Of course, there are reasons to 
distinguish between an authentic speech, which formulates for the first time, and a secondary 
expression, a speech about speech that makes up the usual basis of empirical language.’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 183, n6). This section will flesh out Merleau-Ponty’s distinction 
between ‘authentic’ (speaking) speech and ‘secondary’ (spoken) speech,  positioning the 
subject within ‘a world already spoken and speaking’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189).  
Speaking speech, also known as ‘authentic’ speech’, is a spontaneous and creative speech-act 
of first-hand meaning-making. In a footnote, Merleau-Ponty exemplifies speaking speech 
through ‘the lover who discovers his emotion’, ‘the “first man who spoke”’ and ‘the writer 
and the philosopher who awaken a primordial experience beneath traditions’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012: 184, n.7).7 These disparate forms of speaking tie together to capture the most original 
 
7 Merleau-Ponty also includes in this list ‘the child uttering his first word’ (ibid). I have not included this 
example in the list as I am unsure if it really ought to count as a case of speaking speech rather than spoken 
speech. While it is a new speech act for the child, the child parrots a common-place, pre-established word such 
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of speech acts, whereby the speaker says something altogether new. Speaking speech is an 
expressive act that contributes towards the meaning structures of the world. It calls forth new 
ways of understanding the world, both for the speaker and the hearer.  
Initially, the concept of authentic speech may appear problematic. Although authentic speech 
shapes new meanings for the first time ‘in a nascent state’, this new meaning cannot be 
crafted out of nothingness (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 202). If this were the case, then the ‘lover’ 
or the ‘philosopher’ in Merleau-Ponty’s example would be making an unintelligible 
statement to the hearer. After all, ‘people can only speak in a language we already know, and 
each word of a difficult text awakens thoughts in us that belonged to us in advance’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 184). Consequently, the speaker must have a wealth of pre-established 
words at her disposal in order to formulate such a creative speech act.  In anticipation of this 
criticism, Merleau-Ponty compares the wealth of words used in an act of authentic speech 
expression to the common ‘colors of the palette or the brute sounds of the instruments’ that 
make up a piece of art (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 185). Although a piece of music can express an 
authentic meaning, it cannot construct an entirely new and unique sound. The musician is 
limited to the notes that have made up previously expressed music. The individual sound, 
independent from the piece of music, does not carry the meaning of the final piece prior to 
the artist’s conception.  It is the authentic assembly of sound (‘so long as it truly says 
something’) that creates a new meaning (ibid). Like listening to a new piece of music, a 
person hearing an authentic speech expression experiences the familiar ensemble of words 
with new life, as the speaker ‘rips the signs themselves… from their empirical existence and 
steals them away to another world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 188). The raw material with which 
a person formulates a ‘speaking’ speech act is known as ‘spoken speech’. Whereas through 
speaking speech, the speaker takes hold of the commonplace word, reshapes it and brandishes 
it in a unique context. As such, a new meaning unfolds and takes its place in the world. In this 
way, speaking speech is dependent upon spoken speech 
As we have seen thus far, Merleau-Ponty recognises that ‘we live in a world where speech is 
already instituted’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189).  Language has a pre-established existence in 
the world through previously uttered tropes and conventional phrases, which is what makes 
communication possible. Merleau-Ponty refers to this as ‘spoken speech’ or second-hand 
speech: an ‘alphabet of already acquired significations’ that scaffold the linguistic world 
 
as ‘mama’, ‘dada’ or ‘cat’. For reasons that will become clear in what follows, I believe it is possible that this 
example is better suited to the category of spoken speech.  
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(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 200). Second-hand speech is the everyday manner in which we speak, 
in line with established linguistic rules.  It is used pre-reflectively and habitually when 
making ready-made statements without expressing anything novel. Spoken speech directly 
contrasts with speaking speech, where the speaker’s attention is drawn towards their 
utterance, in awe of its expression. Thus, Merleau-Ponty refers to spoken speech as a ‘pure 
language’ as it ‘hides itself from us’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1976: 10).   
Baldwin proposes that the speaking-spoken speech distinction can be best understood when 
framed within the phenomenological distinction of objectivity and subjectivity:  
For just as it is speaking speech which opens up new meanings, the touching hand is never 
‘completely constituted’ as an object since it is that by which there are tangible objects for us; 
and by contrast the hand that is touched is felt to be an object…just as spoken speech is 
speech that follows established rules which enables it to capture objective truths (Baldwin, 
2007: 95).  
Hence, Baldwin aligns spoken speech with objectivity and speaking speech with subjectivity.  
Following this, he confronts the misconception that speaking speech makes a greater 
contribution toward our understanding of the world than spoken speech; this mirrors the 
misconception found in the objective-subjective distinction more broadly, as subjectivity is 
often perceived (incorrectly) to be the ideal phenomenological state. Here readers have 
overlooked the crucial interdependence of objectivity and subjectivity to achieve the ‘third 
way’ and, analogously, the interdependence of speaking and spoken speech: ‘language is ‘at 
once’ speaking speech and spoken speech’ (Baldwin, 2007: 99-100).  As we have seen, 
speaking speech is dependent upon spoken speech as it offers a pre-established wealth of 
words that the speaker can transform into an original and creative utterance. Equally, spoken 
speech is dependent upon speaking speech in so far as all spoken speech must have once been 
speaking speech. Once uttered, speaking speech is repeated, becomes habitual and eventually 
‘sedimented’ within the linguistic world. Thus, these previously uttered authentic speech 
expressions are solidified into ‘second-hand’ or ‘spoken’ speech.  
However, Baldwin’s application of the objective-subjective distinction in speech has 
implications that extend beyond inter-dependence. In the words of Landes, ‘to be an 
expressive body is to be able to engage with these congealed vestiges of gestures gone by, to 
lend them to life again by taking them up into one’s own trajectory’ (Landes, 2013: 90). 
There is a balance between repetition and creation that grounds the objective-subjective 
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nature of speech.  Here emerges the paradox central to the speaking subject: language is 
simultaneously speaking and spoken. The speaking subject is rooted in an institution of 
language, yet creatively recycles old tropes and projects them into the world in new and 
creative ways, opening up original meanings. Like objectivity and subjectivity, speaking and 
spoken speech form a ‘third way’: the expressive unity of the objective and the phenomenal. 
Consequently, speech grounds the unity between subject and world as an ‘open and indefinite 
power of signifying- that is of simultaneously grasping and communicating a sense- by which 
man transcends himself through his body’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 200). This is the 
paradoxical logic of expression: for Merleau-Ponty, speech expression simultaneously draws 
upon a shared and pre-established well of interconnected meaning, and yet the individual has 
the capacity to creatively sculpt the world into a meaningful landscape through speech 
expression. Rather than a shortcoming of Merleau-Ponty’s theory, Inkpin has identified part 
of the paradoxical structure of expression.  The tension between the individuated bodily 
gesture of speech and it's horizonal, collaborative character is vital for the evolving meaning-
making process. As such, words go beyond the body’s mere biological existence to ‘create 
significations that are transcendent in relation to the anatomical structure and yet imminent in 
the behaviour as such’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 195). In the final section, I further establish the 
ontological power of speech expression to influence the subject’s phenomenal field.  
 
1.2.4.  The Ontological Impact of Speech Expression 
 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, to speak a language is not a matter of using signs to point to aspects 
of the world. Rather, to know a language is to possess it within one’s body schema and to 
speak that language is to employ one’s body within the context of that world. The possession 
of the relevant language is a condition for the embodied subject’s being-in-the-world. For this 
reason, Merleau-Ponty concludes that speech expression is ‘so many ways of singing the 
world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 193). Through speech expression, we are all reaching out 
toward the expression of a shared world, establishing our place within it and instilling it with 
a meaningful texture. In communicating with the Other, we aim, in one way or another, 
towards expressing the world as it is: ‘The verbal gesture, however, intends a mental 
landscape that is not straightaway given to everyone, and it is precisely its function to 
communicate this landscape’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 192). However, here we are confronted 
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once again by the paradox of expression. Through speech expression, we do not merely draw 
upon aspects of the world and put it into speech; we also transform our field of experience 
according to our speech expression. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, successful speech 
expression: ‘makes the signification exist as a thing at the very heart of the text, it brings it to 
life in an organism of words, it installs this signification in the writer or the reader like a new 
sense organ, and it opens a new field or a new dimension to our experience’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012: 188).  
To further flesh out this idea, it is useful to consider Clark’s concept of language as a form of 
‘cognitive niche’ (Clark, 2005). According to Clark, language is a tool for scaffolding action 
and attention. To demonstrate this, he refers to a study that compares pre-linguistic and 
linguistic infant’s ability to complete particular tasks involving their awareness of the 
environment. Infants were shown the location of an object in a room and were asked to find 
the object after being sufficiently disorientated: ‘the location was uniquely determinable only 
by remembering conjoined cues concerning the color of the wall and its geometry (e.g. the 
toy might be hidden in the corner between the long wall and the short blue wall)’ (Clark, 
2005: 259). The study found that while the pre-linguistic infants were unable to exploit the 
cues, the linguistic infants could combine the colour and geometric cues to efficiently locate 
the object. With the command of words such as ‘blue’, ‘short’ and ‘wall’, the environment is 
transformed for the subject. 
Clark only takes this line of thought so far as to say language can ‘sculpt and modify our own 
processes of selective attention’, with a particular focus on its use for problem-solving (ibid.). 
However, this experiment reveals wider implications. There is a transformation in the 
perceptual field between the pre-linguistic infant and the linguistic infant. It supports 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion that linguistic capacity ‘opens a new field or a new dimension to our 
experience’, as it gives the environment a meaningful structure: ‘The child’s relationship with 
his surroundings is what points him toward language. It is a development toward an end 
defined by the environment and not preestablished in the organism’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1979: 
14). Once the bodily function of speech expression is acquired, the world takes on a 
meaningful valence for the subject, thus facilitating them to move through the world with a 
pre-reflective openness.  
Merleau-Ponty goes as far as to claim that objects in the world do not present themselves as 
meaningful in abstraction from language: ‘the most familiar object appears indeterminate so 
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long as we have not remembered its name’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 182). If thought were 
formulated meaningfully prior to speech expression, we could recall an object's name without 
recalling the identity of that object. Instead: 
[when] I say “it’s a brush,” there is no concept of the brush in my mind beneath which I could 
subsume the object and could be moreover linked to the word “brush” through a frequent 
association. Rather, the word bears the sense, and, by imposing it upon the object, I am 
conscious of reaching the object (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 183). 
The act is simultaneous: in recalling the name of the object, we identify its character. The 
word has a meaning in itself that is grasped as its name is uttered. This is no more evident 
than in the example of the person with aphasia who can only move through the world ‘within 
narrower limits’; without the capacity to call forth the relevant word, they have lost a basic 
condition for relating to the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 197). This can be supported by the 
case study highlighted by Clark, as the pre-linguistic children were unable to make use of the 
linguistic cues for colour: ‘pre-linguistic infants…were shown to exploit only the geometric 
information, searching randomly in each of the two geometrically indistinguishable sites’ 
(Clark, 2005: 260). In comparison to the linguistic infants, the pre-linguistic infants found 
themselves in an environment with diminished detail. The distinction between red and blue is 
ambiguous for the infant, and the environment lacks the coherence that comes with language 
possession.  
Influenced by the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, Merleau-Ponty returns to 
his concept of meaning-making in his later work to make an interesting qualification: 
language operates within a web of meaning. First, Merleau-Ponty claims that the word 
assigned to the object itself is effectively arbitrary. As previously established, objects in the 
world offer particular possibilities for interaction. For instance, a book offers the possibility 
to be read in virtue of its properties. However, objects do not offer their linguistic reference in 
the same non-arbitrary manner. The word ‘book’ does not relate to the object itself.  This is 
not to say that words such as ‘book’ have no real meaning in the same way that if ‘term A 
and term B do not have any meaning at all, it is hard to see how there could be a difference of 
meaning between them’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2007a: 241). We are clearly able to distinguish a 
different meaning in the word book compared to the word clock. So, where does the meaning 
in the word ‘book’ lie? The meaning lies in the word’s distinct place in the linguistic system 
in relation to the other words: 
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That which makes the word ‘sun’ signify the sun is not the resemblance between the word 
and the thing, nor is it the internal character of either. Rather it is the relation between the 
word ‘sun’ and all other English words…the word only has meaning through the whole 
institution of language (Merleau-Ponty, 1979: 80).  
Alternatively, the word ‘warmth’ on its own has no meaning. The meaning of ‘warmth’ has 
precisely that ‘ontological weight’ or meaning-power in relation to ‘cold’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964: 86). Words are given life through its place in the system of language: ‘these elements 
form a system of synchrony in the sense that each of them signifies only its difference in 
respect to others’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 88).  For Merleau-Ponty, the assignment of words 
are not random but part of a ‘vast organic project’ (Landes, 2013: 135). As such, the weight 
of meaning bestowed on each word corresponds to its place in the ‘moving equilibrium’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 87).  In the words of De Saussure: ‘[if] one of the planets gravitating 
around the sun were to change in dimension and weight: this isolated fact would generate 
general consequences and displace the equilibrium of the entire solar system’ (Saussure, 
2006: 125). So too, the meaning of language is dependent upon its place in the ever-shifting 
‘equilibrium’, which is driven by the subject’s need to speak and communicate. When a 
successful ‘speaking’ speech expression is uttered, it takes its place in this web of meaning. It 
is for this reason that the equilibrium is in a constant state of flux. As such, ‘I speak as a 
response to the determinate gaps in the metastable field that solicit my voice’ (Landes, 2013: 
134).  
1.2.5.  Speaking to the Other  
 
Although Merleau-Ponty says surprising little on the topic in regards to speech expression (in 
fact, it is only briefly mentioned in the ‘Body as Expression and Speech’), no 
phenomenological account of speech expression would be complete without drawing upon 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, ‘what justifies 
the special place that is ordinarily accorded language- is that, of all expressive operations, 
speech alone is capable of sedimenting and of constituting an intersubjective acquisition’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 195-196).  
As previously intimated, Merleau-Ponty urges that we operate within a world that we 
understand to be shared with Others. We do not experience Others in the world in the same 
way as we do other objects. We witness that Others in the world must possess a subjectivity 
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like my own, in virtue of the fact that they engage with the world in much the same way as 
myself.8 Merleau-Ponty provides the following example:  
I am watching this man who is motionless in sleep and suddenly he wakes. He opens his eyes. 
He makes a move towards his hat, which has fallen beside him, and picks it up to protect 
himself from the sun. What finally convinces me that my sun is the same as his, that he sees 
and feels it as I do, and that after all there are two of us perceiving the world [is as follows]… 
When the man asleep in the midst of my objects begins to make gestures towards them, to 
make use of them, I cannot doubt for a moment that the world to which he is orientated is 
truly the same world that I perceive. (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 136).  
Merleau-Ponty recognises that he and the other man share a common world as they are 
simultaneously impacted by a significant aspect of the world, in this case, the blazing heat of 
the sun: the sun burns them, makes their eyes squint, makes them sweat, makes them raise 
their hand over their forehead in a protective gesture or reach for a hat. Merleau-Ponty 
recognises in the Other’s gestures that they experience the same ‘bite of the world’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 1973: 137). This symmetry is enough to convince him that the Other is moved and 
touched by the same world, and as such, is an embodied subject positioned in the world much 
like himself. In turn, he is aware of himself as a subject in the eyes of the Other, as they too 
witness Merleau-Ponty as a subject that is impacted by the rays of the sun. Consequently, he 
can assume that they both draw the same conclusion: ‘I feel that someone feels me, that he 
feels both my feeling and the very fact that he feels me’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 135).  
However, here Merleau-Ponty does not merely suggest that we have an awareness of the 
Other. He goes as far as to say that the Other constitutes our own subjectivity to some extent, 
and to some extent we constitute theirs. Of course, Merleau-Ponty does not suggest that it is 
possible to genuinely constitute Others in the manner that they constitute themselves. This 
would lead us back to the dilemma of being unable to distinguish between an ‘I’ experience 
and an ‘Other’ experience. Rather, we embrace the Other into our body schema in the same 
way that we embrace other aspects of the world. Recall, for Merleau-Ponty, the body schema 
is in part constituted by objects in the world. The pen is part of my bodily possibilities to 
write; the tea is part of my bodily possibilities to drink, and so on. In the same way, the body 
schema embraces the Other as a means for interaction. When we see the gesture of the Other, 
 
8 This is by no means the extent of Merleau-Ponty’s argument for intersubjectivity, the complex arguments for 
which will not be explored here. For a detailed account of Merleau-Ponty’s defence of intersubjectivity in the 
face of the problem of other minds, see  Romdenh-Romluc (2013). 
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perhaps frowning in anger, we do not infer anger from their gesture but witness it directly: ‘It 
is the simple fact that I live in the facial expressions of the other, as I feel him living in mine. 
It is a manifestation of what we have called, in other terms, the system “me-and-other”’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 154). What Merleau-Ponty refers to here is the bodily aspect of 
intersubjectivity known as intercorporeality. In the words of Trigg: 
As bodily subjects we belong to the same ontological and thus corporeal order. To this end, 
the experience and behaviour of the other person can, in potential, also be my own experience 
and behaviour, given that our bodies dovetail into the same ontological plane of existence 
(Trigg, 2017: 98).  
Turning our attention back towards speech expression, we can see how the intercorporeality 
of ‘I’ and ‘Other’ is a fundamental aspect of successful dialogue.  When we encounter the 
speech gesture of the Other, we ‘take up’ their meaning ‘in so far that this is possible given 
the differences between our bodies, our histories, and the modes of expression’ (Landes, 
2013: 92). By ‘taking up’, Merleau-Ponty refers to the body adjusting to the speech gesture of 
the Other and encompassing it into its infrastructure, adding to its ‘evolving weight’ and 
gearing it toward the world (ibid). This is what makes for a successful dialogue.  Rather than 
undergoing a process of translating a word to an idea, this ‘taking up’ occurs instantaneously: 
‘there is a taking up of the other person’s thought, a reflection in others, a power of thinking 
according to others, which enriches our own thoughts’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 184).  
Although not made explicit by Merleau-Ponty, it seems that the impact of speech expression 
in intersubjectivity is importantly distinct in the case of spoken speech compared to speaking 
speech. Consider a fairly banal conversation you might have with a neighbour, where you 
discuss the weather. Here, you say nothing ground-breaking, novel or new. You just reuse 
stock phrases about how ‘it’s a bit chilly this morning’ or ‘it’s meant to be warm this 
weekend’. This constitutes a case of spoken speech. Here the neighbour does not need to 
infer the meaning of speech expression from the sounds you make; they automatically ‘take 
up’ the meaning of your speech expression upon hearing it. However, the Other’s thoughts 
about the weather are unlikely to be ‘enriched’ by such small talk. In the case of speaking 
speech, on the other hand, Merleau-Ponty emphasises that the speaking subject can transform 
not only their own thoughts but also the thoughts of others. Recall, speech expression 
breathes life into the ‘vague fever’ of thought and thus externalises it into the world. Now, 
through speaking speech, the thought that achieves reality is not a commonplace one, but an 
original and creative source of inspiration. Merleau-Ponty illustrates the impact of speaking 
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speech from one person to another through the example of reading a ground-breaking piece 
of work:  
I start to read the book idly, giving it hardly any thought; And suddenly, a few words move 
me, the fire catches, my thoughts are ablaze, there is nothing in the book which I can 
overlook, and the fire feeds off everything I've ever read. I am receiving and giving in the 
same gesture. (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 11).  
Here Merleau-Ponty makes it explicit that speaking speech has the potential to build upon the 
recipient's thoughts and evolve them. Speaking speech injects these commonplace words with 
new life, creating original meaning structures in the recipient’s horizon.  Thus, while the 
institution of language (spoken speech) furnishes a common landscape for the speaker 
amongst Others of the same language, speaking speech moves beyond the sedimented 
meanings: ‘like a whirlwind they sweep me along toward the other meaning with which I'm 
going to connect’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 12). In this way, speech expression holds the power 




Through this chapter, we see how Merleau-Ponty accomplishes his objective to ‘leave 
behind, once and for all, the classical subject-object dichotomy’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 179). 
By eliminating the supposed ‘inner life’ of speech expression, Merleau-Ponty captures the 
synthesis of thought and speech in expression. In turn, he tears down the barrier between 
body and mind. As speech is the means by which we accomplish thought, Merleau-Ponty 
presents us with a speaking subject that necessarily exists beyond the limits of her body. Here 
Merleau-Ponty establishes an embodied subject that cannot be conceived of in abstraction 
from the world. There is an essential tie between subject and world that is the grounds of their 
very existence.  
To summarise, this chapter has introduced Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological methodology 
and distinguished it from his predecessors’. Merleau-Ponty was set apart through his 
development of the embodied subject, as he further erased any distinction between subject, 
body and world. Following this, I moved toward a focused account of speech expression, 
from which the paradoxical logic of expression emerged: the speaking subject is both 
imminent and transcendent, speech is both spoken and speaking, and the subject is shaped by 
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the world, and simultaneously the world is shaped by the subject. In following this 
paradoxical thread, Merleau-Ponty uncovers speech expression as the bedrock of the 
embodied subject-world synthesis.   
Finally, let’s turn back to the analogy established in the introduction, whereby Merleau-Ponty 
makes the bold claim that we can never truly speak the language of a foreign world because 
we can only ‘live’ one linguistic institution at a time. As Landes puts it: ‘To understand 
English is not to “possess” it in my mind in some mental lexicon. Rather, speaking English 
involves having English gestures ready-to-hand’ (Landes, 2013: 134).  Drawing on the work 
of Frantz Fanon, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s analogy of the foreigner betrays more than 
he intends. The philosopher Franz Fanon shares several similarities to Merleau-Ponty. He 
was a French-speaking existentialist, heavily influenced by psychoanalysis, a veteran of the 
second world war, and published his work during a similar time frame to Merleau-Ponty 
(from 1952 until his life was tragically cut short in 1961).  It was in moving from the French 
colony of Martinique to France around 1945 (the time at which Phenomenology of 
Perception was published) that Fanon became the ‘foreigner’ in Merleau-Ponty’s analogy. 
Here he wrote Black Skin, White Masks (1952), which begins with an exploration of the 
phenomenology of language.  Like Merleau-Ponty, Fanon recognised that ‘To speak means 
being able to use a certain syntax and possessing the morphology of such and such a 
language, but it means above all assuming a culture and bearing the weight of a civilization’  
(Fanon, 2008: 1). Indeed, he identifies that to possess a language is to possess the world of 
this language.  Yet, for Fanon, to be a ‘speaking subject’ is not the universal gift that 
Merleau-Ponty presents it to be.  
Fanon describes the experience of the black ‘creole’ (pidgin French) speaking Antillean man 
who moves to France and attempts to assimilate the ‘proper’ French language. He does so, 
according to Fanon, because ‘proper’ French is regarded as the golden ticket that grants 
permission to a white world: ‘the more the black Antillean assimilates the French language, 
the whiter he gets- i.e., the closer he comes to becoming a true human being’ (Fanon, 2008: 
2). The creole the Antillean speaks is given so little credibility that it is barely considered a 
language at all, banned from some households from being too vulgar and only used in 
conversations with servants. Fanon places creole in stark contrast to what he calls the refined 
‘white’ version of French: ‘The French from France, The Frenchman’s French, French 
French’ (Fanon, 2008: 4). Thus, the Antillean rejects creole, moves to Paris and becomes 
fluent in ‘proper’ French with the intent of belonging to France, ‘i.e. the real world’ (Fanon, 
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2008: 20). But, Fanon observes, the Antillean man has been duped. Even if he becomes fluent 
in ‘proper’ French, he is structurally barred from belonging to their world. He not assimilated 
as another ‘speaking subject’ in the way Merleau-Ponty depicts because, in virtue of his race, 
he is prohibited from the status of ‘speaking subject’. His speech expression does not receive 
the same uptake due to the colour of his skin. As such, in France, he is inhibited from being-
in-the-world.  
Influenced by Fanon, I conclude this chapter by drawing attention to a gap in Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of language that will hereafter be the purpose of this disseration to 
expose. The phenomenological account of speech expression presented by Merleau-Ponty is a 
convincing one. However, as this dissertation proceeds, it will become apparent that this 
phenomenological account is limited to those granted an epistemic privilege. Only those in a 
dominant position in society have the status as ‘speaking subject’, and the subject-world 
synthesis that accompanies it. Fanon limits his analogy to all persons who are colonised, but 
it would not be a stretch to argue that, in general, other features of one’s embodiment (one’s 
race, sexuality, age, gender, ability, etc.) has the power to inhibit one’s membership to the 




















In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Fricker sought to 
conceptualise a neglected area of social injustice, whereby a marginalised speaker suffers an 
injustice in virtue of being afforded an unduly low epistemic status (Fricker 2007). The 
epistemic nature of the injustice derives from a person being wronged in their capacity as a 
knower: as someone who can convey knowledge or information, participate in the creation 
and sharing of knowledge, and who can offer interpretations of their social experiences that 
are accepted as valid (ibid.). Fricker identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial 
injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs where identity prejudice 
causes a hearer to unjustly afford a diminished level of credibility to a speaker’s testimony. 
Hermeneutical injustice occurs where identity prejudice causes gaps in interpretive 
frameworks, so experiences of marginalised groups are either lacking in hermeneutical 
currency altogether or are dismissed in favour of socially dominant interpretations (ibid.).  
While the literature on epistemic injustice has coalesced around these two concepts of 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, comparatively little attention has been paid to 
epistemic silencing. Fricker arrived at the concept of epistemic silencing as she sought to 
understand the full extent of the wrong inflicted upon the victim of testimonial injustice. She 
identified that, in certain cases, the marginalised subject does not only receive a deflated level 
of credibility but is blocked from communicating altogether. Through an examination of 
epistemic silencing, its breadth and depth comes to the fore as a form of epistemic injustice 
that ‘cuts conceptually deeper than anything we had so far envisaged: a matter of exclusion 
from the very practice that constitutes the practical core of what it is to know’ (Fricker, 2007: 
6). While some would have us believe that we live in an era where dissonant voices are 
louder than ever, in reality, most are still straining to be heard. To amplify these voices, it is 
vital to understand the mechanisms that gagged them in the first place and threaten to gag 
them again. On these grounds, I propose that Fricker’s account of epistemic silencing 
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requires urgent attention. This chapter puts forward a detailed definition of epistemic 
silencing that is missing from Fricker’s account.  
I begin by outlining epistemic injustice in its two forms: testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice. The way is then paved for Fricker’s account of ‘Two Kinds of 
Silence’, where she identifies ‘pre-emptive testimonial injustice’ and ‘epistemic 
objectification’ as forms of silencing that can result from testimonial injustice. As a definition 
unfolds, it will become apparent that ‘objectification’ is an ill-fitting concept within an 
epistemic account of silencing. I argue that if epistemic objectification is an epistemic harm 
then it is unclear that it is a form of silencing, and if it is a form of silencing, then it is unclear 
that it is an epistemic one. Consequently, I reject epistemic objectification as a form of 
epistemic silencing. I then go on to argue that we can better understand the phenomenon of 
hermeneutical injustice through a distinction missed by Fricker, namely the distinction 
between 1) hermeneutical injustice that smothers a non-dominant interpretive framework and 
2) hermeneutical injustice that structurally bars a marginalised group from communicating an 
experience due to gaps in the interpretive framework. I develop an account of the latter form 
of hermeneutical injustice, which I term hermeneutical silencing. In so doing, I put forward a 





2.1.  What is Epistemic Injustice?  
 
thi reason 
a talk wia 
BBC accent 
iz coz yi 
widny wahnt 








lik wanna yoo 
scruff yi 
widny thingk 
it wuz troo. 
 
- ‘Six O’Clock News’, Tom Leonard (1976)  
 
John Reith, the BBC’s first managing director, gave an announcement in 1924 outlining the 
aims of the BBC: ‘As we conceive it, our responsibility is to carry into the greatest possible 
number of homes everything that is best in every department of human knowledge, 
endeavour and achievement’ (Reith, 1924: 34). In an effort to achieve this goal, Reith sought 
the support of the Advisory Committee on Spoken English. Received Pronunciation became 
the hallmark of the BBC and thus synonymous with authority and trustworthiness. By 
imagining a BBC presenter speaking in a broad Glaswegian accent, an accent at the time 
‘associated with the unwashed and violent’ (Macaulay and Trevelyan, 1977: 94), Tom 
Leonard’s poem exposes the credibility excess afforded to Received Pronunciation, as well as 
the credibility deficit conjured by ‘working-class’ dialects. Leonard’s poem still resonates 
today, as studies show that the Glaswegian dialect continues to carry the negative 
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connotations of its industrial roots, in contrast to the ‘aspirational’ ‘standard Scottish English’ 
of the ‘middle’ and ‘upper’ classes (MacFarlane & Stuart-Smith, 2012; Menzies, 1991). As 
the poem states, if you heard the BBC news read in a Glaswegian accent, from the voice of 
the ‘scruff’, the powerless in society, ‘yi widny thingk it wuz troo’ (‘you wouldn’t think it 
was true’). With the work of Miranda Fricker, we can finally put a name to this distinct kind 
of wrong that Leonard singled out in much of his work: epistemic injustice.  
Epistemic injustice was first theorised by Fricker to ‘delineate a distinctive class of wrongs, 
namely those in which someone is disingenuously downgraded and/or disadvantaged in 
respect of their status as an epistemic subject’ (Fricker, 2017: 53). The epistemic nature of the 
injustice derives from a person being wronged in their capacity as a knower, as someone who 
can convey knowledge. Leonard’s poem illustrates that knowledge can only be disclosed 
using a certain voice; alternatively, ‘if a piece of writing can’t be read aloud in a “correct” 
received pronunciation voice, then there must be something wrong with it. It’s not valid’ 
(Leonard, 1999: 84).  
To be clear, epistemic injustice is not present in all cases in which a person’s epistemic 
credibility is diminished. One can only be said to have suffered an epistemic injustice if the 
credibility deficit is rooted in unfair prejudice. For instance, I may doubt the reliability of a 
person’s testimony if they are a notorious liar. This would be a rational and fair reason to 
downgrade somebody’s credibility. What makes epistemic injustice distinct is that it is 
motivated by ‘identity prejudice’. Fricker uses this term to refer to prejudice driven by 
socially instituted stereotypes - ‘a distorted image of the social type in question’ (Fricker, 
2007: 4). Leonard’s poem draws our attention to the identity prejudice suffered by those with 
‘working class’ accents: the lack of credibility the Glaswegian receives emerges from 
prejudice against his working-class identity. In virtue of this identity prejudice, the poem’s 
narrator lacks the authority to convey the truth. To use Fricker’s terminology, he is labelled 
as a ‘bad informant’ by his audience.  
Fricker traces back the discussion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ informants through Edward Craig’s 
account of the ‘state of nature’ (Craig, 1990). Craig imagines a social community in its most 
basic form, whose members seek out knowledge of their environment. One way of gaining 
such knowledge is through reliable epistemic agents in the social community. To detect 
reliable informants, the community member will navigate between trustworthy and 
untrustworthy epistemic agents:  
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the result is an objectivised conception of the good informant, the knower, who is now no 
longer tied to the particular relationship with inquiry between inquirer and informant, yet is 
involved in the social practice of pooling information (Wanderer, 2017: 29). 
Discerning which epistemic agents are reliable, the subject unconsciously singles out certain 
marginalised social groups as poor informants. Consequently, members of these groups 
suffer a systematic credibility deficit that follows them through different social domains in 
virtue of identity prejudice. To clarify, few people are judged to be poor informants in every 
aspect of their life. A female philosopher may be wrongfully deemed an unreliable informant 
when discussing Metaphysics or Symbolic Logic, but a good informant when discussing 
Feminist Philosophy. Sometimes a person can be afflicted by epistemic injustice in only 
certain domains. Nevertheless, although it may not affect the subject in every area of their 
life, epistemic injustice is often ‘systematic’ in that it is an injustice that can ‘track’ the 
subject through different dimensions of social activity - economic, educational, professional, 
sexual, legal, political, religious, and so on’ (Fricker, 2007: 27).   
Fricker goes to lengths to emphasise the non-deliberative nature of epistemic injustice. By 
this, she means epistemic injustice is not a calculated false representation of another person’s 
testimony as unreliable; its operations are far more implicit. Consider a case explored by 
Tanesini, where David Cameron told Angela Eagle to ‘calm down, dear’ during a House of 
Commons debate in 2011: 
he wanted her attempts to describe what she saw as the failures of his policies not to have, in 
the eyes of the other members of the Commons present, the status of assertions. He attempted 
to achieve this by feigning that he had not recognized her intentions (Tanesini, 2016: 71).  
Initially, this case may appear to fit within Fricker’s epistemic injustice framework: Cameron 
is invoking a collective understanding that women cannot make reasoned judgements without 
being overcome by emotion. However, Tanesini observes that Cameron’s claim is 
‘transparently disingenuous’ (Tanesini, 2016: 72, n2). In reality, Cameron understood Eagle, 
yet was ‘flustered and unable to address the content of her challenge’, so made a deliberate 
attempt to downgrade the speaker’s credibility (ibid). If Cameron genuinely thought Eagle 
was incomprehensible as a woman overcome by emotion, this would count as an instance of 
epistemic injustice. However, rather than an epistemically unreliable woman, Cameron seems 
to perceive Eagle as a credible epistemic agent that threatens his own credibility in the 
debate. In contrast, when epistemic injustice occurs, the hearer is swayed by a deep-set 
identity prejudice that they are unaware they even hold. This ‘absence of deliberate, 
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conscious manipulation’ makes epistemic injustice so difficult to spot and so important to 
name (Fricker, 2017: 54).9 Fricker goes on to distinguish two forms of epistemic injustice: 
hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice.  I will go on to establish these two forms of 
epistemic injustice in turn.  
 
2.1.1.  Testimonial Injustice  
 
To draw out the salient features of testimonial injustice, Fricker introduces an example from 
‘The Talented Mr Ripley’: Dickie has disappeared, and Marge Sherwood approaches Herbert 
Greenleaf (Dickie’s father) to express her suspicions that Tom Ripley murdered him.  
Greenleaf, who holds Ripley in high regard, responds by saying, ‘Marge, there’s female 
intuition, and then there are facts’ (Minghella, 2000: 130). Greenleaf dismisses Sherwood’s 
claim that Ripley may have murdered Dickie as ‘female intuition’. This credibility deficit is 
grounded in an implicit prejudice against women’s ability to rationalise such matters. Fricker 
identifies this instance of epistemic injustice as testimonial injustice because the speaker’s 
testimony is given insufficient credibility based on the hearer’s prejudice. Fricker defines 
testimony as ‘human practices of telling, and accepting (or not) what we are told’ (Fricker, 
2012: 4); however, as Wanderer observes, the term ‘testimony’ can be used to encompass 
several different speech-acts such as ‘inquiring, questioning, discussing, speculating and 
deliberating, as well as the myriad of thicker and culturally-specific forms that such activities 
take in differing contexts’ (Wanderer, 2017: 32).  
Testimonial injustice is comprised of primary and secondary harms. The primary harm is the 
product of epistemic injustice more broadly, as it captures the harm of being undermined as 
an epistemic subject: ‘They are wrongfully excluded from participation in the practice that 
defines the very core of the very concept of knowledge’ (Fricker, 2007: 145). As rational 
agents, undermining one’s capacity to give knowledge is to undermine something central to 
being human: ‘when someone suffers a testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua knower, 
and they are symbolically degraded qua human’ (Fricker, 2007: 44). Explicitly, it is not 
 
9 Nevertheless, Fricker clarifies that the non-deliberative nature of epistemic injustice does not entail non-
culpability, as there is agency in sustaining a culture of epistemic injustice. See ‘Evolving Concepts of 




merely the individual who suffers a deflated epistemic status but the marginalised social 
group that the individual seemingly represents.  
In contrast, the secondary harm captures the practical ramifications that alter the life of those 
who experience systematic testimonial injustice. Fricker appeals to an example recounted by 
Linda Martín Alcoff, where an untenured philosophy professor ‘suffered two years of 
anguish and self-doubt’ when she was accorded prejudicially motivated reduced epistemic 
credibility by her colleagues (Alcoff, 2000: 248). The reduced epistemic status was caused by 
a white male graduate teaching assistant publicly questioning her competency. Fricker 
observes that through a ‘prolonged erosion of epistemic confidence’, the speaker loses 
conviction in their epistemic capacity (Fricker, 2007: 49). She claims that, in time, repeated 
damage to one’s epistemic status can inhibit the development of the marginalised subject’s 
identity. Fricker captures such a case by appealing to a passage in Beauvoir’s Memoirs of a 
Dutiful Daughter, where Beauvoir is plagued by such persistent credibility deficit accorded to 
her by Jean-Paul Sartre. This assault on her intellectual capacity leads her to claim, ‘I’m no 
longer sure what I think, or even if I think at all’ (Beauvoir, 1959: 344). Thus, testimonial 
injustice can lead to an erosion in 1) the subject’s human self-value and 2) the subject’s 
identity as a knower.  
 
2.1.2.  Hermeneutical Injustice  
 
In Fricker’s example of testimonial injustice, we saw how the testimony of someone like 
Marge Sherwood could receive a deflated level of credibility in virtue of an identity prejudice 
attached to women. For our purposes here, let’s continue our focus on the credibility deficit 
that tracks women. As testimony from women like Marge is not taken seriously, they are less 
likely to participate in fundamental exercises of informational exchange; informational 
exchanges that play an essential role in the creation of a collective social understanding. Such 
exclusion from meaning-making is known as hermeneutical marginalisation and is the first 
stage in hermeneutical injustice.  
Consider the following example of hermeneutical marginalisation.  An informational 
exchange may occur at a university where the participants decide what a good academic 
conference looks like. Those welcome to participate in the exchange may discuss the 
importance of inviting renowned keynote speakers, selective reviewing for submitted talks, 
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and how best to advertise the event. Following multiple exchanges across many academic 
institutions over time, an interpretive framework develops that captures ‘what makes a good 
academic conference’. In the past, women's input in academia (particularly STEM subjects 
and Philosophy) has been suppressed or altogether excluded from such informational 
exchange due to the reduced credibility attached to their testimony (if any women were part 
of the department in the first place). Consequently, the testimonial injustice inflicted upon 
women may incite ‘unequal hermeneutical participation’ in constructing interpretive 
frameworks or what Fricker terms ‘hermeneutical marginalisation’ (Fricker, 2007: 152).  
Due to such hermeneutical marginalisation, a woman’s understanding of ‘what makes a good 
academic conference’ is omitted from the interpretive framework. If invited to informational 
exchange, women may voice the importance of a gender-balanced line-up of keynote 
speakers or the need to offer childcare to attendees who require it. But when women are 
hermeneutically marginalised in the organisation of conferences, these features that may have 
significance for women academics are left as gaps in the interpretive framework. Fricker 
refers to these as ‘hermeneutical lacunas’ (Fricker, 2007: 151). Consequently, hermeneutical 
marginalisation triggers hermeneutical injustice, whereby gaps in the collective 
understanding render the experiences of dissonant groups unintelligible.  
To illuminate the wrong of hermeneutical injustice, Fricker presents the hard-hitting example 
of sexual harassment victims prior to the 1960s. Because certain groups most likely to be 
targeted by sexual harassers were excluded from the construction of interpretive frameworks 
in the workplace, experiences of sexual harassment were not part of the collective 
understanding. Instead, ‘repeated sexual propositions in the workplace are never anything 
more than a form of ‘flirting’, and their uneasy rejection by the recipient only ever a matter of 
her lacking a ‘sense of humour’ (Fricker, 2007: 152-153).  Given this hermeneutical lacuna, 
victims of sexual harassment were incapable of articulating the harm inflicted upon them. 
Consequently, victims were not only unable to report or discuss sexual harassment, but they 
also lacked the hermeneutical resources required to fully grasp the experience themselves. 
Fricker refers to this latter harm as ‘cognitive disablement’: 
The cognitive disablement prevents her from understanding a significant patch of her own 
experience: that is, a patch of experience which it is strongly in her interests to understand, for 
without that understanding she is left deeply troubled, confused, and isolated, not to mention 
vulnerable to continued harassment (Fricker, 2007: 151). 
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 Fricker understands hermeneutical resources as essential for meaning-making; where 
hermeneutical resources are missing from the interpretive framework, the subject’s grasp of 
their experience is distorted, limited, or otherwise confined.  
A further example of a hermeneutically marginalised group, arguably at the forefront of 
combatting hermeneutical oppression, are non-binary persons. Many non-binary persons 
suffer from hermeneutical injustice as the interpretive framework fails to accommodate 
gender experiences beyond male and female: ‘In the wake of this conceptual silence, 
misunderstandings (both blatant and subtle) arise in droves— misunderstandings that 
undermine recognition and respect of nonbinary persons’ (Dembroff, 2020: 2). 10 One way in 
which this hermeneutical injustice manifests is through a lack of appropriate pronouns that fit 
their genderqueer identity. As such, non-binary people are forced to ascribe themselves 
unsuitable gender pronouns, the meaning of which feels remote to them: 
Patients in my practice begin to explore their gender in the negative with statements such as 
the following: “I don't have a gender” “I don't think of myself as a man” “I don't act like other 
women” or “I'm not totally a guy or a girl.” It is as if they are attempting to draw a picture of 
an object using only the negative space. They are defining themselves as “not” something. 
People's experience of their gender is not recognized in the language, often causing them to 
feel out of sync with the world. (Langer, 2011: 303).  
The non-binary experience is a prime example of how a limited interpretive framework can 
drive cognitive disablement.  
Fricker further develops the concept of hermeneutical injustice by stipulating that a group can 
be limited not only by what they can express but also how they can express it: ‘the 
characteristic expressive style of a given social group may be rendered just as much of an 
unfair hindrance to their communicative efforts as an interpretive absence can be’ (Fricker, 
2007: 160). In this context, a speech expression may be disregarded as unreliable or 
unintelligible due to the subject's style of speech. Rebecca Tsosie provides a useful example 
of such hermeneutical injustice inflicted upon Indigenous groups in Northern California. In 
Lying vs Northwestern Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the court permitted the 
 
10 To be clear, words like ‘transgender’ (1974), ‘gender-fluid’ (1987) and ‘cisgender’ (1997) were established 
long ago (Baron, 2020: 5). Since the gender-neutral pronoun ‘ze’ was first coined in 1864 it has resurfaced 
several times (in 1888, 1891, 1972 and 1992), and has finally started to gain traction (Baron, 2020). To neglect 
these achievements in the fight for the correct terminology would be a disservice to the LGBTQ+ community. 
However, despite the existence of hermeneutical resources, a marginalised group can still be hermeneutically 




extension of a logging road through a site that the Indigenous groups of Northern California 
called ‘sacred’. The court ruled that the government was not harming the Indigenous groups 
as they did not ‘coerce the Indigenous peoples into giving up their ‘belief’ that the land was 
‘sacred’’ (Tsosie, 2017: 361). The word ‘sacred’ was not seen to hold any legal weight, 
evaluated to be a concept held ‘in the mind’ at an individual level (ibid). Therefore, although 
the Indigenous groups had the means to articulate the harm they encountered, such spiritual 
language is structurally barred by the legal system. As such, the Indigenous interpretation of 
the events was rejected.  
Unlike testimonial injustice, Fricker understands hermeneutical injustice as a ‘somewhat 
indirect’ discrimination because ‘the injustice will tend to persist regardless of individual 
efforts’ (Fricker, 2017: 54). In other words, it is grounded in structural hermeneutical 
marginalisation. The injustice lies in the wider social structure, as certain groups are excluded 
from contributing to a shared interpretative framework. Accordingly, hermeneutical injustice 
typically endures despite the hearers’ attempts to understand the speaker, as the interpretive 
framework renders the marginalised speaker almost unintelligible. In the case of sexual 
harassment, the marginalisation of the victims is built into the very structure of the interaction 
and has a scope that extends beyond the given interaction. Nevertheless, Medina clarifies that 
the agent’s responsibility is not diminished in a case of hermeneutical injustice. As Medina 
points out, there is collective culpability for hermeneutical injustice as ‘an entire culture can 
be held responsible for not trying to understand a particular kind of experience or a particular 
kind of subjectivity’ (Medina, 2017: 42). In Fricker’s example of sexual harassment, for 
instance, oppressive and patriarchal culture as a whole is culpable for the gap in the 
hermeneutical resources due to their lack of efforts to understand the female experience. For 
this reason, Medina claims ‘we can identify degrees of complicity in how individuals respond 
to lacunas and limitations in the hermeneutical resources they have inherited and in how they 
participate (or fail to participate) in expressive and interpretive dynamics’ (Medina, 2017: 42-
43). 
Thus far, in the literature, insufficient attention has been paid to the complexity of 
hermeneutical injustice as an epistemic harm. In the second half of this chapter, I aim to bring 
to light further nuances in the concept of hermeneutical injustice not articulated by Fricker by 
distinguishing cases of hermeneutical injustice from hermeneutical silencing. Through this 
distinction, we can come to appreciate the far-reaching and destructive impact extreme forms 
of hermeneutical injustice can have on the life of the epistemically oppressed.  
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Since their arrival in philosophy, the terms ‘testimonial’ and ‘hermeneutical’ injustice have 
been enthusiastically applied to a number of specific social domains to draw out 
epistemically unjust practices that have heretofore gone unchallenged. The literature on 
epistemic injustice provides an extremely rich resource of ideas and have done much to open 
new avenues of thought on the insidious kinds of wrongs faced by marginalised groups. 
However, as Fricker herself suggests, some of the more nuanced aspects of her account have 
been lost along the way through its rigorous and broad application. In the words of Fricker, ‘I 
believe the category will only be useful if it remains bounded and specific, not relaxing 
outwards to embrace the generality of unfair interpersonal manipulations’ (Fricker, 2017: 53).  
Here, Fricker calls for strictness on the way these terms are applied in philosophy.11 
I suggest that a similar cautionary note is needed to preserve Fricker’s distinction between 
epistemic injustices that lead to ignoring, dismissing, not being taken seriously or ridicule, 
and epistemic injustices that lead to silencing. These two concepts have become entangled in 
some areas of the literature, where scholars have described Fricker’s central case of 
testimonial injustice discussed above (whereby the testimony of a marginalised knower is 
afforded a credibility deficit) as eliciting a silencing effect.12 However, Fricker makes clear 
that the silencing effect is limited to two extreme forms of testimonial injustice: pre-emptive 
testimonial injustice and epistemic objectification. Distinguishing cases of epistemic injustice 
that lead to ignoring, from those that lead to silencing, is fundamental to understanding the 
different harms that emerge from unjust epistemic practices. To deter their interchangeable 
use in the future, I develop a robust account of epistemic silencing in what follows.  
 
2.2.  Testimonial Silencing  
 
2.2.1.  Pre-emptive Testimonial Injustice  
 
To introduce an account of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, Fricker returns to Craig’s ‘state 
of nature’ narrative. Recall, according to Craig, if we strip back civil society, we see that 
 
11 For instance, she argues that epistemic injustice must be limited to cases where the credibility deficit is 
unintentionally imposed (Fricker, 2017).  
12 For example, testimonial injustice is conflated to testimonial silencing in Spewak (2017), Kim Q Hall (2017), 
Congdon (2017) and Pantazatos (2017).  
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people naturally adopt an unjust distinction between those who can provide reliable 
information (good informants) and those who cannot (bad informants). Eventually, being able 
to distinguish between good and bad informants becomes second nature in our everyday 
interactions. Fricker observes that once a group of people are labelled as having the 
characteristics of a ‘bad informant’, they will likely be bypassed altogether. Rather than 
addressing a ‘bad informant’ and dismissing their testimony as unreliable, the marginalised 
groups of ‘bad informants’ are simply not approached for information in the first place 
(Fricker, 2007: 130).  Fricker refers to this bypassing as ‘pre-emptive testimonial injustice’ as 
‘the speaker is silenced by the identity prejudice that undermines her credibility in advance’ 
(ibid).   
Fricker puts forward a powerful example of pre-emptive testimonial injustice through the 
case-study of Duwayne Brooks: 
In the London Borough of Greenwich, on April 22nd 1993, a teenager named Stephen 
Lawrence was fatally stabbed by a small gang of white teenagers. Stephen Lawrence and his 
friend Duwayne Brooks, with whom he was waiting at the bus stop, were black, and the 
murder was preceded by no provocation, indeed, no hostile interaction at all.  This was an 
entirely one-sided, explicitly racially motivated attack—the only thing that preceded it was 
that one of the five or six assailants had called out racist abuse from across the road; the gang 
then engulfed Stephen Lawrence, one or possibly two of its members delivering two deep stab 
wounds, which minutes later ended his life (Fricker, 2012: 5).  
As a person who had been terrorized and bore witness to a truly traumatic event, police 
protocol dictates that Brooks ought to have been treated as the victim of the attack. Instead, 
the police assumed that Brooks had instigated a fight with the attackers; an assumption that 
betrays a racial prejudice against Brooks. As a result, Brooks was treated as a perpetrator 
rather than a victim of crime. The report suggests that this racial prejudice motivated a 
credibility deficit toward Brooks, such that little information was solicited from him 
regarding the attack:  
Nobody suggested that he should be used in searches of the area, although he knew where the 
assailants had last been seen…To that must be added the failure of Inspector Steven Groves, 
the only senior officer present before the ambulance came, to try to find out from Mr. Brooks 
what had happened (Fricker, 2012: 6-7).  
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Painted as a perpetrator, Brook’s testimony was considered unreliable by the police in 
advance of questioning. Consequently, as he simply was not asked about the attack, essential 
testimony regarding the event was pre-emptively silenced.  
Although not her intention, Sally Haslanger provides a further example of silencing those 
marginalised in our society in advance of a speech expression. She recounts the following 
experience:  
Recently in an airport next to my husband who is in a wheelchair, an airline employee asked 
me: ‘What is your husband’s name’? as if the fully alert individual in the wheelchair in front 
of him couldn’t answer even that simple question on his own (Haslanger, 2017: 285-286). 
Here, the airline employee has been influenced by a prejudice against the epistemic capacity 
of disabled people. Subsequently, the airline employee bypassed Haslanger’s husband 
altogether and directed his question towards Haslanger herself, who is afforded epistemic 
privilege as an able-bodied person. For Haslanger, the purpose of invoking this account was 
to exemplify ‘Essentialist and Normative Assumptions’, such as ‘by nature disabled people 
are incompetent’, that in turn diminish a speaker’s credibility. However, in addition, 
Haslanger’s example exposes an instance of pre-emptive testimonial injustice as her husband 
is excluded from the conversation in advance due to a credibility deficit.  
There is a further form of pre-emptive testimonial injustice that lies latent in Fricker’s work 
that she does not address directly. We can draw out this further form of pre-emptive 
testimonial injustice by turning back to the secondary harm of testimonial injustice: 
systematic testimonial injustice can erode one’s own reflective understanding of oneself as an 
epistemic agent, eventually leading to ‘prolonged self-doubt and loss of intellectual 
confidence’ (Fricker, 2007: 48). In considering the extent of the impact of this secondary 
harm upon a person’s life, Fricker states: ‘if a history of such injustices gnaws away at a 
person’s intellectual confidence, or never lets it develop in the first place, this damages his 
epistemic function quite generally’ (Fricker, 2007: 50). According to Fricker, the 
marginalised subject may internalise the systematic testimonial injustice to the extent that 
they eventually doubt their own epistemic capacity. Consider the example of Marge 
Sherwood, who is subjected to testimonial injustice by Herbert Greenleaf. If Marge were 
made to endure such testimonial injustice on a regular basis, if she were repeatedly told that 
her beliefs were grounded in ‘feminine intuition’ instead of reason, it would not be difficult to 
imagine that Marge may come to inherit the notion that she is intellectually inferior. 
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Moreover, she may come to conclude that the marginalised group that she belongs to lack 
epistemic agency in general.  
This resembles something like the ‘looping effect of human kinds’ as proposed by Hacking: 
‘To create new ways of classifying people is also to change how we can think of ourselves, to 
change our sense of self-worth, even how we remember our own past. This, in turn, generates 
a looping effect’ (Hacking, 1995: 369). According to Hacking, if a person identifies with the 
classification they have been placed in, a looping effect occurs because the subject alters their 
self-understanding and behaviour in line with the traits dictated by this classification. With 
recourse to Fricker, persistent testimonial injustice may cause the marginalised subject to 
downgrade their own epistemic status to match the credibility deficit attached to their identity 
in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Consequently, through the internalisation of systematic 
testimonial injustice and the looping effect of downgrading one’s epistemic status, the 
marginalised subject may eventually silence their own testimony. Once the subject has 
developed an inhibited epistemic confidence, ‘the underconfident subject will tend to back 
down in the face of challenge, or even at the very prospect of it […] (Fricker, 2007: 50). As 
such, the marginalised subject would eventually exclude themselves from communicative 
exchange, in advance of being addressed, having harboured the belief that they lack the 
epistemic ability to contribute. Thereby, the subject’s testimony has been self-silenced.  
This form of pre-emptive testimonial injustice bears a close resemblance to Dotson’s 
‘testimonial smothering’, where ‘the speaker perceives one’s immediate audience as 
unwilling or unable to gain the appropriate uptake of proffered testimony’ (Dotson, 2011: 
244). Drawing on Hornsby and Langton’s speech-act account of silencing, Dotson attributes 
testimonial smothering to a failure to take up the speaker’s speech-act. After a prolonged 
experience of one’s speech act failing ‘uptake’, the subject is coerced into ‘self-silencing’ 
(ibid). However, I am reluctant to entirely submit the silencing I have identified in the work 
of Fricker under Dotson’s ‘testimonial smothering’. Following Fricker’s model of pre-
emptive testimonial injustice (as opposed to speech-act theory), we are interested in cases 
where the subject’s testimony is literally passed over in silence. Dotson describes testimonial 
smothering as ‘the truncating of one’s own testimony in order to ensure that the testimony 
contains only content for which one’s audience demonstrates testimonial competence’ (ibid). 
Therefore, although the subject does speak, they edit their testimony to ensure that it is 
recognised as credible and receives its audience's uptake. The impact of self-silencing in pre-
emptive testimonial injustice, on the other hand, is fatal to speech expression: due to a 
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damaged epistemic function, the speaker may not only downgrade their testimony but 
eventually stop offering their testimony altogether. The marginalised subject anticipates their 
testimony will be received as unreliable due to routine testimonial injustice, thereby pre-
emptively excluding themselves from the discussion. Thus, in this form of pre-emptive 
testimonial injustice, a communicative dysfunction occurs through self-silencing in advance 
of a speech-act. I want to emphasise that although the marginalised subject carries out self-
silencing, this silencing is perpetrated by those who create a social climate in which the 
marginalised subject believes (based on an experience of routine testimonial injustice) that 
their testimony will be met with diminished credibility. Like Dotson, I perceive such self-
silencing as ‘coerced’ with a collective responsibility placed on the would-be hearers who 
have helped sustain such a climate (Dotson, 2011: 244). 
Therefore, from Fricker’s account of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, we can draw out the 
following criteria for epistemic silencing that sets it apart from testimonial injustice: while in 
an instance of testimonial injustice there is a speaking-subject whose testimony is ignored or 
dismissed, epistemic silencing renders the marginalised subject structurally excluded from 
the conversation before any testimony could take place. In this sense, no speech expression 
occurs. I will now proceed to consider Fricker’s second account of silencing, epistemic 
objectification, and whether it fits within this model for epistemic silencing.  
 
2.2.2.  Epistemic Objectification  
 
Turning back to Craig’s ‘state of nature’ narrative, Fricker identifies a second form of 
silencing that occurs as an upshot from our pursuit of knowledge: one can be silenced not 
only by being perceived as a bad informant but also by being perceived merely as a ‘source 
of information’. Unlike an informant ‘(as when someone tells one something one wants to 
know)’, a source of information conveys knowledge that the hearer can ‘glean’ (Fricker, 
2007: 132). To describe ‘gleaning’ information from a source of information, Fricker uses the 
example of inferring that it is raining from a guest who ‘arrives bedraggled and shaking her 
umbrella’ (ibid). Fricker states that when a speaker is reduced to a mere source of 
information, they are subjected to silencing through epistemic objectification. As Fricker 
points out, we treat people as objects all the time, and it is not necessarily immoral. For 
example, a doctor may objectify a patient when performing surgery as she focuses on the 
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patient’s anatomy. With recourse to Kant, Fricker emphasises that the injustice lies in the 
subject being reduced to a mere object ‘where the ‘mere’ signifies a more general denial of 
their subjectivity’ (Fricker, 2007: 133). As a result, the speaker is wrongfully excluded from a 
basic form of respect as a subject. 
Fricker presents two different examples to capture the nature of epistemic objectification: the 
objectification of a Black man and women's sexual objectification through pornography. 
Despite the tragic number of real-world examples she could draw on, Fricker curiously 
chooses to illustrate the first case through the fictionalised objectification of Tom Robinson 
by the jurors of Maycomb County in To Kill a Mockingbird.13 In particular, she focuses on 
the prejudices of the jury that Atticus Finch exposes in his final speech; the jury holds the 
unfounded belief that Black people ‘lie’, ‘are basically immoral beings’ and Black men ‘are 
not to be trusted around our women’ (Lee, 1960: 208). Fricker claims that this is more than a 
case of testimonial injustice but also one of epistemic objectification, because ‘together they 
radically undermine his general status as an epistemic subject, more than enough to constitute 
the jurors’ epistemic objectification of him as morally bad’ (Fricker, 2007: 135).  
The first problem that emerges from this example is that it is not apparent that Tom Robinson 
is treated in the way Fricker conceives a mere source of information to be. After all, the 
conditions for being regarded as a source of information appear quite radical:  
The moment of testimonial injustice wrongfully denies someone their capacity as an 
informant, and in confining them to their entirely passive capacity as a source of information, 
it relegates them to the same epistemic status as a felled tree whose age one might glean from 
the number of rings (Fricker, 2007: 132-133).  
In contrast, throughout the trial, Tom Robinson is addressed as an informant by the jury 
rather than a source of information. Not only the manner in which he is interrogated, but his 
very position in the trial is a testament to this. It cannot be claimed that Robinson is restricted 
to an ‘entirely passive capacity’ as they ask him questions such as “why were you so anxious 
to do that woman’s chores?” and “why did you run so fast?” (Lee, 1960). There also seems to 
be a contradiction in Fricker’s claim that the jurors came to consider Tom Robinson as 
‘morally bad’ through epistemic objectification. Can an object be morally bad? Perhaps an 
object may be considered morally bad if it were used to cause some harm, such as a relic 
 
13 Berenstain criticises Fricker’s choice of fictionalised accounts to depict epistemic injustice against people of 
colour over the numerous real examples she could draw upon. See (Berenstain, 2020: 749 n30). 
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from war or some racist iconography. Even this is a stretch, however, as really when we call 
an object morally bad, we are, in fact, calling the person who used the object to cause harm or 
the person who created the object, morally bad. The jurors consider Tom Robinson to possess 
a morally bad character- something an object cannot possess.  
Pohlhaus too draws attention to this contradiction in Fricker’s account of epistemic 
objectification, arguing ‘it is precisely because [Sherwood and Robinson] are seen as 
epistemically unreliable subjects, with the capacity to deceive and/or to be deceived by a 
variety of sources, that allows perpetrators to perceive their testimony as not credible’ 
(Pohlhaus, 2014: 104). For a speaker to lack epistemic credibility because of their social 
identity, the speaker must first be recognised as a subject. In a footnote, Pohlhaus provides a 
real-world example that sounds closer to an instance of objectification whereby ‘one 
perceives another as wholly outside the epistemic economy, for example, as an animal not 
subject to the rules governing epistemic practices as in the conquest of the Americas by 
Europe and in US slavery’ (Pohlhaus, 2014: 104, n5). Pohlhaus represents an instance where 
a person is entirely dehumanised, yet this example is vastly different to that of Tom 
Robinson, who is addressed as an informant (albeit an unreliable one). Therefore, Fricker has 
failed to show that Tom Robinson has been reduced to a source of information.  
Moreover, further explanation is needed to show how epistemic objectification is a form of 
epistemic silencing in the first place. Although Fricker initially presents epistemic 
objectification as ‘the second way in which testimonial injustice might silence you’, the 
account appears starkly different from the model of epistemic silencing presented through 
pre-emptive testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007: 131). Following the fictionalised example of 
Tom Robinson, it remains unclear what characterises a case of epistemic objectification as a 
form of epistemic silencing instead of an instance of testimonial injustice for Fricker. Rather 
than presenting a case of silencing, Fricker seems to simply reiterate the idea that the primary 
harm of testimonial injustice is an assault on one’s identity qua human, as she concludes: 
‘this reveals the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice as epistemic objectification: when a 
hearer undermines a speaker in her capacity as a giver of knowledge, the speaker is 
epistemically objectified’ (Fricker, 2007: 133). Here, Fricker suggests that epistemic 




Indeed, Fricker makes no attempt to explain how being reduced to a source of information 
has led Tom Robinson to be silenced. Perhaps we ought to assume that, according to Fricker, 
an epistemic object (source of information) is silenced because the epistemic object is never 
addressed as an epistemic agent. Rather, they are ‘confined to the role of passive state of 
affairs from which knowledge might be gleaned’ (Fricker, 2007: 132). As such, the epistemic 
object is not asked for information, as any knowledge they can provide could be passively 
deduced:  
The subject is wrongfully excluded from the community of trusted informants, and this means 
that he is unable to be a participant in the sharing of knowledge (except in so far as he might 
be made use of as an object of knowledge through others using him as a source of 
information) (ibid).  
But suppose we assume that the silencing effect lies in being excluded from information 
sharing. If that case, we lose any distinction between epistemic objectification and pre-
emptive testimonial injustice, where the speaker suffers an advanced credibility deficit that 
prevents them from being addressed. Moreover, Tom Robinson is evidently not silenced in 
this way; he is addressed in court and, although his responses are considered unreliable, they 
are heard by the judge and jury.  Thus far, this appears to be an instance of testimonial 
injustice rather than silencing.  
To bolster epistemic objectification, Fricker draws parallels to the account of sexual 
objectification put forward by MacKinnon. MacKinnon argues that pornography constructs a 
social climate in which women are perceived to be sex objects. One way in which 
MacKinnon argues that such objectification can lead to silencing is through a credibility 
deficit. She urges that to be dehumanised and reduced to the status of an object is by 
definition ‘what it means to have no credibility’ (MacKinnon, 1987: 181). Fricker argues that 
the social construction MacKinnon describes, in which women are sexually objectified, can 
lead to an extreme form of testimonial injustice in which women’s epistemic status has 
diminished so drastically that ‘a fundamental communicative dysfunction’ may occur 
(Fricker, 2007: 139). Here, Fricker turns back to her theory of testimonial sensibility that she 
posited in her third chapter; while in this instance the woman does speak, through epistemic 
objectification it is as if she has not spoken at all: 
the dehumanizing sexual ideology is such that the man never really hears the woman at all—
her utterance simply fails to register with his testimonial sensibility. This is one construal of 
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the silencing that concerns MacKinnon: an extreme kind of testimonial injustice, 
characterized by a radical communication dysfunction (Fricker, 2007: 140). 
Testimonial sensibility refers to a faculty possessed by a well-trained virtuous agent who 
‘perceives his interlocutor in a way that is epistemically loaded - he perceives her as more, or 
less, credible in what she is telling him’ (Fricker, 2007: 71). Therefore, in a case of sexual 
objectification, when ‘her utterance fails to register with his testimonial sensibility’, no 
credibility judgement even occurs as the hearer fails to view the speaker as epistemically 
loaded in the first place.  
Although both are intended to support a case of epistemic objectification, Fricker's examples 
of racial objectification and sexual objectification are vastly different. As previously stated, 
Tom Robinson does not appear to be treated as a source of information but rather a speaking 
subject (a lying one). In the example of sexual objectification, the speaker is not received as a 
speaking subject at all as she has no epistemic capacity. Initially, this may appear to capture a 
case where one is treated as a source of information ‘recast in the role of passive bystander’ 
(Fricker, 2007: 132). However, Fricker adds that a source of information is ‘confined to the 
role of passive state of affairs from which knowledge might be gleaned’ (ibid). No 
knowledge is gleaned from the woman in MacKinnon’s scenario because she does not 
register at all within the man’s testimonial sensibility. The man does not view the woman 
through any kind of epistemic lens, as if the woman can convey no information at all.14 
Therefore, Tom Robinson seems to be at one end of the scale (as a speaking subject), and 
Mackinnon’s refusing woman seems to be at the other (devoid of any epistemic worth), 
whereas Fricker’s conception of a ‘source of information’ appears to sit somewhere between 
the two.   
Thus far, it is unclear what would be added to MacKinnon’s account by trying to frame it 
epistemologically, as this does not appear to be a case where someone has been silenced ‘in 
her capacity as a giver of knowledge’ (Fricker, 2007: 44).15 Pohlhaus, on the other hand, 
senses that there is merit in such an approach. For Pohlhaus, the sexually objectified woman 
in the case explored by Fricker has possessed the status of something less than an epistemic 
 
14 It is especially surprising that Fricker would advocate such an extreme form of objectification when her sole 
criticism of Hornsby and Langton’s speech-act account of silencing is that it requires too much ‘erosion of 
women’s human status before the silencing effect kicks in’ (Fricker, 2007: 142). 
15 A case could be made that in MacKinnon’s scenario the woman is subjected to epistemic injustice if her 
refusing ‘No’ was ignored on the understanding that she ‘doesn’t really know what she wants’. However, this 
would be an instance of testimonial injustice rather than testimonial silencing.  
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subject but more than an epistemic object. To salvage Fricker’s claim that epistemic injustice 
can reduce a person to less than a full epistemic subject, Pohlhaus proposes to replace 
Fricker’s subject-object distinction with a Subject-Other distinction. 
Pohlhaus draws on the work of Beauvoir, as framed by Cahill, to put forward the following 
conception of the Other:  
 those persons treated as “other” serve to recognize and maintain epistemic practices that 
make sense of the world as experienced from dominant subjectivities, but do not receive the 
same epistemic support with regard to their distinct lived experiences in the world (Pohlhaus, 
2014: 105).  
Pohlhaus borrows Cahill’s term ‘derivatization’ to capture the unidirectional relationship 
between Subject and Other. The Other exists purely in relation to the Subject and can only 
make expressions that fall within the Subject's being. The Other’s attempts to express their 
own being is ‘disregarded, ignored, or undervalued’; that is, if the speech expression is even 
recognised, as ‘it may well be so incomprehensible so as to be beyond the perceptual range of 
the derivatizer’ (Cahill, 2011: 32). Although the Other is considered to possess a minimal 
epistemic capacity, they are treated as though they have nothing to contribute to the shared 
pool of knowledge. With recourse to the case of sexual objectification, the Subject-Other 
conception instils a level of subjectivity in the victim (thus recognising the refusing ‘No’ to 
be more than just a noise):  
 In such cases, the other’s capacities as a subject are reduced to attending only to that which 
stems from the perpetrator’s subjectivity, so that anything the victim might try to express that 
exceeds the range of the perpetrator’s subjectivity is actively prohibited and/or left 
unrecognized by the perpetrator, even while he recognizes the victim as capable of having 
experiences, interests, and desires (Pohlhaus, 2014: 106, my italics). 
In other words, the ‘No’ of the woman refusing sex is either ‘actively prohibited’ by the 
perpetrator or passed over without recognition due to the woman’s epistemically diminished 
status as ‘Other’.  
I identify two problems with Pohlhaus’ revised account of epistemic objectification. The first 
is the agency Pohlhaus attributes to the perpetrator who ‘actively prohibited’ the woman from 
speaking. I do not deny that the perpetrator may actively silence the victim, and I certainly do 
not deny that the perpetrator is morally culpable. Rather, I argue that to frame this case as an 
instance of extreme testimonial injustice, one has to remember that a ‘definitive’ feature of 
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testimonial injustice is that it occurs in ‘the absence of deliberate, conscious manipulation’ 
(Fricker, 2017: 54). As previously discussed, Fricker draws a sharp distinction between 
epistemic injustices and a deliberate manipulation or prevention of another’s speech act. Yet, 
Pohlhaus’ account includes a potential for ‘actively prohibiting’ the speech of the Other. If 
Pohlhaus wants to frame the Subject-Other relation as a form of epistemic injustice, the act 
should be non-deliberate. Nevertheless, one could simply remove the ‘actively prohibited’ 
condition from Pohlhaus’ account so that it reads ‘anything the victim might try to express 
that exceeds the range of the perpetrator’s subjectivity is [...] left unrecognized by the 
perpetrator’. We can remove the suggestion of actively prohibiting speech without 
undermining anything central to Pohlhaus’ argument. However, this draws me to a second, 
more fatal, problem in Pohlhaus’ account of the Subject-Other: she has misconstrued a case 
of hermeneutical injustice for epistemic objectification.  
As I established above, Fricker defines hermeneutical injustice as: ‘the injustice of having 
some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding 
owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’ (Fricker, 
2007: 155). For Pohlhaus, the epistemic injustice of the Subject-Other relation lies in 
prohibiting the Other (intentionally or otherwise) from contributing toward a shared 
understanding:  
 she is treated as if her own lived experience from which she draws in order to add to the 
communal knowledge pool is simply a mirror (or perhaps shadow) of his own, but certainly 
not capable of contributing to our understanding of the world beyond (and in ways that might 
change the shape of) the scope of the derivatizer’s experienced world (Pohlhaus, 2014: 106).  
This account fits Fricker’s conception of hermeneutical injustice exactly, where the injustice 
lies in being structurally barred from contributing toward a shared understanding. Furthering 
the comparison, Pohlhaus adds that being cut off from epistemic practices can lead to an 
inability to articulate, and therefore make sense of, the Other’s experience. Pohlhaus supports 
this with the example of Winston in Orwell’s 1984, who lived in an environment where his 
experiences were ‘systematically not recognised’ and comes to question what is real 
(Pohlhaus, 2014: 106). This example echoes Fricker’s claim that hermeneutical injustice 
‘tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world, or at least the 
relevant region of the world’ (Fricker, 2007: 163). Thus, Pohlhaus fails to salvage Fricker’s 
account of epistemic objectification as a form of silencing, as she distorts Fricker’s account to 
the point that it resembles something much closer to hermeneutical injustice.  
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Overall, it is hard to see what Fricker adds to her account of epistemic silencing by 
introducing epistemic objectification. First, the marginalised knower does not seem to be 
objectified in the manner Fricker suggests. Second, there does not seem to be anything 
especially epistemic about epistemic objectification. Neither of the two examples that Fricker 
puts forward to support her account target the kind of epistemic harm she wants to illustrate 
here. In the case of the sexually objectified woman, her status as a person is so degraded that 
no information can even be gleaned from her. While she may be objectified, it is not clear 
that there is anything epistemic about this objectification as she does not even register as a 
source of information. In the case of Tom Robinson, though he suffered a deflated epistemic 
status, he was questioned directly as a person. In addition, he was perceived to be a morally 
bad person. Although this is certainly an epistemic injustice, it is not apparent that Tom 
Robinson was objectified. For this reason, I suggest that epistemic objectification ought not 
to count as a case of epistemic silencing. While Pohlhaus attempts to revise epistemic 
objectification, I find that her account skews epistemic objectification to the point that it is 
unrecognisable. However, Pohlhaus’ mischaracterisation of epistemic objectification raises 
an important question: can hermeneutical injustice lead to epistemic silencing? An answer to 
this question lies in a further examination of the impact of hermeneutical injustice, which is 
undertaken in the following section.  
 
2.3.  Hermeneutical Silencing  
 
2.3.1.  Fatal and Non-Fatal Hermeneutical Injustice  
 
To better understand the full extent of the harm caused by hermeneutical injustice, it is 
necessary first to consider Medina’s account of ‘hermeneutical death’ (Medina, 2017: 41). 
Medina sets out to measure the impact (‘depth’) of hermeneutical injustices on a sliding 
scale, with ‘non-fatal’ hermeneutical injustices on one end and ‘fatal’ hermeneutical 
injustices on the other. Non-fatal hermeneutical injustices are those ‘in which subjects may 
face unfair uptake in an isolated aspect of their life without leaving any mark in their 
interpretative powers and hermeneutical agency’ (Medina, 2017: 47). Fatal hermeneutical 
injustices, on the other hand, ‘reverberate across all the corners of one’s epistemic life, 
affecting one’s entire hermeneutical subjectivity, that is, one’s voice and capacity to make 
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sense and be understood’ (ibid). These fatal cases of hermeneutical injustice can lead to what 
Medina terms ‘hermeneutical death’: ‘the loss (or radical curtailment) of 1) ‘one’s voice’, 2) 
‘one’s interpretative capacities’ or 3) ‘one’s status as a participant in meaning-making and 
meaning-sharing practices’ (Medina, 2017: 41).  
Although Medina distinguishes hermeneutical death from other ‘non-fatal’ forms of 
hermeneutical injustice, the second and third aspect of ‘hermeneutical death’ are outcomes 
already recognised as necessary features of hermeneutical injustice by Fricker and are not as 
‘extremely rare’ as Medina suggests (Medina, 2017: 47). A loss of one’s ‘interpretative 
capacities’ is an essential feature of hermeneutical injustice for Fricker as it is contained in 
her very definition of the phenomenon; hermeneutical injustice is ‘the injustice of having 
some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding 
owing to persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalisation’ (Fricker, 2017: 154). As 
such, the subject undergoes what Fricker terms a ‘cognitive disadvantage’ as they cannot 
fully comprehend (or interpret) an area of their experience.  
Medina’s third feature of hermeneutical death, the exclusion from being a member of 
‘meaning-making and meaning sharing practices’, is also central to Fricker’s definition of 
hermeneutical injustice. In describing the upshot of hermeneutical injustice in cases of sexual 
harassment, Fricker observes: ‘the whole engine of collective social meaning was effectively 
geared to keeping these obscured experiences out of sight’ (Fricker, 2007: 153). Therefore, 
the only novel aspect of Medina’s ‘hermeneutical death’ that cannot be found in ‘non-fatal’ 
cases of hermeneutical injustice is ‘the loss (or radical curtailment) of one’s voice’ (Medina, 
2017: 41). This prompts the question: how can hermeneutical injustice lead to the loss of 
one’s voice? In search of the answer, I first turn to Medina’s central example of 
hermeneutical death:  
A good illustration of measures that contribute to hermeneutical annihilation can be found in 
slave trader’s practice of separating African slaves who spoke the same language to maximise 
communicative isolation and in US slaveholders’ practice of punishing slaves caught 
speaking African languages (Medina, 2017: 47). 
He furnishes this account in a footnote by adding that in some cases, this punishment 
involved ‘removing their tongues’ (Carnavale, 2012: 45, quoted by Medina). 
Although a poignant example of silencing in its most violent form, here, Medina misses the 
vital distinction between physical, active silencing, and passive silencing I made in the 
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introduction to this dissertation. These two strategies are intentional and active ways of 
curtailing speech expression, in contrast to passive, institutionalised hermeneutical injustice. 
Even if we were to forgo this distinction, Medina’s example would illustrate something closer 
to a pre-emptive form of silencing that is not distinctly hermeneutical. The slaves have not 
been silenced through exclusion from an interpretive framework. Rather, in line with 
Fricker’s account, Medina’s example represents more closely the category of pre-emptive 
testimonial injustice, as the slaves are pre-emptively prevented from producing testimony 
through methods of isolation by the slaveholders, thus condemning the slaves to silence.  
However, I am doubtful that Medina’s example can even be eligible as an instance of 
epistemic injustice. Although driven by a deep-set identity prejudice, the slaves are not 
silenced in virtue of a credibility deficit imposed on them by the slave traders. Instead, the 
slave traders intentionally employ a practice of silencing amongst slaves ‘in an attempt to 
thwart any uprising’ (Carnavale, 2012: 45). Therefore, the silencing is intentional (which is 
counter to the implicit nature of epistemic injustice emphasised by Fricker) and is not 
motivated by the slaves’ diminished status as a ‘knower’. The slave traders employ such 
methods in fear of colluding and solidarity amongst the slaves, suggesting a perceived level 
of epistemic ability. Thus, the examples Medina provides are not those of hermeneutical 
injustice, nor even an epistemic injustice, but of physical (or ‘active’) silencing. At this point, 
it is unclear how hermeneutical injustice can induce a ‘loss of one’s voice’ for Medina.  
Medina then suggests that the distinction he draws between ‘fatal’ and ‘non-fatal’ cases of 
hermeneutical injustice rests on how difficult the hermeneutical injustice is to overcome. 
Drawing on Fricker, Medina observes that non-fatal hermeneutical injustice can be tackled 
using ‘virtuous listening’. Fricker defines virtuous listening as ‘a more pro-active and socially 
aware kind of listening’ that would help ‘generate a more inclusive hermeneutical 
microclimate’ (Fricker, 2007: 171). In contrast, fatal cases of hermeneutical injustice call for 
more drastic action than appealing to virtuous listening. Medina argues that the most effective 
response to fatal hermeneutical injustice is ‘hermeneutical resistance’ (Medina, 2017: 48). To 
exact change, it is necessary to overhaul deep-seated hermeneutical practices by rallying a 
rebellion against communicative norms and forging a path toward a more inclusive 
interpretive framework. Medina illustrates a poignant case of hermeneutical resistance 
conducted by Sojourner Truth’s speech entitled ‘Ain’t I a Woman?’ in which she ‘[refuses] to 
accept established meanings of femininity and [insists] on the inclusion of alternative 
contents in the very meaning of ‘woman’’ (Medina, 2017: 50 n12).  
70 
 
A contemporary example of hermeneutical resistance can be found in the transgender 
community, which is in the process of challenging the interpretive framework. In 1996, 
Leslie Feinberg observed that the more sensitive language that has developed towards the 
transgender community had been ‘won by the liberation movements in the United States 
during the sixties and seventies’ (Feinberg, 1996: ix). Ze highlights the growing demand for 
non-binary pronouns (ze, zir, zirs, zirself), as ‘there are no pronouns in the English language 
as complex as I am, and I do not want to simplify myself in order to neatly fit one or the 
other’ (ibid). Through this upheaval of heterosexual normative communicative practices, 
transgender hermeneutical dissenters like Feinberg made the interpretive framework ever 
more inclusive of non-binary expression as non-binary pronouns are finally entering common 
parlance today. For example, in 2021, the White House added gender-inclusive pronoun 
choices on their online contact form.16 In the same year, Nancy Pelosi introduced a new set of 
rules for the 117th Congress at the House of Representatives, including implementing gender-
neutral language in House rules.17  
By introducing hermeneutical resistance, Medina has offered a crucial addition to Fricker’s 
account of overcoming hermeneutical injustice. It seems that imploring ‘virtuous listening’ 
from the epistemically privileged subject can only go some way towards creating a more 
inclusive hermeneutical framework. The hermeneutically silenced require more drastic 
measures in order to resist oppressive hermeneutical practices, as hermeneutical death can 
‘create a right (if not a duty) to fight epistemically by any means necessary (including the 
right to lie, to hide, to sabotage, to silence others, etc.)’ (Medina, 2017: 49). Nevertheless, an 
account of hermeneutical silencing has yet to be fleshed out in Medina’s work; we are left 
wanting a distinction between non-fatal cases of hermeneutical injustice that require virtuous 
listening and hermeneutical death, which calls for insurrection.  
I argue that the distinction between non-fatal hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical death 
lies in whether crucial hermeneutical resources are suppressed or absent entirely. The former 
pertains to Pohlhaus’ concept of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, whereas the latter is a case 
 
16 See Popat, S., (2021). Biden kicks off inclusive LGBT agenda. [online] BBC News. Available at: 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-55814358> [Accessed 5 February 2021]. 
17 See Wakefield, L., 2021. US House of Representatives approves gender-neutral language rules in stunning 
victory for diversity and inclusion. [online] PinkNews - Gay news, reviews and comment from the world's most 
read lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans news service. Available at: 
<https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2021/01/05/house-of-representatives-gender-neutral-official-language-nancy-
pelosi-new-rules/> [Accessed 5 February 2021]. 
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of hermeneutical lacuna. In what follows, I tease the two apart and demonstrate the different 
harms they produce.  
 
2.3.2.  Wilful Hermeneutical Ignorance and Hermeneutical Lacuna  
 
Drawing on Carol Gilligan, Fricker posits that it could be the case that women have 
developed an intuitive or emotional expressive style concerning ethical judgements that are 
quite different to that of men: ‘a voice that is not recognized as rational but is rather 
marginalised as morally immature’ (Fricker, 2007: 160). Reinstating her example of Marge 
Sherwood being told by Herbert Greenleaf ‘Marge, there’s female intuition, and then there 
are facts—’, Fricker argues that the expressive style of women in ethical judgements is 
‘unjustly afflicted by a hermeneutical gap’ (Fricker, 2007: 161).  
Yet, there seems to be something distinct about Marge Sherwood's case compared to 
Fricker’s other paradigmatic examples. The woman who expresses ethical judgements 
through an ‘emotional’ and ‘intuitive’ language is not confronted by a gap in the 
hermeneutical resources, as Fricker suggests. She does not falter in her speech expression like 
Carmita Wood attempting to report a case of sexual harassment. Marge clearly possesses the 
correct hermeneutical resources to convey her thoughts. Moreover, this expressive style has 
not emerged from a vacuum. The ‘different voice’ concerning ethical judgements has 
developed out of the female community where women like Marge are members. Marge is 
communicatively unintelligible to Herbert, not because she does not possess the 
hermeneutical resources to convey her ethical judgement, but because Herbert does not 
recognise Marge’s expressive style as rational or valid. The female expressive style is 
suppressed in favour of the dominant, male expressive style. I propose that Marge is not 
faced with a hermeneutical lacuna but what Pohlhaus calls ‘wilful hermeneutical ignorance’ 
(Pohlhaus, 2012).  
Pohlhaus suggests that dominantly situated individuals need to take-up currently localised 
hermeneutical resources to grant them widespread epistemic force. Without uptake of these 
hermeneutical resources, marginalised individuals cannot successfully communicate their 
experience beyond their own communities:  
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When a group with material power is vested in ignoring certain parts of the world, they can 
maintain their ignorance by refusing to recognize and by actively undermining any newly 
generated epistemic resource that attends to those parts of the world that they are vested in 
ignoring (Pohlhaus. 2012: 729). 
As the experiences of marginally situated knowers extend beyond the scope of those more 
dominantly situated, the latter are not required to understand these experiences. Turning away 
from marginalised groups' experiences in this way, Pohlhaus argues, is an act of wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance. Pohlhaus revisits Fricker’s discussion of Harper Lee’s novel To Kill 
A Mockingbird and reframes the epistemic harm experienced by Tom Robinson as wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance: ‘it is not simply that the true meaning of Robinson’s words is 
unintelligible to the jury, but also that those words are received by the jury in a way that 
means something entirely different from Robinson’s actual accurate account’ (Pohlhaus, 
2012: 726). In cases of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, hermeneutical resources developed 
by marginally situated knowers are wilfully misunderstood by the dominantly situated 
knowers (in this instance, the jury).  
What is distinctive about wilful hermeneutical ignorance is that there is no lacuna in the 
interpretative framework. The ‘different voice’ that is expressed draws on pre-existing 
resources cultivated by a marginalised group. These resources simply lack credibility due to 
the identity prejudice attached to the marginalised culture they belong to. This detail holds 
some significance, as Fricker has been accused of overlooking the existing wealth of 
hermeneutical resources that belong to marginalised communities by scholars such as 
Berenstain (2020), Medina (2012), Dotson (2012) and Mason (2011). In the words of Mason:  
 Fricker fails to countenance the possibility that marginalized subjects have non-dominant 
interpretive resources from which they can draw to understand and describe their experiences 
despite absences or distortions that exist in so-called collective hermeneutical resources 
(Mason, 2011: 295). 
Although this distinction is not made explicit in her work in the same way as Pohlhaus, 
Fricker seems to acknowledge that a marginalised group can inherit a marginalised 
interpretive framework. In this case, the problem is not that the marginalised group lack 
hermeneutical resources, but that their expressive style is viewed as inferior: ‘the 
characteristic expressive style of a given social group may be rendered just as much of an 




Consequently, we can broaden Fricker’s account to encompass the hermeneutical injustice 
that Mason and others distinguish in the literature: a case of hermeneutical injustice where a 
‘non-dominant’ hermeneutical framework is suppressed in favour of a dominant form. 
Although she does not identify it as wilful hermeneutical ignorance, an example of this can 
be found in Scrutton’s work on epistemic injustice in psychiatric illness. Scrutton draws on a 
study of people who interpret their experience of auditory hallucinations as positive and 
important life events. The study found that people with psychiatric illness often sought a 
spiritual understanding of their voice-hearing, that conflicted with the medical interpretation 
encouraged by doctors (Jackson et al. 2010: 149). Scrutton makes the following observation:  
 Unlike paradigmatic forms of hermeneutical injustice, here it is not the case that an 
experience is not understood at all on account of the absence of a valid interpretation for it. 
Rather, one valid perspective on an experience is lost because another valid perspective is 
dominant or exclusive, giving rise to a one-sided interpretation (Scrutton, 2017: 350). 
In this instance of hermeneutical injustice, the subject has the hermeneutical resources to 
describe their experiences. Those who interpret their auditory hallucinations as a spiritual 
experience likely have the hermeneutical resources in virtue of their participation in a 
religious community. Through meaning-making in this community, a certain interpretation, 
albeit a marginalised one, has emerged.  
To understand the difference between wilful hermeneutical ignorance and hermeneutical 
lacuna, it is important to first overcome Mason’s argument that all cases of hermeneutical 
injustice are instances where marginalised hermeneutical resources have been suppressed. 
With recourse to Pohlhaus, we can understand this to mean that all hermeneutical injustice is, 
in fact, wilful hermeneutical ignorance. If Mason is correct, what Fricker identifies as a 
lacuna of hermeneutical resources is, in reality, suppression of pre-existing resources. Mason 
takes issue with Fricker’s claim that victims of sexual harassment were ‘left deeply troubled, 
confused, and isolated’, unable to make sense of the injustice that has befallen her (Fricker, 
2007: 151). Mason argues that the victims of sexual harassment deserve more credit and 
believes Fricker has passed over the ‘non-dominant hermeneutical resources’ that the victims 
of sexual harassment already possessed to make sense of their experience: 
As recounted by Brownmiller, Wood sought out feminist Lin Farley, voluntarily shared her 
experiences of workplace maltreatment with Farley's consciousness-raising group, and helped 
organize and participated in a speak-out on the topic—all while appealing the decision to 
deny her unemployment insurance claim (Brownmiller 1999, 280). These were not the actions 
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of a woman mystified by her experiences of a yet-to-be-named phenomenon; rather, the 
silencing to which she had previously been subject was exploded by the coalition she formed 
with other women who both corroborated and supplemented her experiences with their own. 
(Mason, 2011: 297). 
By overlooking these non-dominant hermeneutical resources, Mason argues that Fricker 
underestimates these sexually harassed women's epistemic capacity, portraying them as 
flummoxed by their experiences until the term ‘sexual harassment’ offered them a ‘eureka’ 
moment.  
Mason is right that it is important to acknowledge the epistemic agency of the victims of 
sexual harassment and that it would be a disservice to reduce them to ‘rabbits in the 
headlights’. However, it would also be uncharitable to assume that Fricker believed these 
women possessed absolutely no epistemic agency or interpretive capacity. To organise a 
consciousness-raising group, Wood, of course, understood that she had been wronged in 
some capacity. However, there is a difference between having absolutely no understanding of 
something, for instance, my own grasp of quantum mechanics, and not being able to fully 
articulate a gut feeling of unease, as I understand Wood’s experience to be. Moreover, it is 
important to remember that these women were battling against a dominant understanding that 
systematically insisted that the harassment they were subjected to was harmless flirting. If 
everyone Wood attempted to speak to about her harassment asserted that what she had 
experienced was harmless flirting, or if she belonged to a culture where sexual harassment 
was the norm, it is not an insult to the intelligence of sexually harassed women like Wood to 
suggest that she may have struggled to fully make sense of the wrong she had been subjected 
to. Indeed, the collective social understanding ensures that such experiences are challenging 
to understand.  
There seems to be a clear difference between the marginalised group in Scrutton’s example 
described above and that of Carmita Wood. The patient in Scrutton’s example of 
hermeneutical injustice is not ‘deeply troubled’ or ‘confused’ by the injustice inflicted on her 
by the doctor; instead, she expresses a clear understanding or her experience: 
I just felt that this really positive experience was just scrutinised and just not, just like 
mocked. I didn’t feel offended, I just thought they were being really stupid, and disregarding 
this kind of, yeah, really important thing (Holly, cited in Heriot-Maitland et al. 2012: 46). 
75 
 
The experience of auditory hallucination is understood because the marginalised groups 
undergoing wilful hermeneutical ignorance are already members of communities that have 
developed their own dissonant voice. After all, ‘without community there is no liberation, 
only the most vulnerable and temporary armistice between an individual and her oppression’ 
(Lorde, 2007: 18).  When Wood suffers a hermeneutical lacuna, it is before her finding a 
community in which a feminist consciousness could be nurtured.  When she does find a 
community of sexual harassment survivors, they undertake collaborative, meaning-making 
exercises and thereby put the vague sense of wrong they had been experiencing into words.  
While Mason suggests that overcoming the hermeneutical gap is solely based on the 
development of the term ‘sexual harassment’ for Fricker ex-nihilo, it is interesting to note 
that the ‘click, aha!’ moment, in fact, occurred before this:  
Lin's students had been talking in her seminar about the unwanted sexual advances they'd 
encountered on their summer jobs,’ Sauvigne relates. ‘And then Carmita Wood comes in and 
tells Lin her story. We realized that to a person, every one of us—the women on staff, 
Carmita, the students—had had an experience like this at some point, you know? And none of 
us had ever told anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound 
revelation (Brownmiller, 1990: 280-281).   
In the quote above, we see the formation of a community whereby a marginalised collective 
understanding begins to take shape. Mason fails to acknowledge that Wood is subjected to a 
hermeneutical lacuna before (not after) her participation in this meaning-making exercise. 
After forming this group, the hermeneutical resources she has developed are vulnerable to 
wilful hermeneutical ignorance. Due to her marginalised status, it will likely take time for 
Wood’s newfound understanding of sexual harassment to become part of the dominant 
interpretive framework. Yet, thanks to these hermeneutical resources, she no longer suffers 
the ‘acute cognitive disadvantage’ that accompanies a hermeneutical lacuna.  
In light of Mason’s criticisms, it is worth adding that a hermeneutical lacuna can still occur 
even if there are existing hermeneutical resources to express an experience. Here I refer to 
cases in which a marginalised subject is structurally barred from accessing pre-existing 
hermeneutical resources, perhaps because they are part of an institution that shields its 
members from particular hermeneutical resources, for instance, in a religious community. 
Alternatively,  the marginalised subject has been ‘protected’ from such hermeneutical 
resources due to their age. An example of this can be found in Feinberg’s narrative of her 
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childhood, where she recounts a gap in her vocabulary to describe an experience of 
homosexuality: 
I was taught there was only one official meaning of the word love - the kind between men and 
women that leads to marriage. No adult ever mentioned men loving men or women loving 
women in my presence. I never heard it discussed anywhere. There was no word at that time 
in my English language to express the sheer joy of loving someone of the same sex (Feinberg, 
1996: 4).  
Although the word ‘homosexuality’ existed, Feinberg was not part of a community where she 
could participate in collaborative meaning-making practices. As such, she was structurally 
barred as a child from accessing vital hermeneutical resources. For this reason, she was 
unable to understand, let alone articulate, an experience of homosexuality. Kidd and Carel 
call this ‘epistemic isolation’, whereby hermeneutical injustice arises because a marginalised 
knower does not have access to pre-existing hermeneutical resources (Kidd & Carel, 2017: 
183-184). As Kidd and Carel suggest, there is still a hermeneutical lacuna in place when 
hermeneutical injustice occurs via epistemic isolation (as opposed to wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance). Although the hermeneutical resource exists, the marginalised knower is socially 
positioned so that it does not exist for them. For this reason, a gap in their hermeneutical 
resources persists.  
Following Medina’s distinction, I propose that wilful hermeneutical ignorance pertains to a 
case of non-fatal hermeneutical injustice, and hermeneutical lacuna is a case of fatal 
hermeneutical injustice. Recall, for Medina non-fatal hermeneutical injustice occurs when 
‘subjects may face unfair uptake in an isolated aspect of their life without leaving any mark in 
their interpretative powers’ (Medina, 2017: 47).18 Wilful hermeneutical ignorance seems to 
fit this description as, due to the hermeneutical resources they have obtained through their 
community, the marginalised knower does not suffer an acute cognitive disadvantage. As 
such, their interpretive powers are intact. The second feature of non-fatal hermeneutical 
injustice I drew out from Medina’s work is that it can be overcome if the dominantly situated 
individual exercises a reflexive, ‘virtuous listening’ to the hermeneutical resources used by 
 
18 Medina does add that in a cases of non-fatal hermeneutical injustice, not only are the ‘interpretive powers’ of 
the marginalised knower in tact but also their ‘hermeneutical agency’ (Medina, 2017: 47). Though Pohlhaus’ 
account we can clearly see that the hermeneutical agency of the marginalised knower is impacted. I exclude this 
feature from Medina’s description of non-fatal hermeneutical injustice for the purpose of using it as a working 
term, because I cannot see how it could be a case of hermeneutical injustice at all if the hermeneutical agency of 
the marginalised knower is not impacted.  
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the marginalised knower. Indeed, Pohlhaus suggests that wilful hermeneutical ignorance can 
be ameliorated through virtuous listening when discussing Scout’s immunity to the unequal 
hermeneutical practices in her community: ‘If she continues to listen to racialized others in 
this way, Scout stands a chance not just of believing persons she ought to believe, but of 
learning to use epistemic resources that attend to the experienced world beyond dominant 
interests’ (Pohlhaus, 2012: 730). Although Pohlhaus does not say as much, this is clearly 
what Fricker has in mind for ‘virtuous listening’. Through such careful listening, a dominant 
knower can avoid succumbing to the wilful hermeneutical ignorance that has influenced those 
around them.  
In contrast, cases of hermeneutical lacuna fit Medina’s definition of fatal hermeneutical 
injustice. Whereas in a case of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, there is a marginalised 
speaking subject whose non-dominant hermeneutical resources are considered irrational and 
invalid, in an instance of hermeneutical lacuna, the marginalised knower has no 
hermeneutical resources with which to express themselves. Prior to any speech act taking 
place, there are ‘blanks where there should be the name of an experience which it is in the 
interests of the subject to be able to render communicatively intelligible’ (Fricker, 2007: 
160).  Consequently, the marginalised subject can only pass over their experience in silence: 
‘Her hermeneutical disadvantage renders her unable to make sense of her ongoing 
mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from protesting it, let alone securing effective 
measures to stop it’ (Fricker, 2007: 151). Finally, through this distinction between wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance and hermeneutical lacuna, an account of hermeneutical silencing 
emerges. The fatal form of hermeneutical injustice whereby the marginalised knower’s 
voiced is ‘radically curtailed’ occurs when there is a hermeneutical lacuna. Henceforth, this 
shall be referred to as hermeneutical silencing.  
Although those impacted by wilful hermeneutical ignorance undergo a serious wrong, I argue 
that the ‘acute cognitive disadvantage’ described by Fricker is limited to cases of 
hermeneutical silencing.  Victims of hermeneutical silencing are deprived of the 
hermeneutical resources to make sense of the wrong inflicted upon them, unlike those who 
fall victim to wilful hermeneutical ignorance. This cognitive disadvantage's disabling effect is 
apparent in the ‘life-changing flash of enlightenment’ experienced when a hermeneutical 
lacuna has been overcome (Fricker 2007: 153). Fricker illustrates an instance of 
‘hermeneutical breakthrough’ via the case of Wendy Sanford, who is introduced to the term 
‘postpartum depression’ after participating in a university-based workshop. In a ‘life-
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changing forty-five minutes’, she can make sense of her own experience of postpartum 
depression. Consequently, a ‘hermeneutical darkness’ is ‘suddenly lifted from Wendy 
Sandford’s mind’ (Fricker, 2007: 149). The epiphany that occurs through the creation of 
hermeneutical resources demonstrates the debilitating effect hermeneutical silencing can 
cause compared to wilful hermeneutical ignorance. This makes hermeneutical silencing 
particularly difficult to expose compared to wilful hermeneutical ignorance, as it is easier to 
detect suppression of hermeneutical resources than the non-existence of resources. 
The ‘hermeneutical breakthrough’ that both Wendy Sanford and Carmita Wood experience 
leads to hermeneutical resistance, and in turn overcomes the fatal form of hermeneutical 
injustice (Medina, 2017: 49). Once both women eventually find a community of people who 
are subjected to the same identity prejudice and undergo the same marginalised experiences, 
they can resist the established dominant framework and instead ‘work toward the formation 
of original meanings, alternative expressive styles, and new horizons of interpretation’ (ibid). 
While wilful hermeneutical ignorance may be combatted through virtuous listening, 
hermeneutical silencing calls for hermeneutical resistance through collaborative meaning-
making practices in a marginalised community; what Lorde called ‘a war against the 
tyrannies of silence’ (Lorde, 2007: 41).  
To summarise this section, I have teased apart two distinct forms of hermeneutical injustice 
using Medina’s categories of ‘fatal’ and ‘non-fatal’ hermeneutical injustice. Wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance takes the form of non-fatal hermeneutical injustice, where the 
marginalised subject may belong to a community whose meaning-making practices are 
suppressed. This causes hermeneutical frustration for the marginalised knower, as their 
speech expressions go unrecognised by the dominantly positioned knowers. To overcome this 
form of hermeneutical injustice, a reflexive, virtuous listening to the dissonant expressive 
style of the hermeneutically marginalised should suffice. In contrast, fatal hermeneutical 
injustice occurs when the marginalised knower is met with a hermeneutical lacuna where 
resources to describe their experience ought to be. In this instance, the marginalised knower 
is not merely hermeneutically frustrated but hermeneutically silenced. This fatal form of 
hermeneutical injustice can only be overcome through hermeneutical resistance, whereby the 
marginalised knower finds a community where new hermeneutical resources can be forged. 
A clear distinction between the features of fatal and non-fatal hermeneutical injustice can be 
found in the table below:   
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 Non-fatal Hermeneutical 
Injustice 
Fatal Hermeneutical Injustice 
Status of Hermeneutical 
Resource 
Suppressed by the 
dominant interpretive 
framework 
Absent for the marginalised knower 





Means to overcome Virtuous listening Hermeneutical resistance 
Capacity for detection of 
injustice 
Comparatively easier to 
detect 
Comparatively harder to detect 
Consequences Hermeneutical frustration  Hermeneutical silencing  
 
I end by drawing attention to an important distinction between pre-emptive testimonial 
injustice and hermeneutical silencing. Like in the case of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, 
hermeneutically silenced subjects are barred from participating in the pooling of information 
before a speech-act has even taken place. In the case of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, this 
is because the marginalised subject is simply not asked for information (to ‘share their 
thoughts, their judgements, their opinions’) in the first place (Fricker, 2007: 130). On the 
other hand, in hermeneutical silencing, even if the marginalised subject were invited to 
participate in the pooling of information, they would lack the necessary hermeneutical 
capacity to clearly express their position. This is because ‘the moment of hermeneutical 
injustice comes only when the background condition is realized in a more or less doomed 
attempt on the part of the subject to render an experience intelligible, either to herself or to an 
interlocutor’ (Fricker, 2007: 159). Thus, the hermeneutically silenced lack something even 
more primordial than those exposed to pre-emptive testimonial injustice: they lack the 
hermeneutical resources to construct a speech expression. To conclude this chapter, I 
introduce a final sub-type of fatal hermeneutical injustice that, while overlooked in Fricker’s 
account, is an overarching theme in Black feminist literature.  
2.3.3.  Hermeneutical Silencing as Empty Speech Expression    
 
Thus, in a case of fatal hermeneutical injustice, the marginalised knower is socially 
positioned in such a way that they have no hermeneutical resources with which to articulate 
themselves. I propose that a person who meets such a hermeneutical lacuna has two options. 
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They can either pass over their experience in silence or attempt to adopt the voice of their 
oppressors because it is the only voice they have with which to speak. I refer to this form of 
hermeneutical silencing where one attempts to fill a hermeneutical lacuna with ill-fitting 
dominant hermeneutical resources as ‘empty speech expression’.  
For those who suffer from fatal hermeneutical injustice, it may feel like the hermeneutical 
resources of those better positioned in society are the only hermeneutical resources with 
which to speak. bell hooks depicted a poignant example of this, whereby she argued that 
Black women were ‘placed in a double bind’ in trying to locate their political voice (hooks, 
2015: 3). At the time of writing, she observed that Black women were often forced to speak 
with the language devised by White women’s liberation circles to assert their feminist beliefs; 
a language that did not acknowledge Black women's experiences and a language imbued with 
racism. Alternatively, she could adopt the voice of Black male suffrage, which in turn 
endorsed a patriarchal social order that failed to include her experiences as a woman (ibid).  
While bell hooks, through her pathbreaking work, exercised hermeneutical resistance and 
rejected the limitations of each interpretive framework, it is not hard to imagine those who 
were forced to take up these ill-suited voices as their own: either the hermeneutical resources 
of better positioned marginalised groups, like those described above, or the white male voice 
that spoke loudest of all. As Lorde observes: 
in order to survive, those of us for whom oppression is as american as apple pie have always 
had to be watchers, to become familiar with the language and manners of the oppressor, even 
sometimes adopting them for some illusion of protection (Lorde, 2007: 10).  
Initially, this form of silencing may appear to be an unusual addition to the narrow scope of 
epistemic silencing that I have established thus far. Unlike my previous examples of 
epistemic silencing, here we have a speaking subject. However, the hermeneutical resources 
with which the marginalised knower speaks do not articulate her own marginalised 
experiences. 
For instance, rather than pass over the nameless experience in silence, Carmita Wood may 
attempt to report her harasser. In doing so, as many others had, she may resort to calling the 
incident ‘unwanted flirting’. In this sense, the hermeneutically marginalised knower speaks.  
However, this term (designated by the dominant interpretive framework) is alien to Wood’s 
experience of sexual harassment. In other domains where she actually is flirted with, this 
word has meaning. But in this context, to describe this experience of what we now know to 
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be sexual harassment, the speech expression fails in a significant way. Although she speaks, 
the hermeneutical lacuna persists. For this reason, her speech expression is ‘empty’.  Worse 
still, by adopting the dominant interpretive framework, she only strengthens the voices of 
those who oppress her. In this sense, she is hermeneutically silenced. It is this form of 
silencing that prompts Lorde’s rallying cry: ‘For those of us who write, it is necessary to 
scrutinize not only the truth of what we speak, but the truth of that language by which we 
speak it. For others, it is to share and spread also those words that are meaningful to us.’ 
(Lorde, 2007: 43, my italics).19  
2.4. Conclusion  
 
In her opening to ‘Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice’, Fricker asks: ‘What does the 
concept of epistemic injustice do for us? What should we want it to do?’ (Fricker, 2017: 53). 
Following this chapter, I would like to pose these questions in light of epistemic silencing: 
What does the concept of epistemic silencing do for us? What should we want it to do? The 
concept of epistemic silencing forces us to re-examine the full impact of persistent and 
systematic cases of epistemic injustice. This chapter has demonstrated that routine epistemic 
injustice can obstruct one’s basic human capacity to express oneself altogether. Moreover, by 
delineating epistemic silencing as a distinctive outcome of epistemic injustice, we have been 
able to extricate cases of silencing qua one’s epistemic status from more general accounts of 
silencing, which have become amalgamated in the literature.  
In filling out the framework for epistemic silencing, two distinct kinds have emerged: 
testimonial silencing and hermeneutical silencing. In revising Fricker’s account of testimonial 
silencing, I have jettisoned the concept of epistemic objectification in favour of testimonial 
self-silencing to better fit Fricker’s definition. Following this, I have identified hermeneutical 
silencing as a form of epistemic silencing missing from Fricker’s account. I presented two 
distinct uses of the term hermeneutical injustice in the literature: 1) cases in which a non-
dominant expressive style is suppressed in favour of a dominant one (wilful hermeneutical 
 
19 It is worth adding that those subjected to wilful hermeneutical ignorance, though they have their own 
hermeneutical resources, may adopt the dominant framework too. One reason for this may be to communicate 
with the dominant community, because their own hermeneutical resources would likely be dismissed as 
irrational. Alternatively, in line with Lorde, it may be in the interests of those condemned to wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance to commit to the behavioural conformity of the dominant voice for one’s own 
protection. In this instance, the marginalised knower is not silenced, because they still retain the hermeneutical 
resources required to make sense of their experiences.  
82 
 
ignorance) and 2) cases where there is a gap in the hermeneutical resources (hermeneutical 
lacuna). I concluded that the latter is, in fact, an instance of hermeneutical silencing, as 
without the words to express an experience, it must be passed over in silence. Finally, I 
introduced a sub-type of hermeneutical silencing, whereby the marginalised subject is forced 
to adopt the dominant interpretive framework. As such, they are inhibited from 
communicating their unique experiences.  
As a new contribution to the field (in the form I have proposed), the next question to ask is: 
what is the harm of hermeneutical silencing? While victims of hermeneutical silencing are 
vulnerable to the same primary and secondary harms as those inflicted with epistemic 
injustice, I argue that hermeneutical silencing can lead to distinct phenomenological 
ramifications to the marginalised subject’s being-in-the-world. Building on Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account developed in chapter one, the following chapter will explore the 























In his 1945 essay ‘The War Has Taken Place’, Merleau-Ponty recognises the limitations of 
his most successful work, Phenomenology of Perception, completed only the previous year. 
As the title suggests, the latter took as its focus the nature of perception. Through case studies 
of the phenomenologically diverse, Merleau-Ponty sought to expose the various dimensions 
of lived embodiment through 'a direct description of our experience such as it is' (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012: lxx). With the exception of people with rare illnesses, he took as given that all 
individuals are launched on to an even playing field, open to endless possibilities of 
expression. Universally, Merleau-Ponty takes consciousness to be 'destined to a world that it 
neither encompasses nor possesses, but toward which it never ceases to be directed' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxxii). It takes coming to terms with the fact that 'the war has taken 
place' for Merleau-Ponty to revise his belief in individual freedom. Through this paper, a 
seemingly shell-shocked Merleau-Ponty recognises that we are not individuals but citizens, 
and our influence as citizens has invisible reverberations across the phenomenal field. 
Unbeknownst to us, every action we take (or do not take) alters the phenomenological 
landscape. The horrors of the second world war were not orchestrated by just one man. 
Rather, it was a milieu of individual actions that directed history toward such violent ends 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2007b).  
Merleau-Ponty attributes the invisibility of the individual's influence on the 
phenomenological landscape to the comforting lull of the pre-war 'world situation' in which 
France was absorbed: 'we did not think there were Jews and Germans but only men, or even 
consciousness. It seemed to us that at every moment each of us chose to be and do what he 
wished with an ever-new freedom' (Merleau-Ponty, 2007b: 45). Even when the war began, 
free subjects continued to exist in a world that conveniently obscured the impact every 
embodied expression had upon others. However, the aftermath unmasked the power of even 
the most subtle of embodied expressions and the capacity of our gestures to drastically 
infringe upon the gestures of others: 'we had not understood that consciousness has the 
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strange power to alienate each other and to withdraw from themselves; that they are 
outwardly threatened and inwardly tempted by absurd hatreds, inconceivable with respect to 
individuals' (Merleau-Ponty, 2007b: 46). The purpose of this chapter is to imbue Merleau-
Ponty's account of 'Body as Expression, and Speech' from the Phenomenology of Perception 
with the political insight that struck Merleau-Ponty against the backdrop of post-war France. 
In the first chapter, I established an account of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
framework, according to which the subject, qua their human nature, is gifted with the miracle 
of speech expression. Through speech expression, the subject can launch themselves into a 
meaningful world. Here, by his own admission, Merleau-Ponty failed to consider the freedom 
of gesture (such as the linguistic gesture) as not only an essential human capacity but a 
privilege: 'from our birth we had been used to handling freedom and to living an individual 
life. How then could we have known that these were hard to come by?' (Merleau-Ponty, 
2007b: 42). Although I concede that speech expression is a fundamental form of bodily 
action, in light of the fast-growing epistemic injustice movement we can now understand that 
speech expression does not take place within a stable or neutral power equilibrium. Rather, 
the ability to gear one's body toward speech expression is limited by an unequal 
hermeneutical climate. Hermeneutical gaps built into the very structure of this climate limit 
marginalised groups from participation in speech expression. Given the structural nature of 
hermeneutical injustice, the unequal hermeneutical climate is blindly created and sustained by 
the communicative practices of those in a dominant social position, despite their best 
intentions: 'when we look closely at things, we find culprits nowhere but accomplices 
everywhere' (Merleau-Ponty, 2007b: 43).  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the phenomenological ramifications of this unequal 
hermeneutical terrain. Borrowing the methodology of Merleau-Ponty's essay 'The War Has 
Taken Place', the first section examines the landscape of human consciousness in a state of 
ignorance. Here I unpack the hermeneutically privileged life-world, which reflects the 
transcendental experience described in Phenomenology of Perception. A framework is then 
developed that considers Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice through the lens of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of speech expression. In the second section, I develop a 
phenomenological account of hermeneutical silencing. I examine the role of 'dissonance' in 
Fricker's understanding of epistemic harm, extracting two different uses of the term in her 
work. Following Fricker's invitation to 'dig a little deeper into the nature of the primary 
aspect - the situated hermeneutical inequality- to see whether it might sometimes extend to 
85 
 
influence the construction of the individual subject', this section expands Fricker's account of 
dissonance to include embodied dissonance (Fricker, 2007: 163). Rather than constituting a 
mere psychological disadvantage, I argue that hermeneutical silencing can produce a 
breakdown in the body-world synthesis. Finally, I offer some thoughts on how we may 
ameliorate this phenomenological dysfunction. I propose that Merleau-Ponty's conception of 
'speaking speech' can be used as a tool for hermeneutical resistance, as understood by Medina 
(2012). Through this phenomenological approach to investigations in epistemic injustice, I 




3.1.  A Phenomenology of Hermeneutical Privilege  
 
3.1.1.  The Method 
 
The Merleau-Pontian method of phenomenological investigation usually takes pathology as 
its starting point: 'The study of a pathological case has thus allowed us to catch sight of a new 
mode of analysis – existential analysis – that goes beyond the classical alternatives between 
empiricism and intellectualism' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 138). By focusing on abnormal or 
'disrupted' lived body experiences, Merleau-Ponty can shed light on the constitution of our 
'common' phenomenal experience. For instance, Merleau-Ponty utilises the renowned case 
study of 'phantom limb syndrome' to elucidate the general experience of limbs.  Through this 
method, Merleau-Ponty achieves his own brand of epoche (the transcendental 
phenomenological reduction), as the pathological case study draws our attention to the 
overlooked structure of everyday experience.  
For an investigation into the phenomenological structure of hermeneutical injustice, I propose 
to reverse this methodology. Merleau-Ponty adopted this approach to expose the embodied 
constitution of the familiar experience, which would ordinarily remain unnoticed: 
'pathological phenomena make something flicker before our eyes' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
126). By contrast, our aim here is to draw the reader's attention toward the covert 
hermeneutical injustices that marginalised groups are systematically subjected to and yet are 
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'inevitably hard to detect' (Fricker, 2007: 152). Rather than using the marginalised experience 
to expose the familiar, I shall describe the familiar experience to shed light on the 
marginalised. This strategy is adopted in the literature on privilege.   
Discussions on privilege can be traced back to W.E.B Du Bois (1920), who coined the term 
'white-skin privilege' to describe the systematic social and psychological advantage afforded 
to white people in comparison to their black counterparts (Du Bois, 2003: 130). He argued 
that with the status of whiteness comes a sense of perpetual belonging to the world: 
'whiteness is the ownership of the earth, forever and ever, Amen!' (Du Bois, 2003: 83). Peggy 
McIntosh revitalised the academic study of privilege in 1988, expanding its scope to 
encompass all who enjoy a dominant social position. McIntosh understands privilege 'as an 
invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which 
I was "meant" to remain oblivious' and sets as her task the exposure of this privilege to those 
who are unfairly granted it (McIntosh, 1989: 1). She argues that, although it is challenging to 
face the system of oppression that renders non-dominant groups powerless, we find it even 
harder to face the benefits this system offers us; a system that is strengthened by such denial. 
For instance, a person who is willing to concede that certain groups are under-represented in 
the higher-level positions of their workplace may nevertheless struggle to recognise that their 
privilege has helped them get promoted over their marginalised co-workers. McIntosh argues 
that, given its elusive nature, freedom such us this passes us by unnoticed. As Kimmel puts it, 
'to be white, or straight, or male, or middle-class is to be simultaneously ubiquitous and 
invisible. You're everywhere you look, you're the standard against which everyone else is 
measured. You're like water, like air' (Kimmel, 2018: 3). By examining the taken-for-granted 
ease by which the privileged move through the world, this field does much to highlight the 
comparative disadvantage of the marginalised in society.  
This section attempts to bring to the fore one neglected dimension of privilege that I call 
'hermeneutical privilege'. I take the term 'hermeneutical privilege' to denote the dominantly 
situated in society who can pre-reflectively utilise the interpretive framework from a position 
of hermeneutical comfort.20 I understand 'hermeneutical privilege' to be a subset of what 
 
20 My concept of ‘hermenuetical privilege’ is importantly distinct from the term ‘epistemic privilege’ 
popularised by standpoint feminist theory. In the latter context, ‘epistemic privilege’ pertains to the invaluable 
insight a woman has of her experiences of being a woman; given this insight, she ought to be responsible for 
defining these experiences in her own terms (Hartsock, 1983). In this sense, the term privilege then is not used 
in the same way as those described above, as it is not a beneficial social position that the identified group 
(women) have had unduly bestowed on them. Rather it is a unique and vital perspective on their own situation. 
Although she asserts that ‘the powerful are likely to have a peculiar epistemic advantage of a kind which means 
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Medina calls 'epistemic privilege', whereby a socially dominant group is systematically 
afforded a credibility excess (Medina 2011). While Medina mainly focuses on the impact of 
epistemic privilege in testimonial injustice, I limit my scope to hermeneutical injustice. Using 
Merleau-Ponty's account of speech expression, I describe the lived experience of 
hermeneutical privilege with the hope that it will make the phenomenological disruption 
produced by hermeneutical lacunas all the more transparent to the reader.  
3.1.2.  Hermeneutical Privilege and the Interpretive Framework 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, for a meaningful speech expression to take shape, and in turn, 
to understand the speech expressions of others, there must exist a pre-established linguistic 
institution. The linguistic institution is composed of all the previously uttered speech 
expressions that have received uptake. Merleau-Ponty refers to this phenomenon as 'spoken 
speech':  
Available significations, namely, previous acts of expression, establish a common world 
between speaking subjects to which current and new speech refers, just as the gesture refers to 
the sensible world. And the sense of speech is nothing other than the manner in which it 
handles this linguistic world, or in which it modulates upon this keyboard of acquired 
significations. I grasp it in an undivided act that is as brief as a cry (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
192).   
Returning to Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice, stark similarities emerge between 
'hermeneutical resources' and Merleau-Ponty's 'spoken speech'. Both concepts capture a pre-
established linguistic institution that is fundamental to the activity of speech expression. As 
Merleau-Ponty observes, 'to understand the other person's words, I must "already know" his 
vocabulary and his syntax' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189). Similarly, Fricker understands 
speech as grounded in a 'shared pool of concepts and interpretive tropes that we use to make 
generally share-able sense of our social experiences' (Fricker, 2017: 163). For a 
communicable speech act to occur, the speaker must draw from this well of hermeneutical 
resources. In doing so, the speaker can make meaningful speech expressions regarding their 
social experiences. Thus, we can proceed to use the Merleau-Pontian' spoken speech' and 
Fricker's 'hermeneutical resources' interchangeably. What we can gain from Fricker's account 
 
that the powerless are epistemically oppressed’, Fricker employs the term ‘epistemic privilege’ in the standpoint 
theorist sense (Fricker, 1999: 208). In contrast, like Medina (2011), I invoke the term ‘privilege’ as an 
undeserved social advantage.  
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that is absent in the Phenomenology of Perception, however, is an understanding of the social 
power structures latent in the linguistic institution that in turn skew these hermeneutical 
resources. 
Merleau-Ponty describes the linguistic institution as something that necessitates human 
existence. For this reason, the linguistic institution is experientially invisible to the speaker. 
Reflecting from a position of hermeneutical privilege, Merleau-Ponty makes the following 
assertion: 
We possess in ourselves already formed significations for all of these banal words…that 
require no genuine effort of expression from us, and that will demand no effort of 
comprehension from our listeners. Thus, language and the comprehension of language seem 
self-evident. The linguistic and intersubjective world no longer causes us any wonder, we no 
longer distinguish it from the world itself, and we reflect within a world already spoken and 
speaking (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189). 
Yet, through the work of Fricker, it becomes apparent that the 'already formed significations 
for all these banal words' convey some experiences better than others. Fricker recognises that 
our hermeneutical landscape is an uneven one, as our collective understandings are shaped by 
social power. More specifically, they are shaped by identity power-a power attributed to 
social groups in virtue of their identity, such as white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied, neuro-
normative, cis-gendered or upper-classed. The voices of those with identity power are 
amplified over those who belong to marginalised groups, thus influencing 'conceptions alive 
in the collective imagination that govern, for instance, what it is or means to be a woman or a 
man, or what it is or means to be gay or straight, young or old, and so on' (Fricker, 2007: 14).  
Our knowledge practices are constructed through a privileged gaze so that the effortless 
expression described by Merleau-Ponty is, in fact, limited to those who constructed the 
interpretive framework. As Fricker observes, 'relations of unequal power can skew 
hermeneutical resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understanding of their 
experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experience' (Fricker, 2007: 
148). Consequently, the very collective understandings that structure our perspective of the 
world operate within the limits of a biased framework. In the words of Patricia Hill Collins: 
'Because elite White men control Western structures of knowledge validation, their interests 
pervade the themes, paradigms, and epistemologies' of our society (Collins, 2009: 251). 
Drawing on a discussion found in John Gwaltney's inner-city African-Americans, Collins 
offers the example of the socially constructed idea that 'you are your work' (Collins, 2009: 
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48). In other words, the interpretive framework equates a person's value to their occupation. 
This social understanding best serves those in a position to attain high-earning, high-
satisfaction employment. This social understanding does not, on the other hand, serve those 
who face barriers in the labour market and are more likely to undertake 'economically 
exploitative, physically demanding, and intellectually deadening' employment (ibid). Yet, the 
interpretive framework is singularly orientated around the experiences and interests of the 
hermeneutically privileged. Moreover, this one-sided interpretive framework is self-
perpetuating. The more these hermeneutical resources are utilized, the more ingrained into 
our systems of understanding they become. Through the systematic reaffirmation of the 
dominant worldview, the shared collective understanding is preserved with hermeneutical 
lacunas intact.  
As such, the hermeneutically privileged possess the power to 'make public' certain aspects of 
the world that it is in their interest to be public: 'to name an object is to bring it into 
existence', and equally to cast a darkness over areas that are irrelevant to their own social 
experiences (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 183). We need not limit this claim to physical objects; 
Merleau-Ponty would likely recognise social objects as contingent upon meaningful speech 
expression too. After all, 'the perceived is not necessarily an object present in front of me as a 
term to be known, it might be a "unit of value" that is only present to me in practice' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 335). Merleau-Ponty considers 'respect for other men' or 'loyal 
friendship' examples of such a 'unit of value' (ibid).  Thus, it would not be a stretch to include 
the social structures pertinent to Fricker that inform us what it is to be a woman, or what it is 
to be Black, in Merleau-Ponty's account of making aspects of the world public. Indeed, the 
ontological significance of hermeneutical privilege is not lost on Fricker, who acknowledges 
'if understandings are structured a certain way, then so are the social facts' (Fricker, 2007: 
147). 21 These social facts include the destructive identity prejudices that elicit structural 
hermeneutical gaps, according to which Carmita Wood was merely flirted with by her 
employer.   
Thus, the first advantage of hermeneutical privilege I identity is the power to 'influence… 
those practices by which social meaning are generated' (Fricker 2007: 147). Consequently, 
 
21 In ‘Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege’ (1999), Fricker makes a similar point, but is careful to 
avoid the idealist position that the world is constituted by interpretive practices. She rejects this in favour of a 
‘pre-conditional model’ whereby ‘the standards of truth and falsity are set by our shared form of life - our 
interpretive or hermeneutical practice’ yet ‘the truth or falsity of any statement is settled by (what else?) the 
facts’ (Fricker, 1999: 206). 
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when the hermeneutically privileged prepare to make a speech expression that reflects their 
experience of the world, they simply draw from a wealth of ready-made hermeneutical 
resources tailored towards their expression. Due to the wealth of hermeneutical resources at 
their disposal, such speech expressions roll off the tongue with ease. For the hermeneutically 
privileged: 'Language is there like an all purpose tool with its vocabulary, its turn of phrase, 
and form which has been so useful, and it always responds to our call, ready to express 
anything, because language is the treasury of everything one may wish to say' (Merleau-
Ponty, 1973: 6).   
 
3.1.3.  Hermeneutical Privilege and Intersubjectivity  
 
A further advantage of hermeneutical privilege is the ability to form intersubjective 
relationships with others. As members of the same linguistic institution, the hermeneutically 
privileged recognise other hermeneutically privileged subjects as speaking subjects just like 
themselves. Recall Merleau-Ponty's example of the man in the sun, whose gestures 
demonstrate that he engages and is affected by the world in the same way as the observer. 
From this, Merleau-Ponty recognises that the man is an embodied agent in the world, much 
like himself. So too, when the hermeneutically privileged witness the Other perform speech 
gestures like their own and reference the world in the same way that they do, they understand 
that they belong to a shared world with this speaking subject. Indeed, the hermeneutically 
privileged make their speech expression against the background of this shared world: 'the 
verbal gesture must be performed in a certain panorama that is shared by the interlocutors, 
just as the comprehension of other gestures presupposes a shared world shared by everyone in 
which the sense of gesture unfolds and is displayed' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 200).  
The speech expression is set against a background of shared collective understanding, 
cemented by those in a dominant social position into 'the alphabet of acquired significations'; 
a shared world in which the interests of the powerful, rather than the powerless, are 
perpetuated. Consequently, when the hermeneutically privileged make a speech expression, it 
can be taken up by the Other. However, as established in chapter one, the I-Other dialogue 
goes beyond mere understanding, as 'the other who listens and understands joins with me in 
what is most singular in me' (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 141).  As their speech expressions are 
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born from the same linguistic institution, there is an overlap in the distinct body schemas of 
each hermeneutically privileged subject. In the words of Merleau-Ponty: 
They truly abide in themselves, without feeling exiled from the other. And because they are 
fully convinced that what seems evident to them is true, they say it quite simply. They cross 
bridges of snow without seeing how fragile those are, using to the very limit that 
extraordinary power given to every mind of convincing others and entering into their little 
corner when it believes itself to be coextensive with the truth. (ibid). 
As such, a kind of intersubjective 'social whole' is established between the hermeneutically 
privileged individuals (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 145). This intersubjectivity underscores the pre-
reflective way in which the hermeneutically privileged can seamlessly employ language to 
communicate with the Other: 'I hear myself in him as he speaks in me' (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 
142). 
 
3.1.4.  Hermeneutical Privilege and The Steadied Mind  
 
A further benefit of hermeneutical privilege is a kind of cognitive harmony that is elicited by 
being able to put into words one's beliefs and desires. As previously discussed, hermeneutical 
resources, or ‘spoken speech’, are not containers for thought, as intellectualist accounts 
suggest. In Merleau-Ponty's understanding, thought is accomplished through speech 
expression. Speech expression transforms the fleeting, incoherent 'verbal image' of the mind 
into a meaningful articulation by projecting it into the world in the form of a gesture: 'this 
revelation of an imminent and or nascent meaning in the living body extends…to the entire 
sensible world' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 203). Through expression, thought achieves existence 
and takes its place in the world.  
Although they each move toward a different hermeneutic project, we can draw a comparison 
between Merleau-Ponty's account of thought-speech synthesis and Fricker's discussions on 
the articulation of wishes ('beliefs or desires in waiting') (Fricker, 2007: 52).22 She borrows 
this theory from Bernard Williams, who states that the speaking subject experiences a 
'steadied mind' when intangible 'wishes' are solidified into either desires or beliefs through 
dialogue (Williams, 2002: 192). When a speaking subject finds themselves in dialogue with 
 
22 See Guenther 2017 for a similar comparison between Fricker’s ‘steadied mind’ and Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of transcendence more broadly.  
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an Other, they are forced to confront these undeveloped 'wishes' and test them against their 
shared understanding of the world. According to Fricker, these 'wishes', once articulated as 
beliefs or desires, solidifies one's understanding of 'how the world is' (Fricker, 2007: 52).  
However, the procedure of 'steadying the mind' goes beyond merely stabilising our beliefs 
and desires: 'the process by which the mind is steadied, then, is also the process by which we 
may become who we deeply, perhaps essentially, are' (Fricker, 2007: 53).  Through the 
vocalisation of beliefs, desires and opinions, the speaking subject can come to form ideas that 
are essential to a cohesive sense of self. Take Fricker's example of Wendy Sandford, who 
develops the hermeneutical resources to put into words her experience of postpartum 
depression after participating in a workshop. In doing so, Wendy can finally come to terms 
with her experience of post-partum depression and refine her understanding of motherhood 
(Brownmiller, 1990: 182). While Fricker limits her focus here to the ways in which a person 
can experience testimonial justice, it is safe to assume that this achievement of 'fundamental 
psychological importance' is easily accessible to the hermeneutically privileged (Fricker, 
2007: 54). After all, it requires sufficient hermeneutical resources to express one's beliefs and 
desires successfully. Consequently, this 'steadied mind' and cohesive sense of self can be 
understood as a further advantage of hermeneutical privilege. 
Fricker's definition of 'wishes' as 'beliefs or desires in waiting, so that any given wish may be 
on its way to becoming either' allows us to draw a comparison to the Merleau-Pontian 
account of thought-speech synthesis (Fricker, 2007: 52, my italics). While it is often taken as 
given that thought is pre-formed internally, Fricker suggests that speech at least plays a role 
in the completion of thought. It would not be a stretch for a Merleau-Pontian to interpret the 
'beliefs or desires in waiting' as just such a 'verbal image' that te 
nds towards its completion through speech expression. Merleau-Ponty describes the 
accomplishment of thought through speech expression as 'an interior that is revealed on the 
outside, a signification that descends into the world and begins to exist there and that can 
only be fully understood by attempting to see it there' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 333-334). As 
such, we can draw an analogy between Fricker and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the 
power of expression as contributing to a cohesive sense of self. Yet, Merleau-Ponty goes 
further still, beyond Fricker's notion of the 'steadied mind'. Through a phenomenological 
approach, we understand the cohesion experienced by the hermeneutically privileged as not 
merely psychological 'settling', but a cohesion of body and world.  
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3.1.5.  Hermeneutical Privilege and Transcendence  
 
The final aspect of hermeneutical privilege I wish to highlight is the ‘expressive unity’ the 
speaking subject enjoys through speech expression. Recall, for Merleau-Ponty, the body 
schema underpins all expressive activity for the embodied subject. As a network of bodily 
capacities mapped onto our environment, it is the body schema that allows us to interact with 
the world. Merleau-Ponty identifies speech expression as the most fundamental of these 
bodily capacities, yet this fundamental bodily capacity is limited to the hermeneutically 
privileged. Equipped with hermeneutical resources tailored to their social experiences, the 
hermeneutically privileged can employ their body in expressive activity that is second nature: 
'[Language] is the subject's taking up of a position in the world of his significations…For the 
speaking subject and for those who listen to him, the phonetic gesture produces a certain 
structuring of experience, a certain modulation of existence' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 199).  
To illustrate the phenomenological experience of hermeneutical privilege, consider the 
following account of 'the white male voice': 
I am the man in charge. And people listen. I speak with the voice of the caring father. I am the 
father figure. I speak with strength, with vigor, with clarity, with authority, with fatherly care. 
I am the loving, strong, confident father. After all, everyone wants a father like that. And 
people listen. I speak with the voice of the articulate, hyper-educated, white male professor. I 
have cultivated this voice over many years of practice. I wear it like an old glove. It is so very 
natural to me. I know what I'm talking about, or so they believe. And people listen. I speak 
with the voice of a lover. I speak softly, invoking and inviting intimacy. My soft voice works 
too. I am the privileged friend, lover, family member. The soft voice is a powerful persuader. 
And people listen. I speak with the voice of the artist. I speak my passion! I am the emotional 
male, the autoethnographer who writes through his pain. And people listen. I work my voice 
and its words like a musical instrument, and it plays well, moving my audience where I want 
them to go. This white male voice is a finely tuned instrument (Poulos, 2017: 25). 
The quote above captures the hermeneutically privileged speaker moving through the world 
uninterrupted, in a pure fluid action. The speaker traverses across domains, as the linguistic 
institution is perfectly tailored towards his expression as father, professor, lover etc. He does 
not stumble on his words or struggle to articulate himself. His embodied experience of speech 
expression is so seamless that it is not until he observes (after many years) the challenge his 
wife and female colleges face to communicate effectively, that he recognises his taken-for-
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granted ability to articulate himself (ibid). The skill of speech expression is invisible to him. 
Moreover, as Poulos emphasises, his audience listens. The hermeneutical resources he uses 
are taken up by the hearer and received as a meaningful expression because his speech 
expression fits the interpretive framework within which he speaks.  This skill is so perfectly 
executed that its mechanisms are undetectable to the hearer: 'When someone-an author or a 
friend- succeeds in expressing himself, the signs are immediately forgotten; all that remains is 
the meaning. The perfection of language lies in its capacity to pass unnoticed' (Merleau-
Ponty, 1973: 10). Projecting one's body toward the world in this way, the hermeneutically 
privileged enjoy the phenomenological 'transcendence' that the embodied subject strives 
towards.  
In reflecting upon the nature of freedom, Merleau-Ponty states: 'we choose our world and the 
world chooses us' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 481). Due to the biased nature of the linguistic 
institution, the hermeneutically privileged simultaneously choose the world (by curating the 
collective social understanding) and are chosen by the world (as the linguistic institution is 
geared towards translating their experiences). This paradoxical relationship underpins what 
Merleau-Ponty calls 'the miracle of expression' where the speaking subject does not 'wonder, 
before speaking, whether speech is possible… They sit happily in the shade of a great tree 
and continue aloud their internal monologue. The thought germinates in speech and, without 
seeking it, they are understood' (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 145).  
For Merleau-Ponty, the embodied subject gives itself to the world, and in turn, the world 
gives itself to the subject.  However, Merleau-Ponty's position only holds if one assumes an 
equal distribution of meaning-making power across embodied subjects. This assumption is 
proved false through the concept of hermeneutical injustice as the hermeneutically silenced 
have limited meaning-making capacities. According to Merleau-Ponty, ‘Language is the 
double of being, and we cannot conceive of an object or idea that comes into the world 
without words.' (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 5-6). But if only the dominant in society possess 
appropriate resources to describe the world, large portions of reality remain obscured, not 
only for the hermeneutically silenced but for everyone within the linguistic institution. We 
can conclude from this section that our being-in-the-world is essentially hermeneutical. It 
follows then that exclusion from this fundamental human capacity constitutes a deep and far-
reaching phenomenological harm. If we accept Merleau-Ponty's account of speech expression 
as a fundamental way to employ one's body, we ought to consider a hermeneutical lacuna to 
be a phenomenological impediment for the hermeneutically silenced. In the following 
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3.2.  A Phenomenology of Hermeneutical Silencing  
 
3.2.1.  Guenther on the Phenomenology of Hermeneutical Injustice 
 
Before I launch a phenomenology of hermeneutical silencing, I ought to mention an essay by 
Lisa Guenther, who offers a 'productive starting point for further conversation' on a 
phenomenological insight into epistemic injustice (Guenther, 2017: 195).  When addressing 
'the existential harm of hermeneutical injustice', Guenther employs the broad strokes of 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of intersubjectivity to flesh out Fricker's account of social 
perceptions. She begins by establishing the nature of understanding as necessarily social: 'as 
the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other's are one whole, 
two sides of one and the same phenomenon' (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 412). Guenther aims to 
enrich Fricker's account of 'hermeneutical sensibility' with a phenomenological grounding in 
Merleau-Ponty's account of Self and Other. For Guenther, the disruption to one's personhood 
that arises from hermeneutical injustice can be better understood as a reduction from 
subjectivity to objectivity. Given the prejudice attached to the victim's social identity, 'the 
subject is not just reduced to an object of knowledge for others, he is reduced to the 
ontological status of an object, as a thing rather than a consciousness who gives meaning to 
the world' (Guenther, 2017: 201). This reduction from subjectivity to objectivity acts as a 
catalyst for the disruption of intersubjectivity. As the victim is not recognised as a knowing 
subject by the Other (on the contrary, they are perceived as an object), no Subject-Other 
synthesis can occur. Without one's patterns of embodiment harmonising with the Other, 
Guenther suggests that one loses a sense of identity. She argues that this would justify 
Fricker's observation that hermeneutical injustice deprives the victim of self-understanding 
(Fricker, 2007: 149).  
Although I concede that Guenther's account is indeed a useful springboard for discussion, 
there are limitations to her argument that I hope to rectify through this section. From the 
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offset, her appeal to epistemic objectivity is met with the same criticisms against epistemic 
objectification established in chapter two.  In chapter two, I argued that there is nothing 
epistemic in objectification, and there is nothing objectifying in epistemic injustice. However, 
more pertinently, Guenther's argument does not serve our purposes here as it is targeted at a 
speaking subject rather than a silenced subject.  The definition Guenther offers for 
hermeneutical injustice is as follows: 'what Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice …not only 
blocks the capacity of certain subjects to make sense of themselves and the world, "but 
undermines them in their very humanity"’ (Guenther, 2017: 202). Here Guenther has 
mischaracterised hermeneutical injustice by omitting its most crucial aspect. Hermeneutical 
injustice (as it is known to Fricker) arises through gaps in the interpretive framework where 
words that express the marginalised individual's experience ought to be. Given these 
hermeneutical lacunas, the subject must pass over these experiences in silence. Guenther, on 
the other hand, captures the objectification of a speaking subject: ‘The speaker re-asserts his 
epistemic agency by demanding an explanation, but his question meets with no response’ 
(Guenther, 2017: 201). Guenther’s account effectively captures the breakdown of 
intersubjectivity in testimonial injustice and would also fit a phenomenological account of 
wilful hermeneutical ignorance. However, there is work left to be done to assess the 
phenomenological ramifications of a case of hermeneutical silencing.  
To understand the mechanisms behind hermeneutical silencing, I propose that Merleau-
Ponty’s account of speech expression is more suitable than his broad account of 
intersubjectivity. Guenther is right to observe that intersubjectivity is an important aspect of 
meaning-making, and that hermeneutical injustice would hamper the self-other synthesis.  
However, to limit our discussion to intersubjectivity would be to miss all the significant 
nuances of speech expression that go awry in a case of hermeneutical injustice. Through the 
remainder of this chapter, I use Merleau-Ponty’s account of speech expression to bring to 
light the complex and insidious phenomenological ramifications of hermeneutical silencing. 
To uncover these phenomenological ramifications, I suggest that we take a closer look at 
Fricker’s account of dissonance.  
 




The primary harm of epistemic injustice is the ‘intrinsic injustice’ of being debilitated in 
one’s very nature as a knowing-subject (Fricker, 2007: 5). For Fricker, to undermine a 
person’s capacity ‘to know’ is to undermine an aspect of a person that makes them distinctly 
human. It is this distortion of a person’s humanity that makes the primary harm intrinsic. In 
an instance of testimonial injustice, the primary harm targets the speaking subject as a ‘giver 
of knowledge’, downgrading the credibility of their testimony. In the case of hermeneutical 
injustice, however, the primary harm takes the form of a ‘situated hermeneutical inequality’, 
whereby knowers are disadvantaged by gaps in the interpretative framework (Fricker, 2007: 
7). The primary harm of hermeneutical injustice is captured in Fricker’s paradigmatic 
example of sexual harassment. Carmita Wood’s status as a ‘knower’ was relegated, as she 
was robbed of invaluable hermeneutical resources to describe her experience of sexual 
harassment. Her capacity as a ‘knower’ was inhibited as she could not make sense of her 
experience. Fricker understands such a primary harm to be a profound assault upon the 
constitution of the subject. Her concern is how we ‘receive the word of others’ and how this 
can impact the other’s very sense of self (Fricker, 2007: 168). The intrinsic nature of this 
primary harm derives from its ability to ‘go more or less deep in the psychology of the 
subject […] where it goes deep, it can cramp self-development, so that a person may be, quite 
literally, prevented from becoming who they are’ (Fricker, 2007: 5). She refers to this 
primary harm as ‘dissonance’, or, most frequently, ‘cognitive dissonance’. 
The term ‘cognitive dissonance’ is rooted in the field of psychology and is used to describe 
the experience of psychological distress that arises from two or more conflicting beliefs or 
desires pulling the subject in opposite directions. The most common example is smoking: the 
subject believes that smoking is damaging their health, yet they desire to continue smoking. 
To ease psychological discomfort, the dissonance between two beliefs or desires compels the 
cognitive agent to disregard one in favour of the other - to stop smoking or continue smoking 
despite its impact on one’s health. As our lives are filled with a plethora of choices and ideas 
that often appear equally worthy, we resolve cognitive dissonance on a regular basis. Our 
interest here is in the cognitive dissonance that is not so easily resolved, with a focus on the 
psychological turmoil that ensues.  
The role of ‘cognitive dissonance’ has been largely overlooked in the literature on epistemic 
injustice; an absence that can perhaps be attributed to its complexity. Fricker introduces the 
term in her discussion on testimonial injustice to account for the conflict between prejudicial 
and non-prejudicial beliefs: ‘I emphasize the self-regulatory potential of cognitive dissonance 
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between our standing beliefs in relation to speaker trustworthiness on the one hand, and our 
spontaneous perceptions of speaker trustworthiness on the other’ (Fricker, 2010: 164). Here, 
Fricker appeals to cognitive dissonance as a tool for self-reflection that forces us to jettison 
our prejudicial beliefs regarding the untrustworthiness of a marginalised group in favour of 
beliefs that better align with our perceptual judgements. Imagine a person who has been 
raised to hold the spurious belief that certain races are naturally more violent than others. 
Over time, this belief may stand in opposition to the perceptual judgement that such ideas are 
unfounded and racist. Through the mechanism of cognitive dissonance, the person will 
wrestle with these two conflicting notions, and Fricker is optimistic that the perceptual 
judgement will triumph over the prejudicial belief. This form of dissonance may occur in 
either a marginalised or privileged epistemic position, however, as this form of dissonance is 
employed to correct for testimonial injustice, Fricker likely had the dominantly situated 
knower in mind here. For Fricker, by consciously reflecting upon and rejecting prejudicial 
beliefs that contradict our lived experience, we may be able to pave the way towards a more 
epistemically just outlook.  
 
While this dimension of cognitive dissonance has some presence in the field of epistemic 
injustice (often only mentioned in passing), there is a further dimension to cognitive 
dissonance that has only been recognised in the work of Medina (2012). When Fricker turns 
to the subject of hermeneutical injustice in her final chapter, cognitive dissonance seems to 
take on a new form. Here, Fricker drops the ‘cognitive’ from ‘cognitive dissonance’ and 
refers simply to ‘dissonance’ alone.23 In this instance, ‘dissonance’ captures a disparity in 
meaning-making: ‘authoritative constructions in the shared hermeneutical resource […] 
create a sense of dissonance between an experience and the various constructions that are 
ganging up to overpower its nascent proper meaning’ (Fricker, 2007: 166). Here, the subject 
is torn between two conflicting ideas: personal understanding and collective understanding. 
In the words of Medina ‘hermeneutical dissonance is the phenomenon in which the 
communicative conflict is internalized and both the dominant and the resistant voices are 
within one and the same subject’ (Medina, 2012: 209). This tension between collective 
understanding and personal understanding can only arise when a personal understanding is at 
 
23 It remains unclear whether ‘dissonance’ is a shorthand for ‘cognitive dissonance’ for Fricker, or whether there 
is something distinctly trans-cognitive that occurs in an instance of hermeneutical injustice. Whatever Fricker’s 




odds with the dominant interpretive framework. For this reason, while anyone can experience 
the corrective kind of ‘cognitive’ dissonance, I propose that the hermeneutical dissonance is 
bound to the hermeneutically silenced.  
Unlike in the first form of dissonance discussed, the central focus in hermeneutical 
dissonance is on the psychological ramifications for the sufferer. In an instance of 
hermeneutical silencing, psychological discomfort is not so easily resolved and has a lasting 
impact upon the victim:  
When you find yourself in a situation in which you seem to be the only one to feel the 
dissonance between received understanding and your own intimated sense of a given 
experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world, or at 
least the relevant region of the world. (Fricker, 2007: 163).  
Fricker takes this idea further, arguing that by moving between these two perspectives (the 
personal and the collective), the marginalised subject experiences a fractured sense of self. 
She illustrates this through the case of Edmund White, who describes an internal battle for a 
homosexual identity that fits his experiences. This battle is an arduous one, as his own sense 
of self is repeatedly confronted by seemingly persuasive homophobic stereotypes that depict 
his identity as a ‘sickness’ or an adolescent stage ‘that boys passed through’ (White, 1983). 
Fricker concludes that White, and other hermeneutically marginalised individuals, are forced 
to reckon with this dissonance as they pursue an identity that cannot be formulated by the 
interpretive framework at hand. They do so in the face of persuasive collective 
understandings that ‘have some significant power to construct not only the subject’s 
experience (his desire becomes shameful and so on) but also his very self’ (Fricker, 2007: 
164). The case of Edmund White offers an important example of the acute suffering cognitive 
dissonance can elicit in hermeneutical silencing.  
As a further example, consider the following passage found in Franz Fanon’s Black Skin, 
White Masks.  Fanon describes an encounter where his skin colour is compared to 
amputation; a casualty with which he must contend. Fanon then describes a dissonance 
between this social understanding of his race being a kind of disability and his personal 
understanding of his existence as a state of freedom:  
Yet, with all my being, I refused to accept this amputation. I feel my soul as vast as the world, 
truly a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers; my chest has the power to expand to infinity. I 
was made to give and they prescribe for me the humility of the [disabled]. When I opened my 
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eyes yesterday I saw the sky in total revulsion. I tried to get up but the eviscerated silence 
surged towards me with paralysed wings. Not responsible for my acts, at the crossroads 
between Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep (Fanon, 2008: 119). 24   
Through this example, we see that the impact of cognitive dissonance in an instance of 
hermeneutical silencing has a profound impact on the marginalised subject's life-world. 
When those who experience the first form of cognitive dissonance confront their prejudicial 
beliefs, they are struck by a psychological discomfort as they adjust to accommodate for this 
new perspective. On the other hand, the hermeneutically silenced experience a dissonance 
where they cannot undertake such a simple adjustment either to the collective or their 
personal understanding. If they choose to break their silence by adopting the collective 
understanding, they collude with their oppressors at the cost of their ability to express 
themselves. Alternatively, to champion one’s personal understanding over the collective 
understanding, one must face the cavernous hermeneutical lacuna where the words to 
describe the marginalised experience ought to be. It is at this crossroad that the 
hermeneutically marginalised are silenced.   
Cognitive dissonance of the hermeneutical kind has phenomenological ramifications that go 
well beyond mere psychological discomfort. Caught between personal understanding and 
collective understanding, the subject is met with an inability to act. In Merleau-Pontian terms, 
this dissonance is not merely a division in the mind, but a division between the embodied 
subject (the personal) and the external world (the collective). In the following section, I bring 
to light the embodied experience of the hermeneutically silenced as a dissonance between 
body and world.  
 
3.2.3. Embodied Dissonance 
 
If we are to recognise that speech expression is ‘one of the possible uses of [the] body’, it 
follows that hermeneutical injustice constitutes a disruption in the body schema, and hence, a 
disruption in the embodied subject’s being-in-the-world. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 186). Let us 
turn back to Fricker’s victim of sexual harassment, Carmita Wood. In most environments, 
when she prepares to make a speech expression, she can draw from a wealth of hermeneutical 
 
24 Written in 1952, Fanon’s analogy has strong ableist undertones. Here Fanon equates amputation and disability 
to a lack of freedom.  
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resources with ease. In most environments, she successfully employs her body into an act of 
speech expression, and she moves through the world in a pure fluid action, as her capacity for 
speech expression is effortless and obscured from her attention. However, to express her 
experience of what we now know to be ‘sexual harassment’, she falters. Her body is primed 
to launch into a speech act, yet, caught in a dissonance between the collective understanding 
of her experience (that of mere flirting) and the experience itself (a gut reaction tells her she’s 
been wronged in a significant way), she remains stunted as the necessary speech gesture is 
nowhere to be found. With a much-needed hermeneutical resource missing from the 
interpretive framework, it is as though she prepares to extend her arm to reach for an object, 
only to find her limb is absent.  
To capture the phenomenological impact of hermeneutical injustice, Irigaray offers us the 
best illustration for our purposes here. The hermeneutical injustice that emerges in Irigaray’s 
writing concerns the way a heterosexual and patriarchal interpretive framework robs gay 
women of a vocabulary to express their identity. Deprived of these hermeneutical resources, 
Irigaray observes an experience of distancing from one’s body:  
If we don't invent a language, if we don't find our body's language, it will have too few 
gestures to accompany our story. We shall tire of the same ones, and leave our desires 
unexpressed, unrealized. Asleep again, unsatisfied, we shall fall back upon the words of men-
who, for their part, have "known" for a long time. But not our body. Seduced, attracted, 
fascinated, ecstatic with our becoming, we shall remain paralyzed. Deprived of our 
movements (Irigaray, 1985: 214).  
We can unpack several important observations here. First, in line with Fricker, Irigaray 
recognises the unequal distribution of hermeneutical resources as an inherently epistemic act 
because the interpretive framework is constituted by what men ‘have “known” for a long 
time’. ‘Our body’, the experience of homosexual female embodiment, on the other hand, is 
outside the epistemic scope of the socially dominant and is therefore uncommunicable. 
Second, Irigaray observes that language is a bodily act, and as such, lesbians like herself are 
in a sense immobilised without a hermeneutical framework from which they can speak. In 
Merleau-Pontian terms, with ‘too few gestures to accompany our story’, these women 
experience a restricted body-schema.  
Third, she clarifies that even if the hermeneutically silenced resort to the surrogate voice of 
the socially dominant, they ‘remain paralyzed’ (ibid). Here we can draw out a further 
complexity behind Merleau-Ponty’s speaking subject. When a marginalised group depends 
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upon ill-fitting, pre-established hermeneutical resources, the borrowed language of the 
socially dominant appears ‘empty’ because the surrogate voice bares no gestural significance 
to the marginalised speaker. I will unpack this third point in the final section. For now, what I 
hope to draw from Irigaray here is the embodied dissonance in body and world produced by 
the exclusion of lesbian experiences from the interpretive framework. I propose that this 
phenomenological dysfunction is not limited to the case discussed by Irigaray but is, in fact, 
an essential feature of hermeneutical silencing.  
What I have in mind here is a phenomenological disruption not unlike that identified in the 
work of feminist phenomenologist Iris Marion Young. Young develops a phenomenological 
account of the female body experience as an antithesis to the unification of body and world 
discussed at length by Merleau-Ponty. She argues that, unlike men, women cannot ‘move out 
to master a world that belongs to [them], a world constituted by [their] own intentions and 
projections’ (Young, 2005: 42-43). In other words, Young argues that the female body, 
defined by her social status, is unable to engage with the world in the same way as her male 
counterpart’s. She draws out three ‘modalities’ of the female body that constitute a 
disharmony been body and world: ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality and a 
discontinuous unity with its environment (ibid). The male body pre-reflectively interacts with 
the possibilities offered by the world: a basketball is thrown through a hoop, a hand is firmly 
shaken, a rickety bridge is confidently traversed. For the female subject, however, when she 
attempts to throw her body into action, she is often restrained by ‘timidity, uncertainty, and 
hesitancy’ (Young, 2005: 34). Young’s paradigmatic example is that of ‘throwing like a girl’, 
where the female body fails to engage in the act of throwing effectively due to preconceived 
notions of her physical (in)abilities. Young observes that this reservation to throw one’s body 
into action is typical of the female body schema, stunting what ought to be a pure fluid action 
toward the world. In this instance, ‘she remains rooted in immanence, is inhibited and retains 
a distance from her body as transcending movement and from engagement in the world’s 
possibilities’ (Young, 2005: 39).  
I argue that hermeneutically silenced individuals experience much the same 
phenomenological disruption as they are robbed of the fundamental bodily capacity of speech 
expression. If one is unable to speak, an essential form of interaction with the world is 
abruptly halted. The subject’s very being-in-the-world is disrupted through the limitation of 
possibilities to employ their body.  In the words of Young, ‘there is a world for a subject just 
insofar as the body has capacities by which it can approach, grasp, and appropriate its 
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surroundings in the direction of its intentions’ (Young, 2005: 35-36). Through the disruption 
of speech expression, the hermeneutically silenced are deprived of an essential bodily 
capacity and consequently cannot ‘approach, grasp and appropriate’ their environment in the 
same way as their hermeneutically privileged counterparts. However, there is a little more to 
unpack here. In the words of Irigaray, ‘they've left us only lacks, deficiencies, to designate 
ourselves. They've left us their negative(s)’ (Irigaray, 1985: 207).  From a phenomenological 
perspective, this prompts the question: how is a ‘lacuna’, a ‘gap’, an absence of 
hermeneutical resources experienced? How do we experience something that is not there? To 
answer this question, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion on phantom limb syndrome.   
Those with phantom limb syndrome experience an absent extremity as though it is present. 
They continue to perceive the world as if it invites possibilities for the phantom-limb; 
however, no limb is available to throw into action. Therefore, the person with phantom limb 
syndrome experiences a presence that ought to be absent. For Merleau-Ponty, the purpose of 
examining phantom limb syndrome is to draw attention to the experience of absence: 
This phenomenon…can nevertheless be understood from the perspective of being in the 
world. What refuses the mutilation or the deficiency in us is an I that is engaged in a certain 
physical and inter-human world, an I that continues to tend towards its world despite 
deficiencies or amputations and that to this extent does not de jure recognize them (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012: 83).  
The absence is experienced as an unexpected gap in one’s possibilities for action. The person 
with phantom limb syndrome is oblivious to the gap in their body schema, as he continues to 
engage with the world as if their limb were available to be called to action: ‘he tries to walk 
on his phantom leg and is not even discouraged by a fall’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2014: 83). When 
he falls, he is met with a negation in his body schema, and he ‘can no longer actually unite’ 
with the world that invites such actions (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 84). It is in such cases the 
person with phantom limb syndrome is implicitly aware of the absence.  
Merleau-Ponty explains the paradoxical awareness and unawareness as a conflict between the 
habitual body and the actual body. The former describes a body geared towards a series of 
pre-reflective habitual actions, ‘the natural movement that throws us into our tasks, our 
worries, our situation, and our familiar horizons’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 83-84).  In contrast, 
the actual body is the body in a state of reflection and awareness of having (rather than being) 
a body. This would be the difference between drumming one’s fingers on the table absent-
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mindedly (habitual) and attempting to play the drums for the first time (actual). In the case of 
phantom limb syndrome, the person’s habitual body remains intact, producing the 
representation that the world can still be engaged with in the same pre-reflective way. The 
actual body, however, is missing an essential bodily capacity and renders such engagement 
fundamentally altered. The habitual bodily expectations persist, despite an absence in the 
actual body. Merleau-Ponty identifies this phenomenon as a paradox central to being-in-the-
world: ‘the patient knows his disability precisely in so far as he is ignorant of it, and he 
ignores it precisely insofar as he knows it’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 84).  
Thus, Merleau-Ponty presents the phenomenology of absence as the endurance of the body's 
habitual arrangements in the face of negation in the actual bodily experience. He bolsters his 
account by drawing a comparison between the absence of a limb and the death of a friend: 
despite the gap in our phenomenal field where our friend ought to be, we continue to 
anticipate that the friend is there to engage with. This anticipation makes their absence all the 
more apparent. The experience of absence in grief is well illustrated by Uncle Monty's death 
in The Reptile Room: ‘it is like walking up the stairs to your bedroom in the dark, and 
thinking there is one more stair than there is. Your foot falls down, through the air, and there 
is a sickly moment of dark surprise as you try to readjust the way you thought of things’ 
(Snicket: 1999, 96-97). I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account of absence can lend itself to 
explaining the experience of hermeneutical lacuna, where one meets an absence in the 
interpretive framework as a ‘sickly moment of dark surprise’(ibid).   
In an instance of hermeneutical silencing, the world continues to call to the marginalised 
subject, so their habitual body anticipates the capacity for speech expression; after all, in 
many other areas of their life, they can throw their body into an act of speech expression 
without a second thought. Yet, when they find themselves in a domain where vital 
hermeneutical resources are missing, the marginalised subject experiences a negation in the 
phenomenal field. As the world still encourages the habitual intention of speech expression, 
this absence of hermeneutical resource is experienced much like an unexpected missing step 
on a dark staircase. Having encountered a gap in the hermeneutical climate, the environment 
no longer appears to invite possibilities for action in the same way. Rather, it appears 
ambiguous, hostile and unaccommodating. Without speech expression, the hermeneutically 
silenced can no longer orientate themselves in the world, or at least a particular part of the 
world, in the same way as their hermeneutically privileged counterparts. They are ‘fixed, 




3.2.4. ‘Empty’ Speech Expressions 
 
In this section, I answer a pre-empted challenge to the phenomenological account of 
hermeneutical silencing that has taken shape over the course of this chapter. I have observed 
previously that, rather than pass over their experience in silence, those subjected to a 
hermeneutical lacuna may choose to adopt the dominant interpretive framework in an attempt 
to articulate themselves. In chapter two, I have labelled this kind of speech expression as an 
‘empty’ speech expression, and argued that it constitutes a case of hermeneutical silencing. 
An example of empty speech expression can be found in the work of Michelle Cliff. Cliff 
identified as a Jamaican-American lesbian, and much of her work was portrayed as a battle to 
reclaim her unique voice despite the vast hermeneutical lacunas she faced. She discussed 
learning to speak fluently in the voice of the privileged to become established as a writer: 
‘being female forced into male modes of thinking and argument.  Excelling but never 
belonging’ (Cliff, 1978: 7). Cliff described her ability to expertly wield the pre-established 
hermeneutical resources to imitate the speech of those with social power. Yet, without 
hermeneutical resources (or ‘spoken speech’) that adequately reflect her own female, 
Jamaican, homosexual perspective, the interpretive framework limited her to expressing 
powerful ‘authoritative constructions’ alien to her own experiences (Fricker, 2007: 166). 
Thus, Cliff was restricted to speech expressions that only further bolstered the collective 
understanding from which her own perspective was excluded. Through the dominant 
interpretive framework ‘I could speak fluidly, but I could not reveal’ (Cliff, 1985: 12). 
This prompts the question: do such cases constitute a phenomenological disruption? On the 
surface, it would appear that the body schema of the hermeneutically silenced remains intact, 
as they retain the capacity for speech expression. By appealing to Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
‘empty’ speech expression, however, I will demonstrate that this is not the case. I propose 
that when faced with a hermeneutical lacuna, even if the marginalised knower chooses to 
adopt the dominant interpretive framework, they do not successfully perform a genuine 
speech expression. 
Recall, the only group Merleau-Ponty acknowledges as restricted from the capacity of speech 
expression are those with aphasia. Through this phenomenological account of aphasia, 
Merleau-Ponty proposes, in such rare cases, ‘spoken speech’ ‘becomes empty’ for the speaker 
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(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 199, emphasis in original).  Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘empty’ to 
refer to a case where a word bares no gestural significance to the speaker. He exemplifies this 
‘emptiness’ through a case-study of aphasia, an illness that affects speech capacity and 
comprehension. For the patient with aphasia, who is the focus of Merleau-Ponty’s attention, 
the names of colours no longer hold any meaning. Superficially, it may appear that the patient 
is indeed performing a speech expression when he repeats colour names. However, stripped 
of meaning, Merleau-Ponty posits that the patient is merely committing an imitation of 
genuine speech expression. Although the patient still possesses the vocabulary of colour 
names, when asked to categorise coloured labels into similar groups, the patient struggles to 
find a relation between them. Shades of red or shades of blue bare no significance to each 
other. The psychologists who conducted this study make the following observation: ‘it thus 
cannot be a lack of word taken in itself that makes the categorical behaviour difficult or 
impossible. The words must have lost something that normally belongs to them’ (cited by 
Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 198). Merleau-Ponty recognises this ‘something’ as the ‘living sense’ 
of language (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 199). 
As previously discussed, Merleau-Ponty makes the pivotal claim that speech is no mere 
vessel for thought; rather, speech is an external gesture that accomplishes thought through its 
expression. Like other embodied acts, once we have learned how to wield a word correctly, 
we can brandish it in new and different social situations that retain their sense against the 
meaningful backdrop of our environment.  The patient with aphasia, on the other hand, 
experiences a disruption in the thought-speech synthesis.  In its place, aphasia provides the 
patient with ‘the pathological or accidental relation between a language and a thought equally 
cut off from their living sense’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 198). Without the synthesis of thought 
and speech, meaning does not inhabit the words of the person with aphasia: ‘the name is no 
longer useful to him, it says nothing to him, it is bizarre and absurd, just as names are for us 
when we have repeated them for too long’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 199). Consequently, 
without gestural power, these words do not have the same weight for the speaker and thus fail 
in allowing the speaker to take up ‘a position in the world of his significations’ (ibid).  
The process of speech production in aphasia offers us a better understanding of the embodied 
experience of ‘empty’ language. In the example of Carmita Wood, to describe this experience 
of what we now know to be sexual harassment as ‘flirting’ is an ‘empty’ speech expression. 
The word ‘flirting’ does not truly map onto Carmita’s experience of sexual harassment and 
therefore ‘says nothing’ to her. Thus, when the hermeneutically silenced utilise inappropriate 
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hermeneutical resources designed by a privileged group who do not understand their 
marginalised experience, the hermeneutically silenced do not perform a successful speech 
expression. Like the person with aphasia in Merleau-Ponty’s example, she ‘repeats the name 
as if [she] were expecting something from it’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 199). In this sense, I 
propose that hermeneutical lacunas can produce an ‘empty’ speech expression. In the words 
of Irigaray, such marginalised knowers reduce themselves from speaking bodies to ‘speaking 
machines’: 
If we keep on speaking sameness, if we speak to each other as men have been doing for 
centuries, as we have been taught to speak, we'll each other, fail ourselves. Again ... Words 
will pass through our bodies, above our heads. They'll vanish, and we'll be lost. Far off, up 
high. Absent from ourselves: well spoken machines, speaking machines. Enveloped in proper 
skins, but not our own. Withdrawn into proper names, violated by them. Not yours, not mine. 
We don't have any. (Irigaray, 1985: 205).  
The hermeneutically silenced are forced to use these inauthentic, ‘empty’ hermeneutical 
resources in a merely perfunctory way as they are not properly ‘inscribed in the human body’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 195). They hold no hermeneutical weight to the marginalised knower 
and thus are not truly embraced as part of her body schema. Consequently, like the patient 
with aphasia, the hermeneutically silenced individual ‘moves within narrower limits, in 
smaller and more restricted circles than in the case of normal perception’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012: 197). Regardless of whether one is silenced by a hermeneutical lacuna or one attempts 
to compensate for this gap with the ‘empty’ language of the socially dominant, the 
marginalised knower experiences a breakdown in the body schema.  
This section has established a form of dissonance produced by hermeneutical injustice that is 
missing from Fricker’s account. Those who are subject to hermeneutical silencing are not 
only vulnerable to a cognitive dissonance but an embodied dissonance that deconstructs the 
subject’s very being-in-the-world. Qua human nature, we tend towards speech expression. 
However, due to gaps in the interpretive framework, the hermeneutically silenced experience 
an inhibited body schema. Whether the marginalised knower faces the hermeneutical lacuna 
or attempts to overcome it with the dominant interpretive framework, they are subjected to a 
dissonance between body and world. For this reason, filling a hermeneutical gap is 
experienced as more than merely settling a psychological discomfort. Rather, Fricker 
describes it as an ‘astonishing and life-changing cognitive achievement’ (Fricker, 2007: 148). 
I suggest that such a hermeneutical feat is indeed life-changing, as it transforms the vague 
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fever of, say, an experience of sexual harassment, into a concrete and meaningful speech 
expression.  In turn, the subject may once again participate in ‘the fundamental activity by 
which man projects himself towards a “world”’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 197).  
After exploring just how hostile and unaccommodating the hermeneutical climate can be for 
the marginalised subject, plugging these hermeneutical gaps may appear an impossible task. I 
conclude this chapter by offering some thoughts on how a phenomenological approach can 
provide some insight into how we can best challenge hermeneutical silencing. I propose that 
the answer to this question lies in Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘speaking speech’.  
 3.3. Overcoming Hermeneutical Silencing through ‘Speaking Speech’ 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, speech can be divided into two kinds: ‘spoken speech’ and ‘speaking 
speech’. ‘Spoken speech’, constituted by the ‘common-stock’ of hermeneutical resources 
used to construct a speech expression, has been the focus of this chapter thus far. On the other 
hand, ‘speaking speech’ captures new and creative speech expressions that surpass the 
rehashed hermeneutical resources of everyday conversation in expressing something original 
and ‘authentic’. Although Merleau-Ponty attributes such ‘speaking’ speech to fairly 
commonplace creative expressions such as ‘the lover revealing his feelings’, it equally may 
take the form of seemingly more ground-breaking acts of creativity such as ‘the writer or 
philosopher who reawaken primordial experience anterior to all traditions’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1973: 30). In both these incidences, Merleau-Ponty recognises a ‘transcendental’ form of 
speech expression that arises when the subject feels limited by the hermeneutical resources 
they have at their disposal. ‘Speaking speech’ occurs ‘the moment I refuse to content myself 
with the established language, which is in effect a way of silencing me’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1973: 20). On the surface, then, it would seem that ‘speaking speech’ poses a simple solution 
for the hermeneutically silenced individual: fill these hermeneutical lacunas by employing 
new and authentic speech expressions regarding their experiences. Unfortunately, they face 
an all-important hurdle that makes speaking speech far less accessible: as established in 
chapter one, ‘speaking speech’ is dependent upon ‘spoken speech’.  
For Merleau-Ponty, authentic expression occurs through innovative play with the bedrock of 
pre-established speech. The dependence of ‘speaking speech’ upon ‘spoken speech’ is 
revealed through Merleau-Ponty’s example of poetry: the author’s words are limited to those 
that have been previously uttered, yet the way she composes these words can call forth an 
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original speech expression (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 185). The creative capacity for ‘speaking 
speech’ comes far more easily to the hermeneutically privileged compared to those who are 
hermeneutically silenced. As ‘spoken speech’ is already primed for the speech expressions of 
the powerful, the linguistic institution lends itself to ‘new’ speech expressions to be made 
from a position of hermeneutical privilege. Armed with the capacity for ‘speaking speech’, 
the hermeneutically privileged can find new and creative ways to strengthen the 
hermeneutical climate from which they benefit, as their ‘speaking speech’ become solidified 
and sedimented into the interpretive framework, thus transforming into further ‘spoken 
speech’ that articulates their privileged experiences.  
Therefore, constructing new and authentic speech expressions that articulate the obscured 
social experiences of the hermeneutically silenced is no easy task. Unlike their privileged 
counterparts, they must create an authentic ‘speaking’ speech expression that sheds light on 
the hermeneutical darkness using the very linguistic institution that alienated them in the first 
place. The hermeneutical resources that make up the linguistic institution do not lend 
themselves to formulate any new speech expression other than that which conforms to the 
exclusionary interpretive framework. After all, in the words of Audre Lorde:  
The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to 
beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.  And 
this fact is only threatening to those women who still define the master's house as their only 
source of support. (Lorde, 2018: 19).  
Nevertheless, while ‘speaking speech’ does not come easily to the hermeneutically silenced 
individual, this does not mean that it entirely out of their grasp.  
Although Merleau-Ponty emphasises that ‘the same transcendence that we found in the 
literary uses of speech can also be found in everyday language’, there seems to be an 
important distinction to be made between everyday creative expression such as ‘the lover 
revealing his feelings’ and ‘the writer or philosopher who reawaken primordial experience 
anterior to all traditions’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 20). The lover revealing his feelings,  
Baldwin observes, does not ‘need to create new idioms, but only to express themselves in 
ways that are new to their relationship’ (Baldwin, 2007: 90). On the other hand, for a creative 
expression like that in literature or philosophy, Merleau-Ponty ‘holds that the creative writer 
proceeds precisely by taking apart the established idioms of ‘spoken speech’, with their 
ready-made thoughts, in order to express something new which transcends those thoughts’ 
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(Baldwin, 2007: 93). In such ‘speaking speech’, the speaker outstrips and modifies the 
existing hermeneutical resources, tearing them apart to create something new. Merleau-Ponty 
describes the birth of such creative expression through a baptism of fire: 
I bring the match near, I light a flimsy piece of paper, and, behold, my gesture receives 
inspired help from the things around, as if the chimney and the dry wood had been waiting for 
me to set the light, or as though the match had been nothing but a magic incantation, a call of 
like to like answered beyond all imagination’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 10). 
Here, Merleau-Ponty captures the paradoxical dependency upon, yet the destruction of, the 
‘spoken speech’ required for radical ‘speaking’ speech expression to take place: ‘he wants to 
fulfil language and destroy it at the same time’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 99).  
This process that Merleau-Ponty recognises as necessary for truly ground-breaking ‘speaking 
speech’ to take place closely resembles Medina’s call for ‘hermeneutical resistance’. Medina 
proposes that ‘fatal’ hermeneutical injustice (what I recognise to be hermeneutical silencing) 
can only be combatted by ‘exerting epistemic friction against the normative expectations of 
established interpretive frameworks’ (Medina, 2017: 48). To expand our hermeneutical 
practices, we must resist the ready-made meanings of ‘spoken speech’ and create new 
meanings that amplify the experiences of the marginalised.  On this basis, Irigaray makes her 
plea not to be ‘absorbed into familiar scenes, worn-out phrases, routine gestures. Into bodies 
already encoded within a system. Try to pay attention to yourself. To me. Without letting 
convention, or habit, distract you’ (Irigaray, 1985: 206). When the term ‘sexual harassment’ 
was devised by the group that included Carmita Wood, the women did not simply rehash the 
existing hermeneutical resources at their disposal. It was recognised that such hermeneutical 
frameworks ought to be resisted as they were grounded in an inherently oppressive linguistic 
institution. Only by overturning the interpretive framework could Wood’s feminist group 
make room for a whole new area of expressive practice. For this reason, the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ appeared as a ‘profound revelation’ to the group members, as they managed to 
forge a new hermeneutical space despite the existing interpretive framework (Brownmiller, 
1990: 280-281).  In this new hermeneutical space, authentic ‘speaking’ speech expression 
regarding sexual harassment can now occur.   
My hope is that through the successful establishment of ‘speaking speech’, the marginalised 
subject can begin to close gaps in the hermeneutical framework. Through the development of 
such hermeneutical practices, all members of the linguistic institution (including the 
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hermeneutically privileged) are opened to a greater understanding of the hermeneutically 
marginalised experience. I suggest that, like Merleau-Ponty’s description of being confronted 
by the creative ‘speaking speech’ of the writer Stendhal, the hearer will be opened to ‘new’ 
and ‘authentic’ meanings that transcend the sedimented social understanding:  
I have access to Stendhal’s outlook through the commonplace words he uses. But in his 
hands, these words are given a new twist. The cross references multiply. More and more 
arrows point in the direction of a thought I have never encountered before and perhaps never 
would have met without Stendhal (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 12). 
Exchanging Stendhal for Sojourner Truth, one can imagine how her eye-opening speech 
posthumously entitled ‘Ain’t I a Woman?’ may have prompted a similar reaction in her 
audience at the 1851 Women’s Rights Convention in Ohio, and of course, those who read her 
speech in later years (Truth, 2020). In challenging the social understanding of who counts as 
a woman, the privileged in her audience (granted that they were open to hearing what she had 
to say) would have been confronted by an alternative understanding of womanhood beyond 
the remit of their inherited interpretive framework. Despite the treacherous hermeneutical 
climate in which she spoke, Truth pointed those in a position of hermeneutical comfort 
toward a thought they may not have otherwise encountered. In doing so, this act of ‘speaking 
speech’ ‘throw[s] itself beyond itself’ to carve out new hermeneutical practices (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012: 203). In time, through its repeated use, such ‘speaking speech’ becomes 
sedimented into ‘spoken speech’. While the speech expression loses its illuminative quality 
(in broad circles the phrase ‘sexual harassment’ no longer elicits the ‘click, aha!’ moment 
described by Brownmiller), the speech expression gains the habitual nature and pre-
reflectiveness of a well-used hermeneutical resource. Consequently, through such ‘speaking 
speech’, hermeneutical insurgents provide the vital hermeneutical resources required for an 
epistemically inclusive climate.  
This section argued that ‘speaking speech’ offers an essential tool to combat the dissonance 
experienced in hermeneutical silencing. As the marginalised subject’s personal understanding 
is embraced into the interpretive framework, the experience of both cognitive and embodied 
dissonance is eliminated. Consider again the profound revelation that came to Wendy 
Sandford upon discovering the term ‘postpartum depression’ at a workshop: 
In my group people started to talk about postpartum depression. In that forty-five minute 
period I realized that what I'd been blamed for, and what my husband had blamed me for, 
wasn't my personal deficiency. It was a combination of physiological things and a real 
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societal thing, isolation. That realisation was one of those moments that makes you a feminist 
forever (Brownmiller, 1990: 182).  
Fricker calls this a lifting of a ‘hermeneutical darkness’, as she has been able to articulate a 
latent experience that previously had no name for her (Fricker, 2007: 149). On one level, a 
cognitive dissonance is resolved as, within this circle at least, Wendy’s experience of 
motherhood and the social constructions of motherhood are no longer at odds with one 
another. On another level, an embodied dissonance is resolved because Wendy can finally put 
her experience of postpartum depression into words and take up her place in this region of the 
world. Drawing upon this new hermeneutical resource that articulates her experience, Wendy 
can employ her body into an act of speech expression against the backdrop of a meaningful 
landscape. Thus, through ‘speaking speech’, the marginalised subject can overcome the 
‘cognitive and expressive [impediment]’ imposed upon them (Fricker, 2007: 170). Finally, 
the marginalised subject experiences a body-world synthesis that allows them to freely 
transcend themselves: ‘nothing is hidden behind these faces and these gestures, and there are 
no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lvvx).  
3.4. Conclusion  
 
In the opening to ‘The War has Taken Place’, Merleau-Ponty poses the following question: 
‘How could we have waited so long to go to war?’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2007b: 41). The answer 
to this question lies in the invisible and transcendental nature of existence that occludes the 
experiences of the phenomenologically compromised: ‘We lived in a certain area of peace, 
experience, and freedom, formed by a combination of exceptional circumstances. We did not 
know that this was a soil to be defended but thought it the natural lot of men’ (ibid). Through 
this essay, Merleau-Ponty aims to make transparent the obscured political infrastructure and 
interpersonal relations that led to some moving through the world with a taken-for-granted 
freedom, and others crushed under the thumb of a malevolent tyranny.  
In a similar vein, my goal in this chapter has been to bring to light the hidden structures of 
our hermeneutical landscape by contrasting the transcendence of the hermeneutically 
privileged with the diminished embodiment of the hermeneutically silenced. Drawing on the 
work of epistemological liberation, I have exposed the linguistic institution as a mediator of 
social power, as only those equipped with hermeneutical resources (and therefore the 
capacity for speech expression) experience phenomenological freedom. In the words of 
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Merleau-Ponty, ‘no effective freedom exists without some power. Freedom exists in contact 
with the world, not outside it’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2007b: 49). With the freedom of speech 
expression comes the power to transform social understanding according to a privileged 
worldview. Forced to orientate themselves in a world with meaning-structures alien to their 
own experiences, the hermeneutically silenced are subjected to not only a cognitive but an 
embodied dissonance. I have shown that this embodied dissonance disrupts the being-in-the-
world of the marginalised subject, as they are robbed of an essential capacity of the body 
schema.  
Towards the end of the chapter, I examined Medina’s call for ‘hermeneutical resistance’ as it 
relates to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘speaking speech’. I concluded that such ‘new’ and 
‘creative’ speech expressions act as a mechanism for challenging inbuilt hermeneutical 
inequalities in the interpretive framework. I hope that in exposing the phenomenological 
ramifications of hermeneutical silencing, I have not only painted a complete picture of 
hermeneutical injustice but have provided a framework that will make us better equipped for 









Fricker grounds her theory of epistemic injustice on the proposition ‘start thought from 
marginalised lives’ (Fricker, 2017: 58).25 The focus of this chapter is on some of the most 
marginalised and vulnerable in our society: people with psychiatric illness. The Mental 
Health Foundation states that ‘people with mental health problems are amongst the least 
likely of any group with a long-term health condition or disability to find work, be in a 
steady, long-term relationship, live in decent housing [or] be socially included in mainstream 
society’.26 To uncover the social structures that sustain such marginalisation, I turn to the 
fast-growing interdisciplinary literature on the stigmatisation of psychiatric illness. This work 
exposes prejudicial attitudes towards psychiatric illness, according to which people with 
bipolar disorder are ‘unbalanced, not in control, [and] aggressive’ (Bonnington & Rose 2014: 
12), those with schizophrenia are ‘bizarre, incomprehensible and irrational’ (Sanati & 
Kyratsous 2015: 484), and people with depression are ‘unpredictable’ and ‘weak’ (Li et al. 
2018: 361). 
 As sanist discrimination is entrenched in our social practices, the need to address the 
credibility deficit that grounds it is ever more pressing. Fricker’s conception of epistemic 
injustice provides us with a useful framework to better understand the wrong suffered by 
people with psychiatric illness. Drawing upon this framework, the literature on epistemic 
injustice in psychiatric illness demonstrates that sanist attitudes can fuel a credibility deficit 
that tracks the person with psychiatric illness through multiple social domains, such as the 
criminal justice system (a victim of crime is less likely to be believed by the authorities if 
they have a history of mental health problems (Carver, Taylor & Morely 2016))and in the 
healthcare system (a diagnosis of mental health problems can downgrade the severity of 
one’s reported somatic symptoms (Thornicroft, 2006: 97)). 27 This bulk of this chapter, 
 
25 This quote can be attributed to Dorothy Smith (1988), but was popularised by Sarah Harding (1993). 
26 See Mental Health Foundation. (2021). Stigma and discrimination. [online] Available at: 
<https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/a-to-z/s/stigma-and-discrimination> [Accessed 6 February 2021].  
27 See also (Pettitt et al. 2013: 8-9).  
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however, focuses on the epistemic injustice experienced within the Western psychiatric 
healthcare system itself.  
It may appear surprising that identity prejudice could track those with psychiatric illness into 
the healthcare system itself, perpetrated by those who have their patient’s best interest at 
heart. However, prejudicial beliefs that psychiatric patients are ‘cognitively impaired or 
emotionally compromised’ can cloud the judgement of even the most attentive healthcare 
professional (Crichton et al. 2016: 2). 28  According to Thornicroft, ‘the core issues that occur 
time and again in service users’ accounts are of being spoken to as if they were children, 
being excluded from important decisions and staff assuming a lack of capacity to be 
responsible for their own lives’ (Thornicroft, 2006: 95).  
For the first half of this paper, I limit my focus to epistemic injustice within the psychiatric 
healthcare system. I show that in this domain, epistemic injustice is fuelled by 1) the 
healthcare professional-patient relationship and 2) the formal psychiatric policies that 
structure the system itself. I argue that the influence of these negative stereotypes can lead to 
epistemic degradation across all areas of psychiatric illness that ‘may be as harmful as the 
disease itself’ (Overton & Medina, 2008: 143). In the second half of the paper, I contribute a 
new kind of epistemic harm to the literature, experienced both inside and outside of the 
psychiatric healthcare system. This epistemic harm is driven not by negative identity 
prejudices but by positive identity prejudice that trivialise the psychiatric condition. Whereas 
sanist attitudes depict people with psychiatric illness as ‘dangerous and frightening’, 
‘incompetent to participate in “normal” activities’, ‘morally repugnant’ and ‘other’ (Perlin 
1992), trivialisation devalues the epistemic status of people with psychiatric illness by 
reducing their symptoms to mere personality traits, thus denying those with psychiatric 
illness a fully recognised psychiatric identity. Through this chapter, I expose some more 
subtle forms of epistemic injustice that occur in psychiatric healthcare and draw attention to 
the ways in which the structure of the psychiatric system can render the psychiatric patient 




28 I use the term’ healthcare professional’ here to encompass a variety of roles in psychiatric healthcare (nurses, 
psychiatrists, therapists, case workers etc) for simplicity’s sake.  
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4.1. Psychiatric Authority 
 
I begin this section by offering the following clarification: the purpose of this dissertation is 
not to pose an attack on psychiatry. I do not suggest that healthcare professionals 
intentionally downgrade the credibility of their patients. Nor do I suggest that they intend 
their patients any harm at all; in fact, they often impact the patient’s lives in a positive way.  I 
have no intention to delegitimise psychiatry, without which psychiatric patients would be 
unable to receive the support they deserve. When epistemic injustice occurs, it is through an 
implicit prejudice despite the healthcare professional’s best efforts to help their patient.29 
Moreover, in some cases, it is the healthcare system itself, as opposed to individual clinicians, 
that maintain an environment of epistemic injustice.  
Nevertheless, it is important to observe the ‘social power’ possessed by the healthcare 
professional. Fricker defines ‘social power’ as ‘a practically socially situated capacity to 
control others’ actions, where this capacity may be exercised (actively or passively) by 
particular social agents, or alternatively, it may operate purely structurally’ (Fricker, 2007: 
13). In the case of psychiatry, this social power, bestowed upon the healthcare professionals 
in virtue of their training and expertise, takes on a unique form (Carel & Kidd, 2014: 530). 
The healthcare professional possesses the power to legally detain a person under the Mental 
Health act and consequently significantly infringe upon their liberty; to define the state of 
mind of their patient and to position them in a conclusive diagnostic category; to prescribe 
treatment to their patient, sometimes in the form of medication that may transform their 
mental state significantly. And so, with any possession of social power, Fricker encourages us 
to ask: ‘who or what is controlling whom, and why’ (Fricker, 2007: 14). Through a brief 
history of psychiatry, I hope to answer this question here.  
In the latest ‘Big Mental Health Survey’ conducted by Mind, 86% of participants reported 
experiencing discrimination in at least one life area.30 The survey showed high levels of 
discrimination reported in the participant’s social life, employment, education and online. 
 
29 As Kidd and Carel observe, the nature of the healthcare professional’s work itself often hampers their ability 
to afford their patients epistemic justice: ‘Working under constant time pressure, routinisation of tasks, and shift 
work all undermine opportunities to listen at length to what patients say and to create a relationship with them’ 
(Kidd & Carel, 2017: 176).  
 
30 See Mind.org.uk. (2018). 
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Such stigma and prejudice directed at those with psychiatric illness have been dubbed 
‘sanism’, through which people are discriminated against and oppressed in virtue of their 
psychiatric illness. Like racism, sexism or homophobia, Michael L. Perlin popularised the 
term ‘sanism’ to draw attention to the discriminatory distinction between the ‘mad’ and the 
‘sane’ (Perlin, 1992).31 This distinction has far-reaching philosophical roots in the work of 
Michel Foucault, who formulated a genealogy of ‘madness’ to trace back the schism that 
separated the so-called ‘man of madness’ from the ‘man of reason’ (Foucault, 2001).  In the 
preface to Madness and Civilisation, Foucault defends the urgent need for such a genealogy 
due to the breakdown in communication between these two groups:  
The constitution of madness as a mental illness…affords the evidence of a broken dialogue, 
posits the separation as already affected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, 
imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the exchange between madness and reason 
was made. The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has 
been established only on the basis of such a silence. (Foucault, 2001: xii).  
For Foucault, the entrenched sanism in our society is driven by a disparity between the voice 
of the ‘mad’ and the voice of the ‘sane’. More specifically, the voice of the ‘mad’ and the 
voice of the psychiatrist. The unchallenged, unidirectional ‘monologue’ of the latter is made 
all the louder against the enforced silence of the former. The ‘archaeology of that silence’, 
constructed by the unquestioned authority of psychiatry, is the focus of Foucault’s work 
(ibid).  
Through Foucault’s historical account, the reader witnesses the concept of ‘psychiatric 
illness’ evolve over time. It begins as a mysterious force in the middle ages; a beast that has 
consumed the spirit of its victim. By the end of the Renaissance, psychiatric illness’ is 
perceived to be a positive character trait, whereby those experiencing psychiatric illness were 
thought to possess a unique form of wisdom. The progress made in the Renaissance was 
quickly curbed during the Enlightenment period, however, where a clear distinction between 
rationality and ‘madness’ emerged. Those with psychiatric illness had no place within an 
enlightened society and were thus condemned to asylums. Although named as such because 
the asylum was meant to act as a refuge for those with psychiatric illness, Foucault notes that 
 
31 While Perlin popularised the term ‘sanism’, it is worth noting that it was the lawyer and mental health 
advocate Morton Birnbaum who first coined the term during a trial in 1960. A further important contribution to 
the literature was the term ‘mentalism’, which captures the exact same injustice, introduced by Judith 
Chamberlain in 1975 (however the latter term did not receive the same level of uptake).  
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there was little distinction between the asylum and the prison.  Finally, in the nineteenth 
century, through the work of Tuke and Pinel, psychiatric illness becomes conceptualised as a 
medical condition and the subject of scientific scrutiny (Foucault, 2001).  
Foucault’s contemporaries regarded this final move toward therapeutic intervention to be a 
kind of liberation for those with psychiatric illness. The prison was transformed into a home-
like setting, with stone walls and iron bars swapped for windows that opened onto the 
countryside, and chains were swapped for large gardens where the residents could roam. 
However, Foucault condemns this liberation as illusionary. Though invisible, the chains that 
curtailed the freedom of those with psychiatric illness persisted through the imposing power 
of the psychiatrist.  His critique of the uneven and non-reciprocal relationship between the 
‘madman’ and his ‘keeper’ finds its crescendo in the final chapter, whereby Foucault reveals 
the psychiatrist’s characterisation as the ultimate authority. An authority initially bestowed 
upon them, according to Foucault, on the simple grounds that they are not ‘mad’:  
It is thought that Tuke and Pinel opened the asylum to medical knowledge. They did not 
introduce science, but a personality, whose powers borrowed from science only their disguise, 
or at most their justification. These powers, by their nature, were over moral and social order; 
they took root in the madman’s minority status, in the insanity of his person, not of his mind. 
If the medical personage could isolate madness, it was not because he knew it, but because he 
mastered it (Foucault, 2001: 258).  
Thus, for Foucault, the first psychiatrist was unduly granted this pedestal in virtue not of his 
medical knowledge but because of the illusion of knowledge, the illusion that he held the 
‘miraculous power to cure’ those with psychiatric illness (Foucault, 2001: 260). This 
authority was exacerbated by the power he possessed over the patients and their contrasting 
epistemic fragility and willing submission. From then on, according to Foucault, a person 
blindly inherited this authority upon receiving their status as a psychiatrist. As such, the 
authority of the psychiatrist’s speech came to replace the instruments used for restraint 
(Foucault, 2001: 234).  
In contrast, the word of the patient was reduced to nothing. Foucault recognises this as a 
fundamental strategy of the asylum, whereby the psychiatrist becomes the observer, and the 
ill person is reduced to the observed.32 As ‘the observed’, Foucault argues that the voice of 
 
32 Here Foucault clearly invokes Sartre’s concept of the ‘gaze’, whereby people with psychiatric illness are 




the psychiatric patient becomes inconsequential. Initially, this point seems not to pertain to 
the case of psychoanalysis, whereby the patient’s narrative plays a pivotal role in their 
psychiatric classification. However, for Foucault, psychoanalysis is still a form of 
observation; in fact, he claims that psychoanalysis ‘doubled the absolute observation of the 
watcher with the endless monologue of the person watched’ (Foucault, 2001: 238). He 
suggests that the narrative of the patient is not truly speech expression, or at least not speech 
expression that has any power. Instead, the ‘endless monologue’ is a means of eliciting 
further behaviour from the patient to submit to psychiatric scrutiny, ‘thus preserving the old 
asylum structure of non-reciprocal observation but balancing it, in a non-symmetrical 
reciprocity, by the new structure of language without response’ (ibid).   
While Foucault’s history of the Western psychiatric institution sheds light on the history of 
psychiatry, it could be argued that it bears less relevance today. Conditions of psychiatric 
healthcare systems have changed substantially since Foucault’s time. Although mental 
institutions still exist, and many people are involuntarily committed year each, coercive 
sectioning is now considered an absolute last resort (Saya et al. 2019). 33 The Mental Health 
Act has been modernised in 2021 to ensure that it is being utilised in the least restrictive way 
possible and with the aim to restore the patients’ role in their own treatment.34 Overall, there 
has been a significant shift away from Foucault’s asylum and towards deinstitutionalised 
therapeutic practices. On the surface, these practices seem to elicit an entirely different power 
dynamic from the one depicted in Madness and Civilisation. Outside of sectioning, the 
healthcare professional no longer has the same level of control over the patient’s liberty. The 
relationship appears closer to medical doctor and patient than ‘keeper’ and ‘prisoner’, as 
Foucault depicted. Yet, although the power dynamic between the psychiatrist and the patient 
beyond the asylum is a different one, I argue that the credibility excess of the psychiatrist 
persists. Indeed, by turning instead to a history of contemporary psychiatry, we are met with a 
picture that is all too familiar.  In Greenberg’s The Book of Woe: The DSM and the Unmaking 
of Psychiatry, we can see the shape in which the authority of psychiatry took through the 
elevation of the diagnostic manual.35  
 
33 In 2019-2020 there were 50,893 new involuntarily detentions in England alone. See (Poupart & Foster, 2020)  
34 See Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. (2021).  
35 While other diagnostic manuals exist (most notably the ICD), Greenberg focuses specifically on the DSM 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), the diagnostic manual that now holds the most weight 
in psychiatry. However, much of what he says about the DSM pertains to other diagnostic manuals too. 
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Although psychiatric diagnostic manuals have existed since the nineteenth century, the 
diagnostic manual was not an indispensable part of psychiatric treatment until the 
introduction of the DSM-3 in the 1980s. 36 To shake off the waning reputation of 
psychoanalysis and compete with the prestige of medical science, a diagnostic manual 
emerged (‘a dictionary of disorder’) that listed the symptoms for twenty-one psychiatric 
illnesses (Greenberg, 2013: 41).  In reflection upon the popularity of the DSM-3, Robert 
Spitzer (chair of the task force behind the DSM-3) stated: “DSM-3 looks very scientific” and 
“If you open it up, it looks like they must know something” (ibid). Indeed, by introducing this 
third development of the DSM, faith in psychiatry was restored: ‘the DSM seemed to grant 
psychiatrists dominion over the entire landscape of mental suffering, a perch from which they 
could proclaim as a mental disorder any aberration they could describe systematically’ 
(Greenberg, 2013: 22-23). However, Greenberg argues that this epistemic credibility was 
misplaced. 
Like Foucault, Greenberg calls into question the authority of the DSM and the paternalistic 
role of the practitioners who facilitate its rule. He discusses the arbitrary nature of the DSM’s 
categories and criteria, which are under the thrall of ‘journal editors, grant reviewers, 
regulators, and Food and Drug Administration’ (Greenberg, 2013: 48).  Greenberg brings to 
light the capricious debates that have taken place over the development of the DSM regarding 
which ‘psychological problems’ were worthy of classification. However, many argue that 
diagnostic criteria simply cannot be carved up in the same way as somatic diagnoses. In the 
words of Svenaeus: 
The DSM wants to create the impression that doctors can explain and cure the sufferings of 
the soul in the same manner as they explain and cure the sufferings of the body, but, of 
course, they cannot, since life-world matters and existential questions are not amenable to 
biological analysis in the way the functions of the body are. (Svenaeus, 2018: 8).  
Consequently, Greenberg poses the following question: ‘why should we trust them with all 
the authority they’ve been granted?’ (Greenberg, 2013: 21).  
Quoting Steve Hyman, Greenberg describes the misplaced authority of psychiatrists as an 
‘unintended epistemic prison’ because the perceived legitimacy of the DSM forces 
psychiatrists to adopt an absolute conviction in their ability to fully understand the patient’s 
 
36 One of the first recognised psychiatric diagnostic manuals was ‘Psychiatrie’ published in 1883 by Emil 
Kraepelin. See (Kraeplin, 1889).  
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mental health condition (Greenberg, 2013: 49).  Unlike a physician who can use an X-ray of a 
broken bone to illustrate their diagnosis to the patient, the psychiatrist has only the DSM and 
the patient’s testimony to navigate their illness. A large portion of the psychiatrist’s authority 
now rests precariously upon the legitimacy of the DSM. To rouse doubt in the DSM’s ability 
to decode mental health problems would be to undermine the credibility of the entire 
psychiatric industry. Hence, for Greenberg, psychiatrists are imprisoned by their own 
authority. 
So far, it may appear as though I support the idea that the authority held by the psychiatrist is 
entirely fabricated. This indeed seems to be the position of Foucault, Greenberg and others, 
particularly those belonging to the anti-psychiatry movement. However, the validity of such a 
claim will not be explored here. My concern for this chapter is not whether psychiatrists' 
authority is a fallacy or whether there really is such a thing as ‘psychiatric knowledge’. For 
the purpose of this dissertation, I take it to be true that there is psychiatric knowledge. I also 
take it to be true that the DSM can be a useful tool for psychiatric care (indeed, by the end of 
this chapter, I will have established that the diagnostic categories they provide can be of 
paramount importance for a person with psychiatric illness). My concern here is whether this 
psychiatric knowledge is afforded what Fricker calls a credibility excess or epistemic 
privilege, whereby a speaker is granted greater epistemic status than they deserve (Fricker, 
2007: 17).  
It is not difficult to find evidence of such epistemic privilege. For instance, in response to 
Sadler et al.’s question ‘Should Patients and Their Families Contribute to the DSM-5 
Process?’ (Sadler et al. 2004), Spitzer reacts as if even raising this question is to attack the 
moral standing of the psychiatrist:  
It is insulting to the mental health professionals involved in the DSM revision process, many 
of whom have family members with psychiatric illness or have experienced illness 
themselves, to suggest that they are insensitive to such issues and that they need to be 
educated by patients and families (Spitzer, 2004: 113).  
Spitzer goes on to argue that it is ‘politically correct nonsense’ to suggest that psychiatric 
patients and their family members could provide a unique insight into diagnostic criteria that 
‘committees of mental health professionals who are chosen because of their expertise in some 
aspect of psychiatric diagnosis’ could not possess (ibid).   
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It is such epistemic privilege that leads psychiatrists to dictate the ways in which a psychiatric 
illness is interpreted and which testimonies are credible (Carel & Kidd, 2014: 530). Consider 
a study conducted by Horn et al., which examined the service user experience of patients with 
borderline personality disorder. The study showed that participants experienced systematic 
reinforcement that the patient’s knowledge of their illness was inferior to that of the 
psychiatrist’s:  
Danielle described how any questions about the diagnosis were met with “No, this is 
definitely what you have. We are 100% sure” and Andrea found similar recourse to 
“expertise” when she was told that “if that was his (Psychiatrist’s) gut reaction then he’s 
probably right”. Such dialogues appeared to be a deferment to some greater, expert 
“knowing” position but which left participants in the opposite “not knowing” position (Horn, 
Johnstone & Brooke, 2007: 260-261).  
Credibility excess can produce a particular form of epistemic harm in itself as it further 
perpetuates the credibility deficits inflicted upon marginalised speakers. Such epistemic 
authority is more likely to make the privileged hearer deaf to the voice of the credibility 
deficient, ‘rendering him closed-minded, dogmatic, blithely impervious to criticism, and so 
on’ (Fricker, 2007: 20). It would be close-minded itself to ascribe such characteristics to all 
psychiatrists, whose primary interest is in assisting their patient. On the other hand, it would 
not be uncharitable to assume that a credibility excess may bolster the psychiatrist’s 
confidence in their own understanding of an illness over their patient’s first-person insight, 
driving them to champion their own perspective.  
Medina argues that credibility excess plays a more significant role in epistemic injustice than 
Fricker is prepared to concede. For one, epistemic privilege may silence the marginalised: 
‘they may feel intimidated by the speaker’s authoritative voice, inhibited to express dissent or 
to raise objections, and so forth’ (Medina, 2011: 17). In the case of psychiatric healthcare, the 
patient may lose faith in their own understanding of their illness and defer all judgement to 
the epistemic authority of the healthcare professional. But more pertinently for Medina, the 
epistemic wrong lies in the disproportionate and unfair epistemic merit afforded to those with 
credibility excess.  For Medina, ‘epistemic injustices are produced as much by lack of 
epistemic recognition (the credibility deficits of some) as they are produced by epistemic 
privilege (the credibility excesses of others)’ as the positive stereotype that fuels epistemic 
authority acts as a further juxtaposition to the negative stereotype that perpetuates epistemic 
injustice (Medina, 2011:21). Therefore, the epistemic privilege of the DSM and the 
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healthcare professionals that wield it only further reduces the patient’s standing as a ‘knower’ 
of their own illness.  
Through this section, I have brought to light the peculiar battle for epistemic authority 
undertaken by psychiatry. The inherent epistemic asymmetry in the doctor-patient 
relationship sheds light on the long history of the ‘psychiatric survivors’ movement, members 
of which posit themselves as survivors not just of the effects of psychiatric illness but of the 
psychiatric treatment itself. In what follows, I offer an account of how this disproportionate 
credibility economy can lead to testimonial injustice in psychiatric healthcare.  
 
4.2.  
4.3. Testimonial Injustice in Psychiatric Healthcare   
 
Testimony plays a vital role in the treatment and diagnosis of psychiatric illness. If no disease 
process has been identified behind a psychiatric illness (unlike in cases of neurological 
disorder), testimony is the foremost means of access healthcare professionals have to the 
patient’s symptoms. As Kurs and Grinshpoon observe, the patient’s communication with the 
clinician ‘involves not only the exchange of information but also asking questions, raising 
ideas, and perhaps considering alternative treatments that the patient feels might be more 
beneficial or appropriate for his or her lifestyle’ (Kurs & Grinshpoon, 2018: 342). Without 
this interaction, the healthcare professional cannot successfully diagnose their patient nor 
offer appropriate treatment.  
However, it is not sufficient for a patient to simply talk to the healthcare professional. 
According to Fricker, the speaker must possess a certain epistemic status for her testimony to 
be recognised as credible. As has been suggested thus far, in contrast to the almost 
omniscient psychiatrist, the psychiatric patient is perceived to possess a deflated epistemic 
status due both to the psychiatrist's comparative credibility excess and the negative identity 
prejudice that tracks those with psychiatric illness. A survey conducted by Corrigan and 
Watson exposes the following three identity prejudices as the most commonly held against 
people with psychiatric illness: 1) ‘people with mental illness are homicidal maniacs who 
need to be feared’, 2) ‘they are responsible for their illness because they have a weak 
character’ and 3) ‘they have childlike perceptions of the world that should be marvelled’ 
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(Corrigan & Watson, 2002: 16). These sanist attitudes have been shown to spill over into the 
psychiatric healthcare system itself, thus further affecting the epistemic standing of those 
with psychiatric illness. Consider the following quote from a psychiatric patient: 
“I went to different psychologists and doctors and so, talked and talked, but it didn’t help me 
to do something about it.”/“. . .and I went there three times a week for 2 years and carried on 
about my problems, my despair and my suicide thoughts, and I just got worse and worse, but 
that must be the idea of psychoanalysis-just harping and harping on the same string, until you 
feel so sick you want to puke.” (Patient quote in Perseius et al. 2003: 223). 
In such instances, the patient speaks, yet her testimony is not granted the epistemic worth it 
deserves. Without epistemic worth, the patient’s words lose their meaning, devolving from 
‘talking’ to ‘harping’. Due to the high prevalence of stigma toward people with psychiatric 
illness, psychiatric patients are frequently met with testimonial injustice where the 
psychiatrist unwittingly downgrades the credibility of their patient’s testimony, disregarding 
it as confused, exaggerated, or simply unreliable. 
Initially, it may appear ethically sound to question the credibility of people with certain 
psychiatric illnesses, whose faculties of judgment are hampered in virtue of their illness. 
Those with a neurological disorder, such as dementia, or people who experience delusions 
and hallucinations, diagnosed under the schizophrenia spectrum or other psychotic disorders, 
have a particular epistemic fragility. It could appear that deflating the credibility of their 
testimony is justified because the credibility deflation is grounded in the person’s history of 
false-belief states as opposed to a negative identity prejudice. Yet, if the hearer operates 
under a confirmation bias, where they make the reductive conclusion that because the 
person’s belief-states can sometimes be fallible, their belief-states ought to always be under 
scrutiny, this constitutes a testimonial injustice (Sanati & Kyratsous, 2015: 483). Sanati and 
Kyratsous provide an example of such testimonial injustice through the psychosis patient J.N. 
Following a period of positive response to treatment and seeming improvement, J.N. started 
showing signs of psychosis again. When her partner came to visit, she would refuse to talk to 
him and just stare at him, ‘following and watching him whenever he was walking in the ward 
or talking with staff and other patients’ (Sanati & Kyratsous, 2015: 482). The therapeutic 
team diagnosed J.N. with delusional jealousy and ignored her testimony concerning her fears 
for her marriage. It later transpired that her partner had indeed left J.N for another woman, 
and her behaviour was justified.  
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In this example, the person’s identity as a psychosis patient encompassed all facets of her 
being so that all testimonies became unreliable and a symptom of her condition in the eyes of 
the healthcare professional. If we delve further into the literature, we find that such 
confirmation bias is not limited to psychosis. Consider the following quote from a patient 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder:  
If you are behaving as you are – you’re happy – and they [consultants] say ‘oh, you’re hyper’, 
I think that is a particular bipolar-related discrimination. I was once in hospital and towards 
the end I really believe I was fine, I was just being my normal self. But they kept me in 
because they were saying I’m not, I’m still high… I don’t appreciate that at all (Bonnington & 
Rose, 2014: 11, ellipses as in text).  
Through this confirmation bias, everything the person says is coloured by their diagnosis. In 
this example, the person with bipolar disorder is considered incapable of knowing or 
reporting their own mental state.37 As such, the healthcare professional’s third-person 
perspective is privileged over the patient’s first-person experience. In the words of Kidd and 
Carel, ‘Many patients will not be as well placed as their doctors to understand certain aspects 
of their illness and treatment, but this neither requires nor justifies the further attribution to 
those patients of inferior epistemic status tout court’ (Kidd & Carel, 2017: 175). 
Recent literature has brought to light the ways in which testimonial injustice operates in 
psychiatric illness more broadly (Crichton et al. 2016) and within specific illnesses, such as 
depression (Jackson, 2017), dementia (Jongsma, Spaeth, and Schicktanz, 2017), (Young, 
Lind, Orange, & Savundranayagam, 2020), borderline personality disorder (Kyratsous & 
Sanati, 2016), (Watts, 2017), autism (Jongsma, Spaeth, and Schicktanz, 2017) and 
psychosis (Sanati & Kyratsous, 2015). These authors have done much to illuminate the 
different ways in which testimonial injustice can emerge from the distinct negative identity 
prejudices that track each illness. As I believe there is little to add to these rich accounts, I 
instead offer two examples of domain-specific testimonial injustice that impact patients 
across the psychiatric healthcare system: testimonial injustice toward sexual abuse claims and 
testimonial injustice towards suicide claims.  
4.3.1.  Testimonial Injustice in Sexual Abuse Claims 
 
 
37 For further examples of confirmation bias leading to testimonial injustice in psychiatric illness see Crichton, 
Carel and Kidd 2016.  
126 
 
According to the Care Quality Commission report, a total of 1,129 sexual incidents were 
reported in mental health wards within three months in 2017, including 29 alleged rapes and 
457 incidents of sexual harassment and assault. Two-thirds of these reports were made by 
patients, and 97% of incidents ‘were classified as “no harm” or “low harm” (2018). Reports 
of sexual abuse are frequently ignored or downgraded due to the negative stereotypes 
attached to psychiatric patients as being fallible or attention-seeking. As one person reported: 
‘I was being harassed by a male patient and...I had to report it because he was continuously 
harassing me all the time. And the staff, they just kept putting it off, they wouldn’t say 
nothing to him’ (Mezey et al. 2005: 580). These reports capture a prevalence of testimonial 
injustice towards sexual abuse claims in psychiatric care, as the severity of the claims appear 
to be undervalued in virtue of the speaker’s reduced epistemic status.  
This systematic credibility deficit leads to a looping effect by further fuelling the 
victimisation of mental health patients, as sexual abusers are more likely to target those who 
could be deemed an unreliable witness: ‘psychiatric diagnoses- those that put a question mark 
on the veracity of one’s testimony…give abusers an especially easy way to intonate or 
explicitly frame testimony as a sign of illness, hysteria or attention seeking’ (Watts, 2018). 
This looping effect can be understood as what Fricker calls ‘the sinister mechanism of causal 
construction’ in testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007: 88). Fricker exemplifies this through the 
example of Marge Sherwood and Tom Ripley: ‘Ripley successfully constructs Marge as 
‘hysterical’’ by exploiting the identity prejudice against her, which in turn leads various other 
men to cast doubt on Marge’s claims against him and influences them to dismiss her 
testimony (Fricker, 2007: 88). Through routine testimonial injustice, just such a feedback 
loop is created in which violators can take advantage of their victim’s credibility deficit. 
Consider the following patient quote:  
Being diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder…actually caused harm by reinforcing 
the controlling behaviour and lies which the perpetrator of my childhood abuse had used to 
prevent me from escaping the abuse or reporting him, making me believe it was all my fault, 
increasing the self-blame and the self-harm.  (cited in Watts, 2019) 
To combat testimonial injustice in the mental healthcare system, the CQC observe in their 
report that claims of sexual abuse ought to receive a higher level of credibility from the 
offset: ‘Even if it is concluded that the alleged incident did not take place, staff must work to 




4.3.2.  Testimonial Injustice in Suicide Claims 
 
Within psychiatric healthcare, reports of the intent to kill oneself are frequently not met with 
the credibility they deserve, with potentially fatal results. Psychiatric illness constitutes the 
most common cause of suicide worldwide, with studies predicting as much as 80- 90%.38 The 
most common psychiatric illnesses attributed to suicide are depression, substance use-
disorder and psychosis; however, people diagnosed with anxiety, personality disorders, eating 
disorders and PTSD are also at high risk (Brådvik, 2018). Consider the following example: 
Tom is 22 and has made a couple of serious attempts on his life following prolonged periods 
of depression. “When I regained consciousness after the last attempt”, he said, “I was told ‘If 
you really want to kill yourself, you would have done it’.” Tom, like many other people, feels 
like when he now contacts the crisis team, they treat him brusquely. “It is like they will only 
take me seriously if I actually die” (Watts, 2017).  
Narratives like Tom’s are not uncommon, as claims that one will kill oneself are frequently 
met with credibility deflation. The very language healthcare professionals utilise in the 
context of suicidal patients betrays an inherent identity prejudice, as such patients are not 
referred to as ‘communicating’ or even ‘confessing’ suicidal urges but of ‘threatening 
suicide’. This language suggests that the patient is blackmailing the healthcare professional, 
using the ‘threat’ of suicide as part of an ultimatum to force them to give in to the patient’s 
demands. It is conceivable that the use of such biased terminology is grounded in discussions 
of so-called ‘contingency-based suicide’ in psychiatry, a term coined by Lambert & Bonner 
(Lambert & Bonner, 1996). Contingency-based suicide can be defined as follows: 
These patients may communicate their suicidality as conditional, aimed at satisfying unmet 
needs; secondary gain; dependency needs; or remaining in the sick role. Faced with 
impending discharge, such a patient might increase the intensity of his suicidal statements or 
engage in behaviors that subvert discharge. Some go as far as to engage in behaviors with 
apparent suicidal intent soon after discharge (Bundy et al. 2014: 1).  
 The authors add that such patients may have ‘mood disorders, personality pathology, 
substance use disorder, or a history of serious suicide attempt’ (ibid). In their guide on 
discharging patients who ‘threaten’ ‘contingency-based suicide’, Bundy et al. provide the 
case study of Mr K, who is described as ‘male sex, white race, low-social support, mood 
 
38 See (MHFA Portal. 2020). 
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disorder, substance use disorder (SUD), and chronic pain’ (Bundy et al. 2014: 2). Bundy et al. 
recommend not taking Mr K’s threat of suicide seriously as ‘his statement that he will kill 
himself if discharged appears to be an expression of unmet needs (housing, pain 
management) that is representative of his limited and often-maladaptive coping and skills, 
rather than an indicator of imminent risk of death’ (ibid). Bundy et al. suggest that Mr K's 
case can be distinguished from an authentically suicidal patient purely from Mr K’s use of an 
ultimatum in his testimony to healthcare professionals. Note that, in the case study of Mr K, 
the so-called ‘ultimatum’ is as follows: ‘if I am discharged then I will kill myself’. Bundy et 
al.’s account fails to draw a clear distinction between a case that could be fatal and one that 
could be a manipulative ploy. This inability to distinguish between the two is, of course, 
because both cases look outwardly the same, as we cannot fully determine the patient’s 
intentions.  
The literature on contingency-based suicide uses language that reflects a battle between the 
‘demanding’ and ‘unyielding’ patient and the ‘caring’ yet ‘fearful’ healthcare professional 
who must not ‘give in’ to the patient’s ‘manipulative’ (often associated with women) or 
‘malingering’ (often associated with men) behaviour; discussions mainly surround the 
doctor’s fear of liability versus the scarcity of resources, particularly hospital beds  (Wilson et 
al. 2016) (Wedig et al. 2013), (Berlin, 2007), (Lambert, 2003). The literature on contingency-
based suicide exposes an inherent identity prejudice against psychiatric patients that portrays 
them as controlling and deceitful. These identity prejudices lead healthcare professionals to 
downgrade the credibility of suicidal claims, such as in the case of Tom above. The 
parliamentary and health service ombudsman Rob Behrens reported in March 2018 a death 
toll of at least 271 psychiatric patients over the last six years (Campbell, 2018). In most cases, 
the patients had taken their own lives (ibid). Following this report, the need to expose the 
inherent testimonial injustice against suicide claims in psychiatric healthcare has never been 
so urgent. 
 
4.4. The Trivialization of Psychiatric Illness  
 
An essential feature of epistemic injustice is that the credibility deficit is motivated by an 
identity prejudice. Fricker uses this term to refer to prejudice driven by socially instituted 
stereotypes: ‘a distorted image of the social type in question’ (Fricker 2007: 4). She 
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acknowledges that prejudice may not necessarily take an overtly pejorative form and offers 
the following definition: ‘judgements, which may have a positive or a negative valence, and 
which display some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter‐evidence owing 
to some affective investment on the part of the subject’ (Fricker 2007: 35). Nevertheless, she 
concludes that it is, in fact, negative identity prejudice that drives epistemic injustice: 
This affective investment may or may not be ethically bad, but given our central concern with 
systematic testimonial injustice, we have a special interest in negative identity prejudices, and 
these are, I take it, always generated by some ethically bad affective investment (ibid.). 
Fricker understands negative identity prejudice to be ‘prejudices with a negative valence held 
against people qua social type’ and adds that it is ‘certainly the most morally problematic 
kind of prejudice, and it is the kind we are most interested in’ (Fricker 2007: 34-35). 
According to Fricker, negative identity prejudice is motivated by morally bad assumptions 
about the marginalized subject. She provides the example of Solomon, who holds the belief 
that women are irrational (a belief grounded in contempt for women) despite being exposed 
to evidence to the contrary (Fricker 2007: 34). For Fricker, it is this morally bad assumption 
that is central to the injustice in epistemic injustice.  
By establishing negative identity prejudice as central to epistemic injustice, the literature has 
generally followed Fricker in assuming negative identity prejudice as the sole driver of 
credibility deficit.39 Indeed, the burgeoning research on epistemic injustice and psychiatric 
illness centres on the assumption that it is negative identity prejudice that motivates a deflated 
level of credibility (Crichton et al. 2016). It is this form of epistemic injustice that this chapter 
has focused on thus far. And yet, we have long known that prejudices with a seemingly 
positive valence are equally divisive. On the surface, positive stereotypes may appear to right 
the wrongs of negative stereotypes: ‘Women aren’t less capable than men; they are more 
empathetic and nurturing’, or ‘Black people aren’t less accomplished than white people; all 
the best athletes are Black’ are some unfortunate examples of this.  
In fact, in some cases, positive stereotypes may be more insidious than their negative 
counterparts because their putatively complimentary appearance makes them harder to detect: 
 In contemporary contexts the relative ease with which positive stereotypes can “fly under the 
radar” and evade red flags may, ironically, make them more damaging to general egalitarian 
 
39 Besides Emmalon Davis, whom I discuss shortly.  
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social beliefs than not only the absence of any stereotypic information but negative 
stereotypes, too (Kay et al., 2013: 287). 
To test this assumption, Kay et al. conducted a study revealing the impact of the racial 
stereotype ‘Black people are superior athletes’ upon non-marginalised hearers. They found 
that positive stereotypes ‘are less likely to produce skepticism about their veracity’ than their 
negative counterparts (Kay et al. 2013: 291). Drawing from this literature, I suggest that 
despite their positive valence, these stereotypes are harmful in at least four ways: 
1. Positive stereotypes can compromise the wellbeing of members of their associated 
group due to an increased expectation to live up to the stereotype. For instance, ‘if Black 
women overly identify with the [strong black woman] image, they may feel as if they have to 
live up to societal expectations of invincibility and indestructibility, even in the face of 
significant stress’ (West et al. 2016: 394). This study found that Black women who identified 
with this stereotype often avoided therapy and struggled with their mental health.  
2.  When a positively stereotyped individual fails to live up to these positive attributes, 
they may experience persecution. For example, Huang et al. found that the positive stereotype 
of maternity attached to women further enhances the stigmatisation they experience if they 
terminate a pregnancy (Huang et al. 2016). Besides, due to their marginalised status, the 
individual does not possess the epistemic authority to challenge such persecutions.  
3. Positive stereotypes emphasise group difference between marginalised and non-
marginalised people. In examining the so-called positive stereotype ‘Black people are 
superior athletes’, Kay et al. argue that such stereotypes indicate a performance difference 
between Black and non-Black people. The hearer is then left to explain where the disparity 
lies, possibly by appealing to some presumed biological difference (Kay et al. 2013).  
4. Positive stereotypes draw attention to juxtaposing negative stereotypes attached to the 
marginalised group in question. In this instance, the positive stereotype ‘Black people are 
superior athletes’ conjured in the participant’s mind the undue negative stereotype ‘Black 
people are inferior intellectually’ (Kay et al. 2013).  
This is not an exhaustive account of the harmful impact positive stereotypes can produce; 
there are doubtless other examples. Rather, I offer these as a platform from which I can argue 
that what may seem like a positive construal of a psychiatric diagnosis does not reduce 
epistemic injustice but exacerbates it. Before I launch an account of the negative epistemic 
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impact of positive stereotypes, I would be remiss not to discuss Emmalon Davis's work, 
which identifies how credibility excess based on positive identity prejudice can be 
detrimental. 
Davis begins by broadening Fricker’s scope of testimonial injustice to include Medina’s 
characterisation of credibility excess, through which ‘those who have an undeserved (or 
arbitrarily given) credibility excess are judged comparatively more worthy of epistemic trust 
than other subjects, all things being equal’ (Medina 2011: 20). Drawing on Medina, Davis 
proposes that testimonial injustice can arise when a marginalised group is afforded epistemic 
privilege in a particular domain. For instance, a gay man may be wrongly attributed with 
credibility excess in the realm of fashion, or an Asian student may be wrongly attributed with 
a credibility excess in mathematics. According to Davis, credibility excess can constitute 
testimonial injustice if an identity prejudice (positive or negative) leads to an unmerited 
credibility assessment. Davis provides the following example:  
A male shopper walks up to another shopper in a discount retailer and asks where he can find 
dryer sheets. “I don’t know ... I don’t work here,” the shopper responds. Somewhat baffled, 
the man replies, “I know you don’t work here, but you’re a woman!” (Davis 2016: 487). 
The positive stereotype ‘women are domestic experts’ has led the male shopper to recognise 
this woman as a ‘knower’ in this specific domain. On Davis’ account, the testimonial 
injustice lies in (i) the reduction of an individual’s epistemic agency to that of a marginalised 
group and (ii) presuming to know which epistemic exchanges a marginalised group is best 
suited to (Davis 2016: 495). As these cases depict how prejudice influences the credibility 
afforded to a marginalised subject’s testimony, Davis claims that credibility excess ought to 
be included within Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice as ‘credibility excess often 
operates alongside credibility deficit to define the social, epistemic, and professional realities 
of marginalized individuals’ (Davis 2016: 493). 
Davis concludes with the hope that her paper ‘articulates a way in which the conceptual 
framework of epistemic injustice might be further opened’ (Davis 2016: 495). I take Davis up 
on her invitation to furnish this conceptual framework by uncovering a further way in which 
positive identity prejudice can lead to epistemic harm. While Davis argues that positive 
identity prejudice can lead to a detrimental form of credibility excess, I suggest that positive 
identity prejudice can lead to credibility deficit through trivialisation.  
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I argue that positive stereotypes can dilute a psychiatric diagnosis by emphasising the 
putatively positive aspects of the condition while obscuring the debilitating aspects of the 
illness. Although no negative stereotype has been activated, the seemingly positive stereotype 
gives rise to a form of epistemic injustice. I refer to this epistemic harm as trivialisation. First, 
I argue that trivialisation can drive testimonial injustice because testimony about the 
condition’s negative effects may be dismissed as exaggerated. Second, I demonstrate that 
trivialisation can lead to a form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance. Positive stereotypes may 
reduce the hermeneutical force of diagnostic labels so that an essential hermeneutical 
resource used to articulate the negative aspects of a particular psychiatric illness has been 
obscured. Those who do not belong to the psychiatric community appropriate and misuse 
these terms, robbing people with actual psychiatric illnesses of an important hermeneutical 
resource.  
 
4.3.1.  The Trivialisation of OCD 
 
It is important to note that I do not think it is likely that such trivialisation can occur across all 
forms of psychiatric illness. Some psychiatric illnesses are so fraught with negative identity 
prejudice that it is unlikely they could ever be trivialised in this way. I am thinking of people 
who experience delusions or hallucinations, most commonly diagnosed under the 
schizophrenia spectrum or other psychotic disorders. The negative attitude attached to 
psychosis is so severe than many people experience their diagnosis as taboo:  
People are always afraid of saying that word to me and they’re always saying something else . 
. . My [community psychiatric nurse] was too afraid to say it . . . because it is a dirty word to 
even say that word schizophrenia. (Howe et al., 2014: 156).  
Psychiatric illnesses with this extreme level of negative identity prejudice are unlikely to be 
trivialised to the extent explored in this chapter. 
 The psychiatric illnesses that seem to be particularly vulnerable to trivialisation are those that 
are frequently made light of in public discourse, such as autism, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, anorexia, depression, bipolar disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder (hereafter 
OCD). These psychiatric patients still fight for recognition of the legitimacy and reality of 
their illness. Scepticism regarding the severity of these illnesses persists, supporting 
entrenched prejudices that those with such mental health problems are ‘hypochondriacs’ 
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(Bonnington & Rose 2017: 13), ‘in control of their conditions’ (Seah et al. 2017: 134), or ‘not 
trying hard enough’ (Dawson 2018: 94). While these conditions are still subject to systematic 
stigmatisation, I propose that they are frequently simultaneously trivialised.  
On the one hand, they may be seen as less reliable epistemic agents because they have a 
psychiatric illness, and hence are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice, as has been argued 
in the literature so far (Bueter, 2019) (Kurs & Grinshpoon 2018) (Kyratsous & Sanati 2015) 
(LeBlanc & Kinsella 2016) (Scrutton 2017) (Crichton et al. 2016). On the other hand, the 
positive stereotypes associated with the illness give rise to a trivialisation of the illness, and 
as such, they may not be considered ill enough to receive support and recognition. 
Consequently, a twilight zone of psychiatric illness is created, where the ill person is deemed 
to both exaggerate their difficulties (trivialisation) and be epistemically suspect because of 
their psychiatric diagnosis (stigmatisation). Thus, those with psychiatric illness are judged to 
be too ill to be free of stigma but not ill enough to be taken seriously. In other words, while 
the individual is stigmatised for belonging to the marginalised community of those with 
psychiatric illness, their illness itself is subject to trivialisation. To examine trivialisation in 
epistemic injustice, I focus on how this process operates in the case of OCD.  
The DSM-5 defines obsessions as ‘recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges or images that are 
experienced as intrusive and unwanted’ (DSM-5 2013: 235). These obsessions commonly 
concern contamination, symmetry or incompleteness, responsibility for harm or intrusive 
taboo thoughts (McCarty et al. 2017: 64). Compulsions are then defined as ‘repetitive 
behaviours or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in response to an 
obsession or according to rules that must be applied rigidly’ (ibid.). The DSM-5 describes the 
functional impact of OCD as a ‘reduced quality of life as well as high levels of social and 
occupational impairment’ (DSM-5 2013: 240).  
OCD is time-consuming, through both obsessing and carrying out compulsions. It limits 
activities to prevent the symptoms from being triggered, and it obstructs the completion of 
tasks (for instance, ‘obsessions about symmetry can derail the timely completion of school or 
work projects because the project never feels “just right”’) (DSM-5 2013: 240). If the 
obsessions and compulsions concern contamination, it may lead those with OCD to avoid 
hospitals and doctors for fear of uncleanliness and introduces a further health risk. The 




Amy is a 25-year-old woman who fears that she might cause a catastrophic fire if she does not 
ensure she has turned off all electrical appliances and the gas cooker. After using appliances, 
she repeatedly checks that they are switched off, returning up to 50 times. In the past two 
years, she has tried to avoid using all electrical or gas appliances and asks her mother, with 
whom she lives, to use these for her. If she does have to use an appliance, she will repeatedly 
ask her mother for reassurance that she has not caused a fire. Her mother will reassure her, but 
a few minutes later, Amy will ask again, and this can continue for many hours until Amy has 
a new worry. If Amy’s mother refuses to answer the questions, Amy becomes extremely 
tearful and upset, and her mother will then relent and give her the reassurance. (Drummond, 
2018: 2-3).  
 Despite the severity of these symptoms, many diagnosed with OCD claim that their illness is 
not perceived to have the same legitimacy as other psychiatric illnesses, even by healthcare 
professionals:    
OCD is a nightmare that cannot be imagined by those who do not have it. It’s usually made 
light of in the media and frequently misunderstood by clinicians and misdiagnosed and 
undertreated or mistreated by physicians […] I hear professionals joke about OCD all the 
time (Fennell & Boyd 2014: 681).  
Pavelko and Myrick argue that the trivialisation of OCD in the media may alter people’s 
perception of those with psychiatric illness in a different but potentially equally harmful way 
to stigmatisation: ‘biased portrayals of mental illnesses are not all purely negative. Instead, 
they may also make light of and even define the condition as beneficial’ (Pavelko & Myrick 
2019: 8). One way in which those with OCD are subject to trivialisation is by being ascribed 
‘super-human’ properties. Pavelko & Myrick offer the example of a detective in the TV 
series Monk; the excellent memory, attention to detail and unique perspective that comes with 
the detective’s OCD aid him in solving complex cases. The media often depicts people with 
OCD as ‘highly functional and intelligent – contributing to society in sometimes 
extraordinary ways’ (Pavelko & Myrick 2019: 1). Oversimplification of a psychiatric illness 
often suggests that the diagnosed person will ‘somehow benefit or experience an improved 
quality of life due to their diagnosis because of the super-human traits it affords’ (Pavelko & 
Myrick 2019: 4).  
A further example of the trivialisation of OCD in the media can be found in an interview with 
TV personality Michelle Mone who has self-diagnosed as having OCD. On Good Morning 
Britain she claimed, ‘I love having OCD. It makes me really organised. And I’ve always 
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believed that if your drawers are really organised and tidy, then your life will be organised’.40 
Here we have a portrayal of OCD as a set of positive personality traits. When asked if she 
experiences any negative impact from the illness (after seeming taken aback by the question), 
she briefly mentions having to resist organising other people’s homes before reaffirming the 
illness's positive aspects. Although prompted by the interviewers, Mone fails to highlight 
thought insertion, an essential feature of OCD that forces those with the condition to pray, 
count, repeat words silently, wash hands etc., in ways that impede upon their daily life. By 
reinforcing this false positive stereotype, the debilitating nature of OCD remains invisible. 
The source of the trivialisation, in this case, is that the term OCD has been appropriated by 
someone without OCD, who does not experience the full set of symptoms and problems 
caused by the condition. Thus, a psychiatric term used to describe a certain kind of illness is 
appropriated by those who do not have the illness in question and thus trivialise the condition.  
Appropriation is an important process in its own right, as discussed by Davis (Davis 2018). 
Davis understands epistemic appropriation as the dissemination of epistemic resources by a 
dominant group that were initially cultivated for and by a marginalised group.41 Her example 
is the misattribution of Harriet Taylor Mill’s The Enfranchisement of Women to John Stuart 
Mill (ibid). Davis dissociates epistemic appropriation from Fricker’s conception of 
hermeneutical injustice, ‘because epistemic appropriation primarily concerns our practices of 
disseminating existing epistemic resources, it involves no conceptual deficit. Rather, 
epistemic appropriation involves a sort of conceptual theft’ (Davis 2018: 719). The ground-
breaking ideas presented in The Enfranchisement of Women suffer no ‘conceptual deficit’; the 
harm for Davis lies in the fact that Taylor Mills’ status as an epistemic contributor went 
unrecognised. In contrast, I suggest that a case of appropriation has taken place that does 
cause a ‘conceptual deficit’.42 Through the appropriation of the term OCD to describe a 
desire for cleanliness (in the case of Michelle Mone), the meaning of the term has been 
 
40 Michelle Mone (2015) Interviewed by Kate Garraway and Susanna Reid for Good Morning Britain, 13 
October. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGwKmt5Gdwc (Accessed 27 November 2019). 
41 Somewhat ironically, in her paper ‘White Feminist Gaslighting’, Nora Berenstain charges Miranda Fricker 
with what Davis calls ‘epistemic appropriation’. Berenstain points out that Fricker’s concept of ‘hermenuetical 
injustice’ was initially developed in Black feminist literature (Berenstain, 2020: 739).  
42 Note that while in some cases trivialisation happens through appropriation, it can also take place in other 
ways. For example, if the person with OCD tells someone about their diagnosis, who replies: ‘It doesn’t sound 





diluted. As a result, OCD’s disease status has been denigrated and occluded from societal 
understanding. This trivialisation causes people with OCD to suffer a deflated epistemic 
status because they no longer have clear membership in the patient community. Two kinds of 
epistemic injustice emerge from such trivialisation: testimonial injustice and a unique form of 
wilful hermeneutical ignorance.  
 
4.3.2. Trivialisation and Testimonial Injustice  
 
Consider the following account of OCD, in which the person’s obsession concerns a fear of 
harm triggered by the prospect of everyday activities such as crossing a busy road or using a 
big knife.  The obsessive fear of harm prevents her from driving since, as she explains, 
‘nothing could be more calculated to bring [the obsessions] on than the thought of being at 
the wheel of something that could run someone over’.43 She recounts her previous 
experiences of driving: 
While I was driving, I would be hypervigilant, hesitant and dangerously slow, someone who 
drives with her foot on the brake and uses it far too often. Even when I wasn’t driving, I 
would be spending precious time and energy ruminating about all the moments during the 
drive when it might have been possible for me to have killed someone. (ibid.)   
Due to trivialisation, such testimonies are often regarded as exaggerated, an excuse for 
laziness or simply untrue because they do not fit the positive stereotype of OCD. The narrator 
describes her frustration at being questioned so frequently on her refusal to drive and the 
disbelief she is met with due to her ‘suspiciously calm and reasonable’ demeanour (ibid.). In 
this instance, the positive stereotypes attached to OCD can distort a hearer’s credibility 
judgement to the extent that the descriptions of her symptoms and her requests for support are 
dismissed as illegitimate. As such, this is a case of testimonial injustice.  
Such testimonial injustice can even be found within the psychiatric healthcare system itself. 
Many OCD patients report their testimonies not being taken seriously by healthcare 
practitioners, as the psychiatric illness is often perceived to be less debilitating than the 
patient claims. One OCD patient recalls their experience:  
 
43 Time To Change. (2012). So, why don’t you drive then? [online] Available at: https://www.time-to-
change.org.uk/blog/so-why-dont-you-drive-then [Accessed 15 Jan. 2021]. 
137 
 
I remember halfway through the assessment she said, ‘So what help do you need exactly? 
People with mental health issues can barely get themselves out of the house, they have no 
motivation to do anything. Are you sure you’re not just having a bad few weeks?’. I 
understand she’s the professional, but unfortunately, she completely invalidated my mental 
wellbeing. I panicked and immediately started backtracking. I felt like I had to lie about my 
symptoms because they didn’t seem ‘good’ or ‘correct’ enough to actually get any help, and 
that I was stupid for finally taking steps to get help.44  
In this instance, the healthcare professional seems to have mischaracterised OCD symptoms 
as that of depression, where those inflicted with the illness often lack motivation. Many 
people with OCD do not fit the picture of psychiatric illness described by the healthcare 
professional above. They may be fully capable of getting out of bed, going to work and 
socialising, yet they remain plagued by intrusive thoughts, urges or compulsions to perform 
rituals. Nevertheless, many individuals with OCD face testimonial injustice in psychiatric 
healthcare because their illness is considered less severe than other psychiatric illnesses. This 
testimonial injustice can be attributed to positive identity prejudices that depict people with 
OCD as high-functioning whilst trivialising the debilitating aspects of the condition. 
4.5.  Trivialisation and Wilful Hermeneutical Ignorance  
 
With the development of robust definitions of psychiatric illnesses in diagnostic manuals like 
the DSM, one would think that psychiatric patients have sufficient hermeneutical resources to 
articulate their condition. Once the term exists, say as a diagnostic category, it can provide 
the person with psychiatric illness an identity and an understanding of their condition that 
they can further develop as individual narratives or as a group identity.  In this section, I 
show that the development of hermeneutical resources is insufficient to combat the 
hermeneutical marginalisation of those with psychiatric illness. Rather, the uptake these 
resources receive is critical to their ability to overcome hermeneutical injustice.   
According to Fricker’s original account, hermeneutical injustice occurs when a lacuna in the 
collectively available interpretative resources denies proper intelligibility and salience to 
experiences of marginally situated groups (Fricker 2007: 148). To correct hermeneutical 
 
44 Time To Change. (2019). Some people are high-functioning, but that doesn’t invalidate their mental health. 





injustice, a marginalised group must either establish novel hermeneutical resources that 
convey their experiences successfully (what Medina calls ‘hermeneutical resistance’ 
(Medina, 2012)) or encourage uptake of their own locally developed resources within their 
wider social community (as proposed by Pohlhaus (Pohlhaus, 2012)).  
In recent years, we have seen diagnostic terms such as ‘OCD’, ‘Clinical Depression’, and 
‘Autism’ saturate public discourse. Once incorporated into everyday language, these terms 
are immediately vulnerable to misappropriation and easily subsumed by this broader 
parlance, using such terms in a loose sense. Greenberg captures the casual way in which we 
wield these terms: 
the other day you were talking with a friend and explaining to her that you had to wash your 
dishes before you could leave the house, and you found yourself saying “I’m just so OCD, 
you know?” Or you’ve heard your friends do the same thing with their own or other’s quirks. 
“He’s pretty ADHD”, they might say. Or, “She’s clinically depressed” (Greenberg 2013: 6-7).  
Through Pohlhaus’ concept of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, we can come to understand 
how linguistic resources that belong to people with psychiatric illness can be robbed of their 
hermeneutic power through their misappropriation by dominantly situated knowers.45 I 
describe such seemingly trivial utterances as instances of wilful hermeneutical ignorance 
because the trivialisation of diagnostic terms can suppress the existing hermeneutical 
resources of those diagnosed. Misuse of diagnostic terminology dilutes its hermeneutical 
force and may even subsume the term's clinical meaning within a colloquial one.   
The term ‘OCD’ in public discourse rarely refers to the psychiatric illness but rather has 
become a shorthand description for someone who dislikes mess. As such, a multi-faceted 
psychiatric illness has been reduced to a personality trait. This now-dominant understanding 
of OCD is reflected in a recent advert for Virgin Voyages that made light of the illness. The 
advert states: ‘You can live like a rockstar or indulge your inner OCD, we don’t judge - we’re 
just giving you a luxurious place to do it’.46 The advert appeals to an understanding of OCD 
as a ‘guilty pleasure’ derived from tidiness, not a psychiatric illness. A similar idea is 
 
45 It is interesting to note that in this instance of wilful hermeneutical ignorance the resource that has been 
suppressed has not stemmed from the marginalised group in question. Rather, diagnostic terminology such as 
‘OCD’ has been formed by medical experts. As the terminology serves the meaning-making capacities of the 
marginalised group, however, I posit that this case still ought to be identified as wilful hermeneutical ignorance.  
46 Sheldrick, G. (2019). Richard Branson cruise line says sorry for mocking OCD. [online] Express.co.uk. 
Available at: https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1159506/Richard-Branson-cruise-line-mocking-OCD 
[Accessed 2 Aug. 2019]. 
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captured in a recent advert by the hotel Fairy Hill, which depicts a fork out of place on an 
otherwise flawlessly arranged dinner table. The advert proclaims: ‘Slightly OCD? Then we’d 
love to hear from you’, assuming that the ‘slightly’ OCD person would notice that the cutlery 
is misaligned.47 The advert conveys an understanding of OCD as simply liking order, 
excluding the intrusive and unwanted urge for symmetry or other obsessive thought insertions 
characteristic of OCD.  
The qualifier ‘slightly’ can be deeply harmful. A search for ‘slightly OCD’ on Twitter 
produces countless results, used in statements such as “Toilets bleached regularly and sinks 
thoroughly cleaned. I’ve become slightly OCD”.48 Or “So, what does a *slightly* OCD 
person do while on a 14 day self-quarantine??? Yep, clean out EVERYTHING! Today was 
the Tupperware drawer …”.49 Although the illness has degrees of severity, an essential 
feature of OCD is that the obsession, taking the form of ‘recurrent and persistent thoughts, 
urges or images’, are experienced as ‘intrusive and unwanted, and in most individuals cause 
marked anxiety or distress’ (DSM-5 2013: 237). To suggest that someone can be ‘slightly’ 
OCD is to undermine the term by qualifying its severity, or implying that it comes in degrees, 
shading through into normal behaviour. Such language further enforces the popular 
understanding of OCD as a mere personality trait.  
As Greenberg observes, ‘The power to give names to our pain is a mighty thing and easy to 
abuse’ (Greenberg 2013: 7). By misrepresenting the meaning of the term ‘OCD’, the 
dominantly positioned (in this case, those who do not have a psychiatric illness) rob those 
with OCD of an essential hermeneutical tool to convey the nature of their illness. In doing so, 
the label has been deprived of its power as a hermeneutical resource for people with 
psychiatric illness. Consider the account below, where a person with OCD describes the 
reaction of a financial agency he approached for support:  
You are a healthy big white person, who seems intelligent … [has] no obvious disabilities … 
what possible excuse could you have? Well, I am Obsessive-Compulsive. 
Oh just that? … My roommate … likes to have our apartment tidy and everything placed just 
right, now there’s OCD! … [That’s] not anything serious like bipolar or schizophrenia; I think 
 
47 BBC News. (2019). Wedding venue sorry for OCD tweet. [online] Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-west-wales-43463065 [Accessed 2 Aug. 2019]. 
48 Robinson, Lainely (herladyshp15) 4:41 PM · Apr 5, 2020. Tweet. 
https://twitter.com/herladyship15/status/1246825193059880967 




the problem is just that you are lazy! Oh how I hate that word “lazy.” It does no good trying 
to explain that the colloquial use of the word “OCD” is, at best, only superficially related to 
the medical [DSM-5] use of the term. (cited in Fennell and Boyd 2014: 682, ellipses in the 
original). 
Unlike Fricker’s examples of hermeneutical lacuna, the person above possesses a 
hermeneutical resource that ought to convey her experience to the financial agency 
successfully. But because of the trivialisation of OCD, this term has been appropriated to 
communicate not her illness but personality traits recognisable to the more dominantly 
situated.  
Although the hermeneutical resource ‘OCD’ has been developed to serve those with the 
condition, the clinical meaning of the term has not received uptake by the general public. 
This is because the experience of thought-insertions and uncontrollable compulsive behaviour 
is alien to the world of dominantly situated knowers. More familiar to this dominant group 
are tendencies toward cleanliness and order; thus, the hermeneutical resource ‘OCD’ has 
been appropriated to better suit such communicative needs. This more dominant view of 
OCD trivialises the condition and makes it appear benign or even positive. Consequently, 
knowledge concerning the nature of OCD has been blocked as ‘dominantly situated knowers 
[…] continue to misunderstand and misinterpret the world’ (Pohlhaus, 2012: 716). This 
misrepresentation is not employed to undermine the clinical understanding of OCD 
intentionally. Rather, it occurs through a lack of engagement with the interpretive framework 
of those with OCD. This behaviour goes uncorrected because the clinical use of the term is 
perceived to be only salient to the marginalised subject (if the clinical meaning is known at 
all).  
I propose that the misuse of the term ‘OCD’ is a unique case of wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance that can be added to Pohlhaus’ account: the dominantly situated not only refuse to 
learn to use this hermeneutical resource,  but appropriate the term so that it reflects their own 
experience of the world. Thus, the term OCD has not been discarded but repurposed to suit 
the needs of the dominantly situated. This is a powerful strategy for further obstructing the 
voice of those with psychiatric illness. The term OCD was not ignored or ridiculed; on the 
contrary, it was enthusiastically adopted into common use. But this seemingly benign 




OCD provides a paradigmatic example of wilful hermeneutical ignorance in psychiatric 
illness. However, another search on Twitter shows that such misappropriation is not limited 
to OCD. The search exposed the common trivialisation of autism (‘We’re all on the spectrum 
that’s why it’s a SPECTRUM duh…’), post-traumatic stress disorder (‘…got so much ptsd 
from expressing my feelings to people who just dismiss them…’) and bipolar disorder 
(‘Watching “married at first sight” and it’s confirming that most [people] are bipolar…’). 50 51 
52 These discursive practices alter not only how we speak about psychiatric illness but also 
how we think about and understand them. By reducing a psychiatric illness to non-disruptive, 
non-threatening personality traits, certain psychiatric illnesses may be perceived as less 
serious and damaging than they are. Consequently, through trivialisation significant parts of 
one’s social experience are ‘obscured from collective understanding’ (Fricker 2007: 155) as 
the marginalised subject has been robbed of hermeneutical tools to talk about their illness.53  
By introducing the concept of trivialisation to the field of epistemic injustice, I hope that I 
might open a space for new ways of understanding other marginalised experiences that are 
simultaneously stigmatised and trivialised. For example, this process may occur in cases of 
rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse. In such cases, the individual is vulnerable to 
stigmatisation and victim-blaming, yet their experiences may be trivialised due to cultural 
attitudes that normalise sexual and domestic violence. As a new contribution to the literature, 
I hope that the concept of trivialisation may illuminate further cases of epistemic injustice 
that are driven by the paradoxical operation of stigmatisation and trivialisation, the combined 




By exposing the epistemic harms that arise from sanist stigmatisation, the literature on 
epistemic injustice in psychiatry has already done much to amplify the voices of those with 
 
50 Fergie’s Ghostwriter, (sydneysidewalks)  1:57 am · 28 Apr 2020. Tweet. 
https://twitter.com/sydneysidewalks/status/1254937865064271872= 
51 Moriah, (_Moriah) 4:49 am · 26 Apr 2020. Tweet. 
https://twitter.com/___Moriah/status/1254256272364494850 
52 Nautii (nydrebel) 2:39 pm · 24 Apr 2020. Tweet. 
https://twitter.com/rebelnyd/status/1253679956195975168 
53 This concept of the epistemic harms produced by trivialisation may be used to further support challenges 
against ‘triumphally upbeat’ pathographies that ‘[deny] or [downplay] the negative aspects of illness’ with the 
aim of reinforcing a culture of ‘positive-thinking’ in illness (Kidd, 2017: 325). 
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psychiatric illness. The path is then cleared for greater epistemic sensitivity toward 
psychiatric patients’ testimonial credibility and collaboration on interpretive frameworks 
(Bueter 2019) (Kurs & Grinshpoon 2018), (Kyratsous & Sanati 2015), (LeBlanc & Kinsella 
2016), (Scrutton 2017), (Crichton et al. 2016 ). However, through this chapter, I hope to have 
demonstrated that the effects of epistemic injustice in psychiatric healthcare may be even 
more widespread than currently thought. 
To better understand why psychiatric patients are particularly vulnerable to epistemic 
injustice, I recounted a history of psychiatric authority and the asymmetrical doctor-patient 
relationship. Following this account, the credibility deficit experienced by psychiatric patients 
stood in stark contrast to the credibility excess afforded to healthcare professionals. We can 
understand this credibility excess as an upshot of the healthcare professional's epistemic 
privilege. Regrettably, this epistemic privilege solidifies the reduced epistemic status afforded 
to psychiatric patients. Following this, I explored the testimonial injustice that can emerge 
from this asymmetrical relationship.  I argued that testimonial injustice could be particularly 
divisive in certain clinical domains, such as sexual abuse and suicide claims, where the 
patient’s deflated level of credibility can lead to devastating results.  
I then showed that, not only negative identity prejudice, but positive stereotypes could cause 
credibility deficit. By celebrating seemingly positive aspects of the condition, the debilitating 
symptoms of psychiatric illness become trivialised and obscured. I thus demonstrated that the 
elimination of negative identity prejudice is not sufficient to guarantee epistemic justice. 
First, I demonstrated that trivialisation could lower the credibility awarded to accounts of 
suffering, thus leading to testimonial injustice. Second, with recourse to Pohlhaus, I argued 
that those with psychiatric illness are also vulnerable to wilful hermeneutical ignorance. 
Dominant colloquial interpretations often suppress non-dominant hermeneutic resources that 
people with psychiatric illness use to understand their diagnosis. As a result, the dominant 
interpretation skews the clinical meaning of certain psychiatric illnesses to the extent that the 












There is a long tradition of employing a phenomenological approach to gain greater insight 
into the lives of people with psychiatric illness. While each philosopher may ground their 
theory in different phenomenological methods (that of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre or Merleau-
Ponty), examine different kinds of psychiatric illness and draw different conclusions, their 
starting point is the same: the unique being-in-the-world of psychiatric illness. The literature 
sheds light upon a disturbance in the overall structure of experience that is characteristic of 
psychiatric illness; a disturbance that causes the embodied subject to encounter the world in a 
fundamentally different way to their neuro-normative counterparts. Thus far, I have referred 
to a breakdown in the body-world synthesis as ‘embodied dissonance’. However, in the 
literature on the phenomenology of psychiatric illness, this dissonance is frequently referred 
to as ‘unworlding’, a term popularised by Sass (Sass, 1990) but derived from Heidegger 
(Heidegger, 1985: 196). ‘Unworlding’ captures a severing between the essential body-world 
synthesis, whereby the subject is detached from their environment.54 
This final chapter employs the field of epistemic injustice to expose an obscured dimension 
of the lived experience of psychiatric illness that has heretofore been absent from the 
literature. Drawing on the framework developed in chapter three, I propose that 
hermeneutical injustice not only hinders the ill person’s capacity to make sense of her 
experiences but also has the power to perpetuate and even exacerbate the lived experience of 
‘unworlding’ identified in the phenomenology of psychiatric illness. If a relationship between 
hermeneutical injustice and the experience of ‘unworlding’ can be established, acts of 
hermeneutical resistance, such as ‘talking therapies’, can offer an important way of 
ameliorating the experience of a body-world divide in psychiatric illness.  
This chapter begins with a brief account of ‘unworlding’ from the philosophy of illness. It 
then illuminates the unequal hermeneutical landscape in psychiatric healthcare that drives the 
 




hermeneutical silencing of those with psychiatric illness. The next two sections consider how 
hermeneutical silencing can constitute a breakdown in the body schema, as the subject is 
deprived of an essential bodily capacity: speech expression. In turn, I demonstrate how 
hermeneutical silencing can give rise to the phenomenological experience of ‘unworlding’ 
characteristic of psychiatric illness. The final section addresses how a phenomenological 
psychopathological approach to the therapeutic interview can go some way towards 
alleviating the experience of ‘unworlding’ in psychiatric illness and bridging the gap between 
body and world for people with psychiatric illness.  
 
5.1. Unworlding in Psychiatric Illness 
 
Scarry says of pain: ‘for the person whose pain it is, it is “effortlessly” grasped (that is even 
with the most heroic effort it cannot be grasped); while for the person outside the sufferer’s 
body, what is effortless is not grasping it’ (Scarry, 1985: 4). The sufferings ‘resistance to 
language’ is apparent in numerous pathographies, including ones written by people with 
psychiatric illness (ibid). For example, in Darkness Visible, William Styron describes 
depression as ‘so mysteriously painful and elusive in the way it becomes known to the self… 
as to verge close to being beyond description. It thus remains nearly incomprehensible to 
those who have not experienced it in its extreme mode’ (Styron, 2010: 5). So too, in 
describing her experience of bipolar disorder, Nancy Tracey claims emotional pain is even 
harder to express than physical pain:  
Language is insufficient to express emotional pain and turmoil. We have good words for 
describing physical pain: radiating, hot, throbbing, sharp, achy and so on. But when it comes 
to emotional pain we’re “sad.”…It’s not surprising that people don’t get what we’re talking 
about (Tracey, 2012).  
Scholars in the phenomenology of illness have attributed this communication breakdown to 
the fundamental taken-for-granted elements of the world being drastically altered for the 
person with psychiatric illness. Due to a monumental shift in the ill person’s embodied 
experience, she is thrust into an unfamiliar life-world with new, confusing, and inexpressible 
meaning-structures. As such, people with psychiatric illness become ‘experientially 
unmoored from the lived spaces of their everyday environments’ (Krueger, 2020: 602). The 
literature agrees that the inexpressibility of illness is driven by an ‘unworlding’, whereby the 
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ill person experiences a distancing between self and world due to an inability to orient 
themselves in the now alien environment.  
As established in the work of Havi Carel, the ‘unworlding’ that arises from the disruption of 
bodily experience is most obvious in cases of somatic illness (Carel, 2016). Here the freedom 
to engage with the world is compromised as certain bodily actions are hampered. The ill 
subject finds themselves cut off from certain affordances offered by the world. For the person 
who has lost the ability to walk, stairs no longer invite the possibility of being climbed. For 
the person who experiences breathlessness, a steady slope may present itself as an arduous 
trek (Carel, 2016). Somatic illness roots the person to their body as habitual acts, such as 
crossing the room, now require a reflective, corporal determination to accomplish the action. 
Thus, the ill person’s body can no longer escape their attention as it gains a certain 
opaqueness. This perpetual focus on the body is often further exacerbated by the clinical 
treatment of somatic illness. Under the medical gaze, the patient is objectified as their body is 
tested and measured in comparison to the ‘healthy’ body. These bodily measurements often 
become incorporated into the patient’s daily lives, as they are required to monitor their heart 
rate, blood sugar levels, peak expiratory flow etc. This puts a greater emphasis on having a 
body rather than being a body for the ill subject. 
Carel distinguishes between the somatic and mental forms of infringement upon one’s 
motility as follows: ‘illness can destroy creativity in one of two ways: either by removing the 
capacity to fantasize or by removing the capacity to execute’ (Carel, 2016: 73). Carel 
understands ‘removing the capacity to execute’ as a physical inability to perform certain 
bodily actions. In contrast, she recognises the breakdown in the ability to ‘fantasize’ bodily 
motility to be prominent in psychiatric illness. Although this infringement is not rooted in the 
body in the same way, people with psychiatric illness also feel cut off from the possibilities 
of the world. People diagnosed with depression, for example, report a struggle to perform the 
most every day habitual actions, such as making a cup of tea: ‘it takes an enormous amount 
of effort to engage with the world and your own life’ (cited by Ratcliffe, 2015: 33). In cases 
of agoraphobia, the illness imposes upon the person an inability to leave the realm of ‘home’ 
or the familiar: ‘the centrality of the physical home, with its borders and boundaries, marks a 
threshold from agoraphobic embodiment to non-agoraphobic embodiment’ (Trigg, 2013: 
418).  As one patient with schizophrenia describes: objects in the world ‘[seem] so far away 
as if there is an invisible wall I cannot penetrate’ (Krueger & Henriksen, 2016: 260). Here the 
ill subject is unable to grasp or ‘imagine’ the body’s possibility for action.  
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The shift in the patterns of embodiment produced by illness influences the subject’s sense of 
belonging to the world. As previously established, meaning-structures immerse the embodied 
subject in the world and allow them to move through it effortlessly. Consider Merleau-
Ponty’s example of moving through the streets of Paris: ‘the cafes, the faces, the poplars 
along the quays, the bends of the Seine- it is cut out of the total being of Paris’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012: 294). For Merleau-Ponty, the cafes, the faces and the poplars make up a 
cohesive and meaningful whole that is Paris. The individual features become no more distinct 
to him than ‘the eyes of a familiar face’; these independent objects simply make up the 
totality of Paris for the Parisian (ibid). Merleau-Ponty’s embodied activity in Paris (sitting in 
its café’s, smelling its poplars, talking to its people) is supported by this web-of-meaning. 
The meaning-structures of Paris are mediated by Merleau-Ponty’s embodied engagement 
with it.  It is on this basis that Carel claims ‘meaning and intelligibility depend on consistent 
patterns of embodiment. When these patterns are disrupted, meaning is affected’ (Carel, 
2016: 15).  This disruption is particularly dramatic in psychiatric illness (ibid). Merleau-
Ponty demonstrates this as he places the meaningful and cohesive scene of Paris in stark 
contrast with the ambiguous landscape experienced by someone with schizophrenia:  
Suddenly the landscape is snatched away from him by some alien force. It is as if a second 
limitless sky were penetrating the blue sky of the evening. This new sky is empty, “subtle, 
invisible, and terrifying.” Sometimes it moves into the autumn landscape, and sometimes the 
landscape itself moves…The schizophrenic patient no longer lives in the common world, but 
in a private world; he does not go all the way to geographical space, he remains within “the 
space of the landscape,” and this landscape itself, once cut off from the common world, is 
considerably impoverished. This results in the schizophrenic questioning:  everything is 
amazing, absurd, or unreal because the movement of existence toward things no longer has its 
energy, because it appears along with its contingency, and because the world is no longer self-
evident.  (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 300). 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that psychiatric illness constitutes a breakdown in the meaning 
structures of a person’s world. What once appeared part of a meaningful whole, say a clock, 
no longer speaks to the embodied subject in the same way. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, he 
can no longer ‘understand’ the clock: ‘first the passing of the hands from one position to 
another and above all the connection of this movement with the thrust of the mechanism or 
the “workings” of the clock’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 295). There is no longer a cohesive 
whole of ‘clock’, ‘Paris’, or ‘world’ for the schizophrenic person.  
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This lack of cohesive whole, in turn, impacts how objects in the world invite interaction. For 
instance, Krueger explains that commonly in schizophrenia:  
people and things are no longer encountered as “ready-to-hand”—as affording a range of 
immediately perceived interactive possibilities (the way a friendly smile affords conversation 
or a chair sitting) specified by the norms and conventions tacitly governing the context in 
which they’re encountered. Instead, everyday encounters and projects are experienced as 
puzzling or devoid of meaning (Krueger, 2020: 602).  
So too, in depression, the subject commonly encounters what Ratcliffe terms a ‘severed 
reality’: ‘the depressed person finds herself in a different “world”, in an isolated, alien realm 
that is cut off from the consensus reality’ (Ratcliffe, 2015: 15). Aho says of anxiety ‘nothing 
stands out as significant anymore; my job, my relationships, my commitments, the very 
things I rely on to construct a coherent and unified life-story, are stripped of their import. And 
this undercuts my own ability ‘to be’’ (Aho, 2018: 8). Through this ‘unworlding’, a distance 
emerges between the subject and the world as the patterns of embodiment that serve as a 
backdrop to the person’s very existence collapse.  
We have established that those who are thrust into a state of psychiatric illness are forced to 
re-examine the way they encounter the world.  If we follow the current literature, we can 
conclude that an inability to find oneself at home in the world leads to a breakdown in 
language. After observing the extreme difficulty, or even inability, people with depression 
experience when trying to put their experience into words, Ratcliffe argues:  
Sometimes, this difficulty is no doubt partly attributable to effects that depression has on 
one’s cognitive abilities. But people still struggle to convey the experience after recovering, 
and their accounts often suggest that the problem stems from its very nature. Depression 
involves a disturbance of something that is fundamental to our lives, something that goes 
unnoticed when intact. What is eroded or lost is a ‘sense’ or ‘feeling’ of being comfortably 
immersed in the world. (Ratcliffe, 2015: 16).  
Thus, the difficulty to express psychiatric illness can be understood as a product of one’s 
profoundly altered structure of experience, also known as an epistemically ‘transformative 
experience’. Illness ‘gives us experiences that we would not otherwise have had and that we 
cannot know what it is like to have until we undergo them—knowledge that cannot otherwise 
be acquired’ (Carel et al. 2016: 1152). In other words, certain experiences, such as childbirth 
or an ecstatic religious experience, can only truly be understood by those who ‘have had the 
requisite bodily experience’ (Kidd & Carel, 2017: 185). Take the case of depression; 
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according to Styron, the incomprehension of the illness by others is driven not by a lack of 
sympathy, ‘but the basic inability of healthy people to imagine a form of torment so alien to 
everyday experience’ (Styron, 2010: 14-15). Interchanging pain for illness more broadly, it 
would seem that illness ‘does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing 
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language’ (Scarry, 1985: 4).  
However, the literature fails to acknowledge the institutional silencing that those with 
psychiatric illness are systematically subjected to. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
the voice of those with psychiatric illness can be obstructed not only by an altered being-in-
the-world but also by socially embedded epistemic practices. Epistemic silencing is an 
external force that has the power to drastically curtail the speech expressions of those with 
psychiatric illness. The question I hope to address in this chapter is as follows: what role does 
epistemic injustice play in the experience of ‘unworlding’ characteristic of psychiatric 
illness? 
This chapter challenges this unidirectional causal relationship that depicts the experience of 
‘unworlding’ as driving the loss of speech expression in psychiatric illness. I agree that 
psychiatric illness constitutes an ‘alienation at the level of the being-in-the-world’ that 
inhibits one’s capacity for speech expression (Svenaeus, 2018: 31). However, I propose that 
epistemic silencing also elicits a collapse in the ill person’s being-in-the-world. In other 
words, I identify a two-way causal relationship between the collapse of the ill person’s being-
in-the-world and the breakdown in speech expression. But, it is not just any epistemic 
silencing that has the power to elicit such phenomenological destruction. I argue that 
hermeneutical silencing has the unique power to not only perpetuate but exacerbate the 
experience of ‘unworlding’ characteristic of psychiatric illness. Therefore, although 
‘unworlding’ can obstruct the voice of the ill person, external strategies of hermeneutical 
silencing can sustain and even further perpetuate the experience of unworlding. In what 
follows, I put forward my account of hermeneutical silencing in psychiatric healthcare.  
5.2. Hermeneutical Silencing  
5.2.1. Epistemic isolation  
 
In the last sixty years, an eruption of activism has developed new and vital ways of 
understanding psychiatric illness outside the sanist standards that governed them previously. 
Groups such as the ‘psychiatric survivors’ movement’ that emerged in the late 1960s and the 
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‘neurodiversity’ movement of the 1990s called for people with psychiatric illness to be given 
the power to define themselves in their own terms. For instance, proponents of the 
neurodiversity movement champion terminology such as ‘those with neurocognitive 
differences’ and ‘neurominorities’, in place of ‘those with mental disorders’ or ‘mental 
illness’ as they consider the latter to reinforce pathological models. In addition, the term 
‘neuro-typical’ is opted for in place of ‘normal’ or ‘sane’ (Chapman, 2019). Such 
pathbreaking activism inspired a wealth of academic research, dubbed ‘mad studies’ by 
Richard Ingram (Ingram, 2007).  An abundance of pathographies emerged that described the 
experiences of psychiatric illness and the healthcare system in their own words, casting aside 
the interpretive framework instilled by a sanist society.  
With such an abundance of first-person hermeneutical resources, it may seem strange to 
suggest that someone with a psychiatric illness may be confronted by a hermeneutical lacuna. 
Initially, it may appear more likely that ill persons would suffer from wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance, whereby the hermeneutical resources they possess are suppressed by a dominant 
group.  Yet, many people with psychiatric illness are subjected to what Kidd and Carel call 
‘epistemic isolation’: the ill person is socially positioned in such a way that they do not have 
access to this wealth of hermeneutical resources (Kidd & Carel, 2017). Perhaps the person 
has a psychiatric illness that is not well known or particularly rare, such as sleep apnoea, 
where the hermeneutical resources to describe the experience are less numerous and are 
therefore less likely to be encountered.55  Or perhaps the psychiatric illness they have is so 
skewed in the public eye that they never assume that they have it; they may suppose that they 
can’t have autism because they’re nothing like the lead in Rain Man, or they can’t have 
PTSD because they’re not a soldier.56 57They could be socially positioned in such a way that 
they do not have access to insightful pathographies. This is all the more likely considering the 
strong correlation between low income and psychiatric illness, and therefore exclusion from 
vital resources (Thornicroft, 2006: 71). Alternatively, the ill person may belong to a socio-
demographic where psychiatric illness is unlikely to be discussed; for example, men, older 
people and people of colour are the least likely group to seek psychiatric diagnosis (Affleck 
et al. 2018) (Leong & Zachar, 1999). Perhaps most simply of all, the ill person may have 
been brought up with sanist ideologies that distort their perception of psychiatric illness:  
 
55 See sleepapnea.org. (2020).   
56 See Du, K. and McDaniel, E., (2016).  
57 See Chesak, J., (2019).  
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I was raised to not believe in psychiatric help. I was raised to believe mental illness didn’t 
really exist. I was raised to believe taking pills for mental illness just showed weakness. I was 
raised to believe that all these drugs were just a “big phrama” conspiracy (Tracey, 2016: 15).  
Consequently, there are countless reports of people who were left unaware that what they 
were experiencing was a psychiatric illness for most of their life. Such epistemic isolation 
constitutes the ‘situated hermeneutical inequality’ that renders some people unable to access 
the appropriate hermeneutical resources to describe their experience (Fricker, 2007: 162). 
Thus, despite the wealth of hermeneutical resources out there, many people may still have an 
area of hermeneutical darkness where essential resources ought to be.  
What about people within the psychiatric healthcare system? Surely, a person with 
psychiatric illness would no longer be epistemically isolated once they are ushered into 
psychiatric care? Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Building on Kidd and Carel, I 
argue that one way in which hermeneutical lacunas can emerge for the psychiatric patient is 
through an imposed epistemic isolation by the healthcare professional. Kidd and Carel 
describe epistemic isolation as ‘situations where a person or group lacks the knowledge of or 
means of access to, particular information’ (Kidd & Carel, 2017: 183-184). In the case of 
psychiatric healthcare, the patient may have epistemic isolation imposed upon them if the 
healthcare professional withholds vital information concerning the patient’s treatment plan, 
the nature of their illness or even the very diagnosis itself. From such epistemic isolation, 
hermeneutical lacunas emerge in the patient’s understanding of their illness.  
Though it is no longer standard practice, it was once common for medical practitioners to 
withhold a diagnosis of life-threatening somatic illnesses from their patient. This practice was 
particularly common in cases of a cancer diagnosis. As cancer was considered terminal at the 
time, some medical practitioners called into question whether the disclosure of a cancer 
diagnosis constituted a harm inflicted upon the patient. Arguments against disclosure 
portrayed the diagnosis as an unnecessary, anxiety-inducing burden on the patient.  Indeed, 
cancer was often only referred to as ‘the c-word’, as if the word ‘cancer’ were harmful in 
itself. Yet, as Susan Sontag observed, it is not the word ‘cancer’ that produces a harmful 
effect upon the patient but the social understanding of cancer as an ‘invincible predator’ 
(Sontag, 2002: 7). Consequently, she proposed that ‘the solution is hardly to stop telling the 
cancer patient the truth, but to rectify the conception of disease, to de-mythicize it’ (ibid). 
Following improved survival rates and revised therapeutic practices available to patients 
diagnosed with life-threatening illnesses, there was a major shift in the policy and practice of 
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disclosure in Western medicine by the late 1970’s (Sokol, 2006). Medical professionals are 
now more or less unanimously in favour of the patient’s right to disclosure in somatic illness, 
not least because of the development of patient rights and increased litigation, as well as the 
development of medical ethics (Dégi, 2009).58 Nevertheless, in the domain of psychiatric 
illness, the debate about the risks and benefits of diagnosis disclosure rages on.  
A vital aspect of the epistemic privilege bestowed upon the healthcare professional concerns 
their authority to disseminate knowledge regarding the patient’s diagnosis and treatment. By 
virtue of their epistemic authority, they possess a unique power to grant or conceal medical 
information. According to a recent literature review, the disclosure of psychiatric diagnosis 
has increased from 30-65% pre-2000s to 77-88% post-2000’s (Milton & Mullan, 2014: 263). 
The persistence of non-disclosure practices (12-23%) stems from a conflict between the 
patient’s ‘right to know’ their diagnosis and the ‘non-maleficence principle’, which dictates 
that the healthcare professional must avoid further harm to the patient (Carpiniello & 
Wasserman, 2020: 3). Analogous to the arguments put forward against the disclosure of 
cancer diagnoses, it is argued that the patient’s ‘right to know’ may be waived in favour of 
the principle of ‘therapeutic privilege’, according to which ‘the physician feels obliged to 
forego full disclosure, in order to safeguard the patient’s wellbeing’ (ibid). It could be argued 
that non-disclosure is preferable for the following reasons: 1) the diagnosis itself is stress-
inducing, 2) it carries a high level of stigmatisation 3) the patient has a tendency towards 
negative emotional behaviour and 4) there is uncertainty regarding the validity of the 
diagnosis. The most common undisclosed psychiatric illnesses are schizophrenia (Milton & 
Mullan, 2014: 266) and borderline personality disorder (Lequesne & Hersch, 2004).  
The impact of non-disclosure practices in psychiatric healthcare is uncovered through 
service-user’s reports. For instance, Fenton et al. revealed that all but one of the six 
participants in their study reported a lack of explanation from the healthcare professionals 
regarding their condition and how treatment would proceed (Fenton et al. 2014). In cases 
where the diagnosis is withheld from the patient, they often experience a deflation of their 
credibility status: ‘they hadn’t actually given me a diagnosis. They were never really straight 
with me or explained to me what the problem was, so I just thought they probably thought I 
was an attention-seeker’ (Bonnington & Rose, 2017: 13).59   
 
58 It is worth reiterating here that my discussion is limited to western medical practice. Non-disclosure of 
terminal illness is still widely practiced in other areas, such as China. See (Wang et al. 2018).  
59 See also (Plahouras et al. 2020).  
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Despite these ongoing debates in the field of psychiatric care, the healthcare professional’s 
responsibility to disclose a psychiatric diagnosis is surprisingly absent from the numerous and 
lengthy guidelines on ethical practices in psychiatric healthcare (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists: Confidentiality and Information Sharing 2017) (General Medical Council, 
2020) (Reforming the Mental Health Act 2021). While it is easy to find guidelines on the 
ethics involved in diagnosis disclosure to third parties (such as family members, carers, and 
employers) in psychiatric healthcare, I have been unable to find ethical guidelines concerning 
disclosure to the patient. In addition, there is little research to support the argument that 
diagnosis disclosure constitutes a harm in itself. In fact, there is growing research that 
supports the positive impact of disclosure. In 2017, Blessing et al. conducted a study to 
determine the risks and benefits of disclosing a psychosis diagnosis to the patient. The study 
found that ‘after disclosure of diagnosis, all individuals reported less psychological distress’ 
and ‘all individuals seem to benefit from disclosure of diagnosis on a symptom level’ 
(Blessing et al. 2017: 3). Moreover, the study found that patients who were identified with an 
‘at risk mental state’ have ‘a stronger belief that they can control events affecting them after 
disclosure of diagnosis’ (ibid). This study suggests that disclosure of diagnosis is more likely 
to improve the patient’s likelihood of recovery, or at least the chances of ameliorating the 
effects of their illness.  
Those studies that did find a negative impact upon the patient following the disclosure of 
diagnosis attributed the negative impact to the stigmatisation attached to the diagnosis itself. 
Gallagher et al.’s study of patient’s reaction to receiving a diagnosis found that if the 
diagnosis is considered ‘bad news’ it is because ‘it is stigmatizing for participants and, it is 
suggested, for participants’ families, resulting in their not sharing the news or sanitizing what 
they share with others’ (cited in Gallagher et al. 2010: 38). For instance, upon receiving a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, one patient described feeling ‘as though I didn’t have a future, 
it was so shocking as to know what was going to happen. I had no idea how it was going to 
affect my life’ (ibid). This fear of stigmatisation seems to be further amplified by a lack of 
explanation from the healthcare professional about what bipolar disorder is and how it will be 
treated.  In line with Sontag, I suggest that the negative impact here is not the disclosure of 
diagnosis, as if the word itself possesses a ‘magic power’ (Sontag, 2002: 6). Rather, the 
negative impact ought to be attributed to the sanist attitudes attached to the diagnosis, plus a 
lack of clarification from the healthcare professional. These sanist attitudes are then only 
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further perpetuated by the secrecy surrounding the patient’s diagnosis, ‘implying that it is too 
terrible to tell the patient and too awful to discuss’ (Atkinson, 1989: 24).  
The problem of non-disclosure in psychiatric healthcare is part of a broader issue of 
withholding information from the patient, thus placing the psychiatric patient at an epistemic 
disadvantage in making sense of their illness. As discussed above, while many clinicians do 
inform patients of their diagnosis, patients are often left in the dark as to what this diagnosis 
actually means. They may have been given a label, but the term ‘bipolar disorder’ or 
‘schizophrenia’ is of little use if the patient is not made aware of the condition's diagnostic 
features. This lack of understanding was revealed in the aforementioned study by Gallagher 
et al., where patients commonly reported an absence of explanation of their diagnosis from 
the healthcare professional. One patient said of her diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder: 
 I didn’t get so much information of what it actually meant [...] I think that sort of covered 
things like self-harming, in part, acting without thinking. I think the diagnosis that covered 
was basics, like ways that I behave and that was a surprise as well because I hadn’t heard of 
it, I didn’t understand what it was [...] (cited in Gallagher et al. 2010: 37).  
Another patient recalls being told by her healthcare practitioner, ‘The good news is you don’t 
need to take medication anymore, the bad news is you’ve got a personality disorder so you no 
longer have ‘bi-polar’; she adds ‘So I actually hadn’t a clue what this meant’ (ibid). 
Further studies have identified cases in which information regarding the treatment plan is 
withheld from psychiatric patients. This seems to be especially prevalent in those 
institutionalised under the Mental Health Act. In a study by Fenton et al., one patient reported 
his confusion over the medication he was receiving: “You don’t know what’s going on 
[laughing]. I must have been on quite a few different things…, it just seemed like they give 
me everything you know, or they tried to” (Fenton et al. 2014: 236). Patients describe having 
to be insistent in their questioning of staff to access withheld information about their illness. 
One patient ‘described how any attempts ‘‘to try and find out more about it [...] it was almost 
as though I had to be quite challenging to professionals, by being persistent’ (Horn et al. 
2007: 261). Service users observed that patients who did not bombard the healthcare 
professionals with questions, ‘those who were quiet and posed no challenge’, were ‘more 
likely to get lost within the system’ (Wright et al. 2016: 372).  
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Some studies revealed a culture of service-users placing the onus of combatting epistemic 
isolation on their fellow patients; they suggested that less demanding patients ought to speak 
up and ‘needed to be persistent and constantly ask for information’ if they wanted to gain 
access to the information they require (Wright et al. 2016: 372). However, as we have 
uncovered through our examination of testimonial self-silencing, routine testimonial injustice 
(let alone the person’s health condition itself) may make patients reluctant to approach the 
healthcare professional for information. They may fear (not unreasonably) that pressing for 
information may further perpetuate the credibility deficit attributed to them. As one patient 
observed, it is best to avoid persistent questioning, other the patient would be ‘put under the 
hat of being a difficult client [...] which as it turned out kind of reinforced the label for them’ 
(Horn et al. 2007: 261).  
Receiving information regarding one’s diagnosis and treatment is more than just desirable for 
the patient; it is essential to the patient’s capacity to make sense of their experiences. In the 
words of Atkinson: ‘when a psychiatrist withholds a diagnosis from a patient he is denying 
the patient knowledge about his condition’ (Atkinson, 1989: 24). Through epistemic 
isolation, the person with psychiatric illness is obstructed from vital information. Without 
these essential resources required to communicate their experiences, the psychiatric patient is 
met with hermeneutical lacuna.  Through epistemic isolation, the psychiatric patient is forced 
to operate as an epistemic agent from the position of an imposed ignorance, where they are 
deprived of resources that are essential for communication. I have identified three different 
kinds of information the psychiatric patient can be obstructed from: the treatment plan, the 
meaning of their diagnosis or the diagnosis itself. Though implemented seemingly for the 
greater good of the patient, such epistemic isolation maintains the unequal credibility 
economy in the psychiatric healthcare system, as it places the patient at an epistemic 
disadvantage from the offset. However, this is just one way in which hermeneutical lacunas 
can emerge for the psychiatric patient. In what follows, I demonstrate that even if the 
healthcare professional is forthcoming with all the necessary resources and information the 
patient requires, they may still experience a hermeneutical lacuna if the clinical interpretive 





5.2.2. Third-person interpretive framework  
 
Healthcare professionals attempted to overcome the inevitable communication barriers posed 
by psychiatry through the development of a universal psychiatric vocabulary. This universal 
vocabulary took the form of diagnostic manuals, the most popular today being the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). According to the APA, the aim of the 
latest edition of the DSM is as follows: 
[to create] a common language for clinicians to communicate about their patients and 
[establish] consistent and reliable diagnoses that can be used in the research of mental 
disorders. It also provides a common language for researchers to study the criteria for 
potential future revisions and to aid in the development of medications and other interventions 
(DSM-5).  
Whilst the DSM may go some way towards creating a universal framework for understanding 
psychiatric illness amongst healthcare professionals and researchers, what is missing from 
this mission statement is the pursuit of a common language between clinician and patient. If 
we agree with Gadamer that a common understanding between the clinician and the patient is 
essential to medical practice, this absence points to a significant gap in the aims of psychiatry 
(Gadamer, 1996). By emphasising communication about patients rather than to patients, the 
APA suggests that the patient’s understanding of their psychiatric illness is secondary to that 
of the clinician’s and researcher’s, if indeed the patient’s understanding is considered relevant 
to the aims of the DSM at all. 
Thus, despite the central role the doctor-patient dialogue plays in psychiatric healthcare, the 
voice of the person with psychiatric illness is notably omitted from diagnostic manuals. 
Instead, an epistemic privilege is afforded to the third-person perspective of the DSM, and the 
psychiatrist who wields it: ‘the medical perspective is regarded not only as authoritative but 
often even exclusive of other perspectives, such that medical diagnosis effectively constitutes 
a monopoly on the way the experience is interpreted’ (Scrutton, 2017: 349). As a result, the 
sense-making of psychiatric illness has been limited to that which can be conveyed through 
the language of the DSM.  
The purpose of the DSM is to provide an accurate description of psychiatric illnesses that 
mirrors the experience of those who have them. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that third-
person insight and empirical data alone cannot create the robust diagnostic criteria needed for 
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an accurate diagnosis. Consider the case-study put forward by Ratcliffe et al., comparing the 
symptoms of a bad case of the flu to the diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder 
(Ratcliffe et al. 2013). According to the DSM-5, to be diagnosed with major depressive 
disorder, the person must display at least five out of nine symptoms; five symptoms on this 
list include: ‘significant weight loss’ or ‘decrease…in appetite’, ‘fatigue or loss of energy’, 
‘diminished ability to think or concentrate’, ‘markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, 
or almost all, activities most of the day’ and ‘psychomotor agitation or retardation’ (DSM-5, 
2013: 160-161). Ratcliffe et al. conclude: 
Given the phenomenologically permissive way in which depression is described by diagnostic 
systems…the general feeling of being unwell, associated with illnesses such as influenza, 
does indeed meet the criteria for a major depressive episode, at least in those cases where 
another illness has not been diagnosed. (Ratcliffe et al. 2013: 206).  
Ratcliffe et al.’s study demonstrates a gap in the hermeneutical resources where the patient’s 
first-person experience ought to be. By excluding the first-person account of psychiatric 
illness from diagnostic criteria, we are left with a picture of major depressive disorder that is 
experientially the same as the flu. To better distinguish between these two symptomologies 
and to create a more accurate account of illnesses like major depressive disorder, the patient’s 
first-person insight ought to be encompassed within the diagnostic criteria. After all, ‘the 
people who might best know the various subtleties of a disorder and the criteria that could 
best be used to describe them are those who have first-hand experience with that disorder on 
a daily basis’ (Flanagan et al. 2010: 303).  
The upshot of such a hermeneutical lacuna can be found in Stanghellini and Mancini’s 
analysis of the ‘structured clinical interview’ or ‘technical interview’; the interviewing 
method developed by Spitzer for assessing psychiatric symptoms. The structural clinical 
interview, combined with the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-5, make up the diagnostic 
process Stanghellini and Mancini refer to as ‘the technical approach’ (Stanghellini & 
Mancini, 2017). Greenberg describes the interview process as follows:  
If you answer yes when the doctor asks you if you’ve been sad for two weeks or more, then 
he is directed to ask you about the next criterion for depression - whether or not you have lost 
interest in your current activities. If you answer no, then he moves on to a criterion for a 
different disorder. This goes on for forty-five minutes or so, the questions shunting you from 
one branch of the diagnostic tree to the next until you land on the leaf that is your diagnosis 
(Greenberg, 2013: 67). 
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Spitzer set the structured interview apart from the previous diagnostic models by limiting the 
variance of patient responses collated through the interview process: ‘Information variance 
was minimized by the use of a structured interview that ensured that the clinician 
systematically covered all the relevant areas of psychopathology’ (Spitzer, 1983: 401). In 
reducing the variance of patient responses, Spitzer aimed to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of the diagnosis. 
Consequently, in ‘reducing the variance of information’, Spitzer’s interview process was 
designed to omit any questions that may produce answers that were seemingly ‘irrelevant’ to 
the diagnosis: ‘Obviously, the relevance of some phenomena (and the irrelevance of all the 
others) is decided a priori – i.e. before the interview with that singular person takes place. 
The consequence is that a great deal of abnormal phenomena may pass unobserved’ 
(Stanghellini & Mancini, 2017: 9). As the structural interview avoids asking questions that 
concern areas of the patient’s first-person experience that may be deemed irrelevant, e.g., 
‘manifold disturbances of embodiment, lived space, and time’, I propose that there is a 
hermeneutical lacuna where the words to describe such experiences ought to be (Stanghellini 
& Mancini, 2017: 8). 
Following Fricker’s account, the unequal hermeneutical participation of a marginalised group 
from ‘some practice that would have value for the participant’ (in this instance, the 
development of the language of psychiatry) leaves a hermeneutical lacuna in the interpretive 
framework (Fricker, 2007: 153).  Eliminating the voice of those with psychiatric illness from 
diagnostic manuals not only restricts the content and accuracy of diagnostic categories but 
also constitutes an injustice against the marginalised subject, as it prevents them from 
contributing towards the creation of hermeneutical resources vital for expressing their 
experiences. In line with Fricker, the subject is met with a cognitive dissonance, whereby 
their personal experience of psychiatric illness is at odds with the language proposed by the 
DSM. In the words of Styron on depression:  
For over seventy-five years the word [depression] has slithered innocuously through the 
language like a slug, leaving little trace of its intrinsic malevolence and preventing, by its very 
insipidity, a general awareness of the horrible intensity of the disease when out of control.  





Here, Styron expresses an internal conflict between the diagnostic term and the experience of 
depression that equates to what Fricker calls a cognitive dissonance. However, in what 
follows, I demonstrate that Fricker does not go far enough. In the face of hermeneutical 
lacuna, the marginalised knower is vulnerable not only to cognitive dissonance but embodied 
dissonance.  
5.2.3. The Phenomenological Impact of Hermeneutical Silencing  
 
To better understand the phenomenological mechanisms that underlie an instance of 
hermeneutical lacuna in psychiatric healthcare, let us turn back to Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of ‘movement toward the possible’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 109). For Merleau-Ponty, when a 
subject successfully performs an action, there is no gap between the intention to act and the 
action itself. For example, when a footballer throws her body into the action of kicking a ball, 
there is a harmonious and invisible bond between the ‘intentional threads’ that pull her 
towards kicking the ball and the actual action of kicking (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 108). Now 
imagine the ex-footballer with phantom limb syndrome. Upon seeing the ball, it still offers 
the ex-footballer the same intentional threads as before, suggesting to her possibilities of 
action. Although the subject feels the pull of intention towards action, the action is stunted as 
she is missing an essential feature of her body schema to perform this action. 
In virtue of being an embodied subject, the hermeneutically silenced feel a habitual pull 
towards speech expression as ‘the intention to speak can only be found in open experience: it 
appears, as boiling appears in liquid, when in the thickness of being, empty zones are 
constituted and move outwards’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 202).  Yet, although the 
hermeneutically silenced is pulled towards an act of speech expression, they are confronted 
by an absence in their body schema where the hermeneutical resource ought to be. Without 
the words to describe their experience, the person with psychiatric illness is thrown into a 
paradoxical state, whereby the habitual body anticipates the capacity for speech expression 
yet is met with a negation in the phenomenal field. This is no small loss, as Merleau-Ponty 
observes that speech expression is a function of the body schema that allows ‘the human 
body to celebrate the world and to finally live it’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 193). Thus, the 
hermeneutical lacuna elicits an experience of embodied dissonance, whereby the 
hermeneutically silenced experiences a divide between body and world.  
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As previously discussed, this experience of a body-world divide is characteristic of 
psychiatric illness as those who are thrust into a state of psychiatric illness are forced to re-
examine the way they encounter the world. Actions pre-reflectively performed by the 
habitual body, such as getting out of bed or making a cup of tea, suddenly cannot be 
accomplished without explicit attention (if they can be accomplished at all).  In the words of 
Styron, ‘I began to experience a vaguely troubling malaise, a sense of something having gone 
cockeyed in the domestic universe I'd done so long, so comfortably’ (Styron, 2004: 41). The 
literature on the phenomenology of psychiatric illness broadly focuses on the profoundly 
altered structure of experience, ‘where the absence of hope, practical significance, and 
interpersonal connection is painfully felt’ (Ratcliffe, 2015: 55). Drawing on the 
phenomenological account of hermeneutical silencing, I propose that the unequal 
hermeneutical climate of psychiatric healthcare perpetuates, and even exacerbates, this 
experience of ‘unworlding’ for the person with psychiatric illness. 
Given the absence of an essential aspect of the body schema, the person with psychiatric 
illness cannot throw their body into an act of free and open expression in the same way as 
their hermeneutically privileged counterparts. For example, in recounting his vain attempts to 
communicate with his psychiatrist, Styron describes such phenomenological deterioration in 
his speech expression: ‘On my visits he and I continued to exchange platitudes, mine 
haltingly spoken now- since my speech, emulating my way of walking, had slowed to the 
vocal equivalent of a shuffle’ (Styron, 2010: 55).  When psychiatric patients like Styron 
attempt to put into words their experience of psychiatric illness, they are often stunted. 
Without the capacity of speech expression, in the domain of psychiatric healthcare, they have 
lost an essential way in which they were tied to the world. Unable to exploit the 
hermeneutical resources that once rolled off the tongue, engagement with their environment, 
and people within their environment, is strained.  Speech expression is no longer an invisible 
act but one at the forefront of the person’s attention as they fumble over ill-fitting 
hermeneutical resources.  Without reliable access to speech expression, the environment no 
longer invites interaction in the way it once did. In this sense, the hermeneutically silenced 
subject suffers an ‘unworlding’ as a gap emerges between self and world. Thus, the 
‘unworlding’ that is an essential feature of the psychiatric illness experience is, in part, either 
perpetuated by or even exacerbated by hermeneutical silencing.  
Thus far, I have developed a phenomenological account of hermeneutical silencing whereby 
the psychiatric patient is rendered speechless by a hermeneutical lacuna. In this instance, I 
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argue that hermeneutically silencing, obstructing the person with psychiatric illness from a 
vital aspect of the body schema, contributes towards the body-world dualism experienced in 
psychiatric illness. But what of those psychiatric patients who adopt the dominant framework 
of psychiatry? Does this sub-type of hermeneutical silencing also drive the experience of 
‘unworlding’ in psychiatric illness? In what follows, I argue that it does.  
 
5.2.4. Empty Speech Expression  
 
To examine this sub-type of hermeneutical silencing, I put forward a striking first-person 
case-study of being silenced in psychiatric healthcare written by K. Steslow. In her essay 
‘Metaphors in Our Mouths: The Silencing of the Psychiatric Patient’, Steslow describes her 
stint of involuntary incarceration in two psychiatric institutions. In reflecting upon her 
experience in psychiatric care, Steslow reports: ‘what I found most distressing—what 
threatened to erode any composure I could manage in hospital—was not the involuntary 
commitment,  but rather the distinct feeling of being unheard’ (Steslow, 2010: 30). Steslow 
argues that, once within the confines of a psychiatric institution, she ‘was cut off from all 
meaningful conversation by the veil of [her] diagnosis’; her speech expressions no longer 
carried the same weight, as everything she said was perceived to be a product of her illness 
(ibid). In her fight to be heard, Steslow recognised that she would be forced to adopt the 
medical terminology of the psychiatric experts (the dominant hermeneutical resources) for 
her account of illness to be considered meaningful. As such, she moulded her narrative to fit 
within the confines of the restrictive medical framework:  
There was a clear and distinct vocabulary being used to talk about my experience, and that 
vocabulary was not mine. But by adopting it, I began to regain some standing as a speaker 
worth listening to; I was then judged to exhibit that peculiarly esteemed quality psychiatrists 
call insight (Steslow, 2010: 30). 
To gain credibility, Steslow was forced to adopt ill-fitting hermeneutical resources, 
‘forsaking the uniqueness of [her] own perspective, understanding, and expression’, in the 
hope that she would be heard in some capacity (ibid).  
Not only has Steslow been robbed of a robust understanding of her illness due to a lack of 
hermeneutical resources, but there is a distinct hermeneutical lacuna that prevents her from 
being able to talk about her illness in her own terms. Steslow concludes that the only way she 
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can communicate her experiences is through the language of psychiatry. Steslow observes 
that the dominant hermeneutical framework of psychiatric healthcare possesses an ‘epistemic 
supremacy’, and while the purpose of this framework is to render the patient’s narratives 
intelligible in a medical context, ‘much of its healing power is lost in the wake of alienation, 
dis-empowerment, and silencing’ (Steslow, 2010: 30). Through the language of psychiatry, 
Steslow could only understand her experiences (to use Fricker’s phrase) ‘through a glass 
darkly’, as the interpretative framework that was forced upon her did not correlate with her 
own experience. It is apparent that Steslow adopts this strategy to avoid the secondary 
(practical) harms of hermeneutical injustice: unless she learns to speak the language of the 
psychiatric experts, she is unable to leave the psychiatric institution. She recounts her 
experience as follows:  
I denied suicidal ideation, talked about creating support systems outside the hospital, 
swallowed SSRIs, discussed setting and meeting goals and making progress in therapy, 
assured authorities I would comply with my treatment. All the while, a gulf widened between 
the self I was able to be outside the hospital and the self I had to present inside. I spoke as I 
knew I had to in order to be heard, aware of the dishonesty that saturated every obeisance and 
distressed that I was losing a sense of wholeness, splitting apart the young woman whose 
religious and existential crises had precipitated a desperate self-assault and the young woman 
who pretended that group therapy was interesting and helpful in order to move a notch further 
toward her discharge (Steslow, 2010: 30). 
On the surface, it appears that Steslow is successfully employing her body in an act of speech 
expression. Yet, she confesses to her reader that this is not her voice (the voice of ‘the young 
woman whose religious and existential crises had precipitated a desperate self-assault’) that 
she is speaking with, but the voice of the healthcare professional (ibid). As such, the act of 
speech expression Steslow describes is merely performative, as the words are inauthentic to 
her. Drawing on the Merleau-Pontian framework established in chapter three, I propose that 
this speech gesture is, in fact, empty. 
If we employ a Merleau-Pontian approach, we can understand such communicative practices 
as ‘empty’, because patients are forced to communicate their conditions through the remote, 
third-person ‘view from nowhere’ (Steslow, 2010: 30). Speech expressions that purposefully 
mimic the approved responses of a ‘healthy’ patient are devoid of gestural significance for 
the speaker. Consequently, patients like Steslow do not accomplish an authentic speech 
expression, as no genuine speech-thought synthesis occurs. Without appropriate 
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hermeneutical resources, Steslow describes ‘a gulf widened between the self I was able to be 
outside the hospital and the self I had to present inside’ (ibid). Her narrative captures a 
conflict between the empty gestures she performs externally and her internal experiences of 
psychiatric illness.  As such, the speech expression has not accomplished thought in the 
correct way. Like Merleau-Ponty’s account of the person with aphasia, Steslow merely 
repeats the words that she knows are met with a positive reaction in a mechanical way, yet 
the words ‘say nothing’ to her (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 199).  
As Steslow observes, oppressive hermeneutical practices that force psychiatric patients to 
mimic a remote medical voice ‘may end by creating minds more fragmented in perceiving 
and speaking than those that first turned up for help’ (Steslow, 2010: 30). Indeed, I propose 
that through empty speech expression, psychiatric patients like Steslow are vulnerable to an 
embodied dissonance. Unable to throw her body into an authentic action, Steslow loses ‘a 
sense of wholeness’ (ibid). There is a discontinuity in her actions as her body schema can 
only perform one of its most essential functions in a hampered and inauthentic way. Without 
freedom for speech expression, Steslow is unable to fully engage in the world. 
Thus, I propose that psychiatric patients like Steslow, though they do speak, speak in a 
restricted, inauthentic manner dictated by the clinical framework. They are inhibited from the 
‘free and open’ speech expressions of their hermeneutically dominant counterparts. This 
restricted speech expression constitutes a case of embodied dissonance, whereby the 
marginalised subject is unable to fully immerse herself in the world. On these grounds, we 
can conclude that the lack of unity between body and world that emerges from hermeneutical 
injustice when examined phenomenologically, sustains, and exacerbates, the unhomelike 
being-in-the-world characteristic of psychiatric illness.  
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s account of speech expression, the full extent of the harm caused 
by hermeneutical silencing in psychiatric healthcare comes to the fore. In line with Fricker’s 
concept of cognitive dissonance: ‘the lack of language one can trust to make sense of one’s 
experiences ultimately leads to a lack of self-understanding. [Suffering] rob[s] her of an 
expressed and articulated self-understanding’ (Svenaeus, 2018: 27). However, through a 
phenomenological method, we can see that hermeneutical silencing has a deeper and darker 
impact on the psychiatric patient than originally thought. Hermeneutical silencing can drive 
not only a cognitive dissonance but an embodied dissonance, whereby the embodied subject 
experiences a breakdown in the body-world synthesis. Therefore, the ‘unworlding’ that 
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constitutes psychiatric illness is not only a product of the illness itself but also a consequence 
of an obstruction of speech expression. We have seen that patients may approach this absence 
by attempting to fill it with ill-fitting medical terminology. Nevertheless, as such speech 
expression is an ‘empty’ gesture, the absence in their phenomenal field remains. Given this 
absence, the subject cannot throw their body into an act of free and open speech expression in 
the same way. This hermeneutical absence sustains and perhaps even exacerbates the 
disharmony between body and world experienced in psychiatric illness. 
How then do we overcome this absence in the hermeneutical climate? At first, Styron appears 
to admit defeat, as he states that we are ‘saddled with 'depression' until a better, sturdier name 
is created’ (Styron, 2010: 37). Yet, his memoir exhibits no such resignation. Rather, it sets 
out to surpass the limitations of the term ‘depression’, not by replacing the word with 
another, but by describing at length, in his own words, his experiences of the devastating 
illness. In the following chapter, I propose that the embodied dissonance induced by 
psychiatric illness can be ameliorated through just such hermeneutical resistance.  
5.3. Hermeneutical Justice  
 
In the concluding section of her final chapter, Fricker sets out a corrective strategy to combat 
hermeneutical injustice. In line with her account of testimonial justice, Fricker finds promise 
in her conception of the virtuous hearer, who practices a ‘reflexive sensitivity’ towards the 
speech expressions of marginalised speakers (Fricker, 2007: 170). To thwart hermeneutical 
injustice, the virtuous hearer would refrain from downgrading the marginalised speaker's 
credibility and would instead reflect on the hermeneutical inequalities that render their speech 
expression difficult in the first place. The virtuous hearer may adopt a form of ‘affirmative 
action’ by upgrading the credibility of those who are vulnerable to identity prejudice or by 
simply suspending their judgement regarding the credibility of their speech act until they 
have further evidence. In certain contexts, if a marginalised speech expression is outside the 
dominant interpretive framework, the virtuous hearer may attempt to gain a better grasp of 
the marginalised speaker’s worldview by approaching others with similar experiences. 
Expecting someone from the same marginalised group to provide further insight into their 
marginalised experience comes with its own moral problems.60 However, one could imagine 
 
60 A marginalised individual does not have a responsibility to educate a non-marginalised knower, or to speak on 
behalf of their marginalised group. See McCoy, H. (2020).  
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a scenario in which a virtuous hearer decides to educate themselves on a speaker's worldview 
by turning to the relevant literature. For instance, if a colleague attempts to discuss the 
misogyny latent in the workplace, a virtuous hearer may seek out feminist literature to better 
understand their colleague’s position. By adopting such strategies, Fricker hopes that ‘the 
virtuous hearer may effectively be able to help generate a more inclusive hermeneutical 
micro-climate through the appropriate kind of dialogue with the speaker’ (Fricker, 2007: 
171). When a more inclusive hermeneutical climate is fostered, it is more likely that 
hermeneutical lacunas can be filled, thus reducing hermeneutical marginalisation.  
After offering a corrective policy for hermeneutical injustice, Fricker closes the section with a 
warning: ‘hermeneutical marginalisation is first and foremost the product of unequal relations 
of social power more generally, and as such is not the sort of thing that could itself be 
eradicated by what we do as virtuous hearers alone’ (Fricker, 2007: 174). Throughout her 
chapter ‘Hermeneutical Injustice’, Fricker has gone to lengths to emphasise the structural 
nature of hermeneutical injustice. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Fricker concludes with a 
rallying cry for ‘group political action’ to reconstruct the hermeneutical landscape (ibid). 
Surprisingly, however, an appeal to structural strategies to overcome hermeneutical injustice 
appears more of an afterthought and the idea is left rather underdeveloped in Fricker’s work. 
For this reason, Medina sets out to create a more robust structural approach to hermeneutical 
justice, arguing that virtuous listening may not be enough to overcome the most extreme 
forms of hermeneutical injustice. As discussed in chapter three, Medina terms this approach 
‘hermeneutical resistance’, which champions a strategy of ‘[working] toward the formation of 
original meanings, alternative expressive styles, and new horizons of interpretation’ (Medina, 
2017: 49). In this concluding chapter, I argue that the creation of ‘original meanings, 
alternative expressive styles, and new horizons of interpretation’ via hermeneutical resistance 
can emerge in psychopathology through a phenomenological approach to the clinical 
encounter.61  
5.3.1. Phenomenological Psychopathology and the PHD model for Therapeutic Interview 
 
 
61 I do not mean to suggest that the only method of enacting hermeneutical resistance is through the PHD model 
for therapeutic interview. As Kidd and Carel observe ‘visual art, film, music, poetry, or drama’ has long been 
used to communicate the experiences of ill persons, and consequently, to overcome such hermeneutical lacunas 
(Kidd & Carel, 2017: 185). See also El Refaie, E. (2019).  I only mean to propose one effective strategy 
amongst many for hermeneutical resistance in psychiatric healthcare.  
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Due to the near inexpressible nature of psychiatric illness, psychiatry can be understood as an 
exercise in hermeneutics: ‘Doctors…are thus not first and foremost scientists who apply 
biological knowledge, but rather interpreters – hermeneuts of health and illness’ (Svenaeus, 
2017: 65). This line of thought derives from Gadamer’s account of medical practice as a 
collaboration between doctor and patient through dialogue. Gadamer proposes that this 
dialogue is a coming together of the first-person and third-person perspective into a ‘merging 
of horizons’ to better understand the patient’s illness. To reach this joint understanding, he 
asserts that it is essential to overcome the underlying asymmetry in the doctor-patient 
relationship: ‘dialogue and discussion serve to humanise the fundamentally unequal 
relationship that prevails between doctor and patient’ (Gadamer, 1996: 112). Gadamer 
suggests that this asymmetry necessitates empathy from the doctor in order to understand the 
perspective of the psychiatric patient. In this sense, psychiatric healthcare is essentially 
hermeneutical. Drawing on Gadamer, Svenaeus proposes that ‘medical theories about the 
workings of the human body need to be enveloped in a professional, empathetic 
understanding of the patient’s being-in-the-world’ (Svenaeus, 2017: 62, original italics). This 
approach is known as ‘phenomenological psychopathology’.  
Phenomenological psychopathology has its roots in Karl Jasper’s seminal work General 
Psychopathology, where Jaspers marries psychiatry and phenomenology to form an approach 
to psychotherapy that puts the life-world of the psychiatric patient at the fore (Jaspers, 1963). 
Phenomenological psychopathology can be understood as the development of ‘a framework 
for approaching mental illness in which theoretical assumptions are minimized and the forms 
and contents of the patient’s subjective experience are prioritized’ (Stanghellini et al. 2019: 
3). Advocates of the phenomenological method recognise that it is impossible to conduct an 
isolated investigation on the ‘mind’ or ‘brain’ of a psychiatric patient because embodied 
subjectivity is irreducible to a mere mind. Rather, phenomenological psychopathology 
surpasses the limited scope of pre-structured interviews and diagnostic criteria by examining 
the patient's life-world. After all, in the words of Stanghellini et al.: ‘we, as clinical 
psychiatrists, do not usually sit in front of a broken brain—we sit in front of a suffering 
person’ (Stanghellini et al. 2019: 4).   
Phenomenological psychopathology aims to create an alternative language to that advanced 
by psychiatry; a language that originates from the patient’s experience of psychiatric illness, 
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meaningful first and foremost to the patient themselves. 62 It is then the psychiatrist's 
responsibility, rather than the patient’s, to understand the significance of the patient’s 
testimony.  Although some advocates of the method have attempted to devise a psychiatric 
classification that is rooted in a phenomenological approach (see Fernandez, 2019), the most 
common view held amongst phenomenological psychotherapists is that, given the world-
disrupting nature of psychiatric illness, there is no straightforward, universal translation for 
any psychiatric experience. Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, phenomenological 
psychopathology strives to facilitate reflective awareness and communicability of the 
patient’s first-person account through doctor-patient dialogue.  Advocates of 
phenomenological psychopathology do not suggest that healthcare professionals simply take 
the patient’s language as direct insight into their inner experience. Rather, the healthcare 
professional must consider the vast landscape of meanings the patient may call upon: 
One patient says, “I feel depressed.” What exactly does she mean by that? Some patients may 
use the word “depressed” to describe themselves as feeling sad and downhearted, but others 
may use it to mean that they feel unable to feel, or to convey their sense of inner void, lack of 
inner nucleus and/or of identity, or feelings of being anonymous or non-existent (Stanghellini 
& Mancini, 2017: 14). 
As such, psychiatric diagnosis is ‘an (often laborious) process of interpretation’ (ibid). The 
pursuit of understanding goes beyond a mere description of ‘what it is like’ to have a certain 
psychiatric illness; phenomenological psychopathology concerns an in-depth examination of 
the interpersonal, intentional, temporal, spatial and affective structure of the patient’s life-
world. In collating these valuable first-person descriptions, the clinician can, over time, paint 
a picture of the life-world of a given psychiatric illness by drawing out the core structures that 
are prevalent in each account. Consequently, phenomenological psychopathology ‘provides 
tools that can facilitate successful clinical diagnosis as well as the revision of our diagnostic 
categories’ (Stanghellini et al. 2019: 4). Through this process, an alternative interpretive 
framework is born, rooted in the patient's first-person experience rather than the clinician's 
third-person view.  
Therefore, phenomenological psychopathology has not only redefined the boundaries of the 
diagnostic model and what we call psychopathological knowledge, but it has also brought to 
light the therapeutic benefits of a phenomenological approach in psychiatric healthcare.  
 
62 There are a variety of different approaches to phenomenological psychopathology. I present here the most 
widely accepted version of the method.  
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Broadly, we can understand phenomenological psychopathology to be ‘a quest for meaning’: 
‘It encourages the patient to unfold his experiences and his personal horizon of meaning, 
helping him to reflect upon them and take a position on them’ (Stanghellini et al., 2019: 4-5). 
As a ‘quest for meaning’, Stanghellini illuminates the benefits of a phenomenological 
psychopathological approach to the therapeutic interview in clinical practice. Stanghellini 
refers to this model as PHD, named after an acronym of its three-part process:  1) 
Phenomenological unfolding, 2) Hermeneutic analysis, and 3) Dynamics analysis 
(Stanghellini, 2016).  
The aim of the first stage of the interview process, phenomenological unfolding, is to expose 
the patient’s transformed field of experience through dialogue. Rather than the closed-
questions and box-ticking characteristic of the therapeutic interview, phenomenological 
psychopathology fosters a technique of open-ended exploration of the patient’s life-world. 
Using the phenomenological method, the clinician conducts an investigation into the complex 
manifold of the patient’s illness experience. In turn, the clinician would examine the core 
phenomenal structures of the patient’s life-world; the experience of ‘time, space, body, Self 
and others’ (Messas et al., 2018: 2). Such phenomenological assessment is not new; this 
method has long been exercised in the philosophical study of illness. We can find examples 
of many different approaches to ‘phenomenological unfolding’ in the literature on the 
philosophy of illness (Carel, 2012). In phenomenological investigations of psychiatric illness, 
some philosophers adopt a Sartrean framework with an emphasis on the ‘uncanny’ body 
(Svenaeus, 2017), or a Heideggerian account, focusing on the temporal experience of illness 
(Hughes, 2020). Stanghellini advocates a Husserlian approach where the clinician employs 
the ‘epoche’ in order to attend to the ‘thing in itself’ (Stanghellini, 2019), while Trigg 
employs a Merleau-Pontian account of the ambiguity of the body to explore the experience of 
depersonalisation in psychiatric illness (Trigg, 2017). What all these approaches have in 
common is the primary operation of this aspect of the therapeutic interview: to draw out the 
hidden structures of the patient’s life-world by a phenomenological method.  
In the PHD interview, the phenomenological method not only brings to the fore the essential 
features of the patient’s being-in-the-world but creates a shared understanding of the 
psychiatric illness between doctor and patient. Stanghellini reminds the reader that a 
reciprocal doctor-patient relationship is fundamental for this communicative intelligibility. 
Much like Fricker, Stanghellini identifies the significance of ‘listening’ to mediate a 
therapeutically promising exchange: 
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it is important to note that this process of unfolding is profoundly rooted in hearing—or even 
better: listening and dialoguing—and in the power of the spoken word… Hearing contributes 
to an ethics based on reciprocity and belonging, as well as to establishing a kind of knowledge 
focused on subjective experiences and personal narratives (Stanghellini, 2019: 960).  
Thus, Stanghellini recognises that a successful therapeutic interview requires the clinician to 
exercise a kind of ‘virtuous listening’. With this reflexive awareness built into the 
‘phenomenological unfolding’ stage of the interview, the clinician can avoid ascribing the 
patient’s testimony an undue credibility deficit from the offset.  
The second stage of the process, hermeneutic analysis, concerns the patient’s own 
interpretation of their illness experience. As previously discussed, the world presents itself to 
each embodied subject in a certain way according to a ‘style’. For a person who holds 
Christian beliefs, a church may represent the house of God and may invite possibilities of 
engagement with God through prayer or otherwise. For a non-Christian, a church may 
represent an interesting historical structure that invites possibilities of architectural 
investigation. We can understand this as a difference in the meaning structures of one’s 
world. We subconsciously develop this system of meanings to organise our phenomenal 
experiences, influencing our belief-system, actions, and feelings. As we have seen, in the case 
of psychiatric illness, for one person an experience of auditory hallucinations may be 
terrifying and uncanny. For another person, an auditory hallucination may be experienced as 
a positive, spiritual event (Scrutton, 2017). Through hermeneutic analysis, the clinician helps 
the patient draw out the unique meaning structures of her illness experience.  
The hermeneutic analysis is closely linked with the final stage of the therapeutic interview, 
which Stanghellini refers to as ‘Dynamic analysis’. ‘Dynamic analysis’ requires the clinician 
to draw out a narrative of the patient’s personal history, in which the meaning structure 
established in the previous step can be positioned: ‘All of any person’s life events (including 
those that at face value look meaningless) are, according to psychodynamics, lawful and 
potentially meaningful in a particular way for that person’ (Messas et al., 2018: 4). By 
contextualising the meaning-structure established in hermeneutic analysis, a rich portrait of 
the patient’s life-world emerges.  
Initially, it may be difficult to differentiate between this second stage of the therapeutic 
process (hermeneutic analysis) and the first (phenomenological unfolding), as both appear to 
explore the patient’s phenomenal field and life-world. For Stanghellini, the hermeneutic 
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analysis differs from phenomenological unfolding as ‘the P moment unfolds the patient’s life-
world or world-experience, the H moment reveals the patient's worldview. This concept refers 
to the person’s philosophy of life, that is, the structure of values that orients her way to 
experience reality and her actions.’ (Stanghellini, 2019: 965). In other words, the first stage 
brings to the surface the patient’s temporal, spatial, and interpersonal experience of 
psychiatric illness, whereas the second stage encourages the patient to make sense of these 
experiences in their own words.  
The distinction between these two stages can be demonstrated in the work of Trigg. Trigg 
begins with an in-depth first-person account of the temporal, spatial and interpersonal 
experience of taking a bus journey as an agoraphobic person (Trigg, 2013). The following 
section is then dedicated to answering the question ‘How can we begin to make sense of this 
experience?’ (Trigg, 2013: 418). Trigg proceeds to elucidate the meaning of ‘home’ for the 
agoraphobe as ‘shelter’, ‘familiarity’, ‘safety’, and ‘control’, in contrast to the outside world, 
which exudes an aura of menace. Without such self-administered hermeneutic analysis, the 
significance held by ‘home’ and ‘the outside world’ remains on a subconscious level. 
Consequently, through hermeneutic analysis, the implicit meaning structure of Trigg’s 
agoraphobia is made apparent.  
As its name suggests, hermeneutic analysis is the stage of therapeutic interview most relevant 
for our pursuit of hermeneutic justice. To achieve a corrective strategy for hermeneutical 
injustice, Fricker proposes: 
 an alertness or sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as 
she tries to render something communicatively intelligent is due not to its being a nonsense or 
her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in the collective hermeneutical resources 
(Fricker, 2007: 169). 
 As we have seen, in a clinical exchange, the meaning the psychiatric patient places on 
aspects of the world may not be taken seriously and may be dismissed as irrational or a 
product of illness itself. Through the PHD interview, on the other hand, the patient’s 
interpretation is placed at the centre of the therapeutic process. In the stage of hermeneutic 
analysis, the clinician is sensitive to the communicative hurdles the patient faces and 
demonstrates a reflexive awareness that the language of the diagnostic manual may be an ill-
fitting hermeneutical resource for the patient’s lived experience. Through hermeneutic 
analysis, the clinician not only exercises a hermeneutical openness to the patient’s 
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interpretation but rejects the dominant interpretive framework in order to foster the patient’s 
alternative understanding of their illness experience. Following Medina, we can understand 
hermeneutic analysis as an act of hermeneutical resistance: ‘the phenomenon in which a 
dissident voice rebels against mainstream voices’ (Medina, 2012: 209). By drawing out the 
patient’s own interpretive framework, a common language is established between doctor and 
patient, a language that transcends the limits of the diagnostic manual and is rooted in the 
patient’s first-person experience of psychiatric illness.  
 
5.3.2. The PHD Interview as Hermeneutical Justice  
 
A Gadamerian approach to psychiatry promotes ‘the art of healing’: using doctor-patient 
dialogue to grasp the disturbance in the patient’s life-world and thereby work towards 
bridging the gap between patient and the outside world (Gadamer, 1996: 163). I suggest that 
the PHD model of therapeutic interview constitutes the ‘art of healing’ as Gadamer 
envisioned. In the first instance, by inviting the patient into an informational exchange that 
prioritises ‘their thoughts, their judgements, their opinions’, the PHD model redresses the 
unequal hermeneutical climate. This shift in epistemic authority is one of the key benefits of a 
phenomenological approach to psychopathology: meaning-making is centred not around the 
clinician but the patient. As such, the therapeutic alliance between doctor and patient is 
strengthened, as the doctor makes a clear attempt towards virtuous listening.  
Second, the literature on phenomenological psychopathology predominantly focuses on the 
epistemic benefits of the approach when it comes to clinical decision making. By uncovering 
the core meaning structures that emerge in depression, borderline personality disorder, 
schizophrenia, or whichever psychiatric illness is under investigation, a complete 
understanding of the illness is established that surpasses the limits of the third-person 
perspective of diagnostic manuals (Stanghellini, 2019). Much like Gadamer, proponents of 
the PHD interview argue that the meaning structures of a patient’s life-world ‘are not 
symptoms to be ‘killed’. They need to be acknowledged by the clinician as an integral part of 
the patient’s form of life, and then modulated, accommodated with the requirements of 
reality, not eradicated’ (Mancini & Stanghellini, 2020: 49). Through this three-step interview 
process, new and alternative ways of making sense of the patient’s illness take shape. As 
such, phenomenological psychopathology can be used to broaden the horizons of what the 
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patient and clinician can ‘know’ about the psychiatric illness in question. Moreover, through 
the PHD interview, the patient may achieve a greater level of self-understanding and further 
insight into their condition. In turn, this understanding thwarts the ‘cognitive dissonance’ of 
hermeneutical injustice identified by Fricker, as the clinician understanding and the patient 
understanding are no longer at odds.  
While the self-understanding and insight of the person with psychiatric illness is frequently 
cited in the literature, Bortolan emphasises that the narrative aspect of phenomenological 
psychopathology offers the patient not only epistemic insight but is also part of the recovery 
process. She argues that, by putting one’s phenomenological experience into words, the 
patient has command over the ambiguous and overwhelming change in her life-world: ‘This 
increased sense of control, in turn, inclines us to be more proactive in regulating our feelings, 
which results in less overwhelming emotions and an increased sense of empowerment’ 
(Bortolan, 2019: 1059). In the words of Messas et al., the purpose of the PHD model of the 
therapeutic interview is ‘to help the patient to recalibrate his miscarried position-taking and, 
finally, to recover his sense of responsibility and agency’ (Messas et al. 2018: 4). In what 
follows, I argue that this transformative aspect of phenomenological psychopathology merits 
further attention as a means of managing what Gadamer refers to as the ‘internal balance’, 
and what I understand to be the body-world synthesis. By enacting and enabling 
hermeneutical resistance, the therapeutic interview can help ameliorate the patient's body-
world divide. However, before we examine the phenomenological benefits of the PHD 
interview, I first identify a required modification and then explain how it can be incorporated 
into the PHD interview process. 
 
5.3.3. A modification of the PHD interview  
 
As a ‘quest for meaning’, the PHD method of therapeutic interview strives to overcome the 
communicative difficulties encountered by the psychiatric patient. Casting aside the often ill-
suited hermeneutical resources of the diagnostic manual, phenomenological psychopathology 
seeks to articulate the world as it appears to the person with psychiatric illness, ‘including all 
those details that resist standard semiological classification’ (Stanghellini, 2019: 959). In the 
face of hermeneutical marginalisation, and potentially even hermeneutical lacuna, this is no 
mean feat. For this reason, the ‘hermeneutic analysis’ aspect of the therapeutic interview 
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plays a vital role. As previously mentioned, Stanghellini proposes that the meaning structures 
of the patient’s life-world are ‘rescued’ (to use Stanghellini’s phrase) or made explicit by the 
clinician through hermeneutical investigation (ibid).  
In his work on phenomenological psychopathology, Stanghellini emphasises the role of the 
clinician as a translator of the patient’s phenomenological experience; by employing a 
suspension of the natural attitude (the epoche) and an empathetic understanding of the 
patient’s life-world, Stanghellini suggests that the clinician is capable of drawing out the 
salient features of the patient’s being-in-the-world. Drawing on Jaspers, the role of 
‘empathetic understanding’ underpins the clinician’s capacity to grasp the patient’s life-world 
for Stanghellini: ‘it consists in reproducing […] in ourselves what is actually taking place in 
the mind of that person’ (Stanghellini, 2019: 954). He goes as far as to propose that only by 
exercising such empathetic understanding ‘the clinician may become a “You” for his patient’ 
(Stanghellini, 2019: 962). By these means, the clinician can draw out the meaning structure 
of the patient’s experience. Here I would like to offer a cautionary note regarding the role of 
‘empathetic understanding’ in the therapeutic interview. 
I agree that empathy is essential to combat systematic epistemic injustice in the clinical 
encounter, both testimonial and hermeneutical. However, it seems to me that it is important to 
not overstate the insight the clinician can gain from an empathetic approach. I consider 
empathetic understanding in the clinical encounter to be taking seriously a patient’s testimony 
and imagining ‘what it would be like’ to move through the world in the way they do. It is not, 
on the other hand, directly accessing the patient’s lived experience in the same way the 
patient can or, as Stanghellini proposes, ‘reviving in ourselves what the other is actually 
living’ (Stanghellini, 2019: 954). After all, the very purpose of this therapeutic endeavour of 
extracting the patient's life-world is a reaction to the enigmatic, ambiguous and personal 
nature of their illness experience.  
To exaggerate the level of insight the clinician can gain from empathetic understanding can 
have dangerous consequences for the patient's epistemic status. Although the purpose of 
phenomenological psychopathology is to champion the patient's perspective, it seems as 
though the clinician's interpretation is still given greater weight than that of the patient. Using 
the PHD interview technique, Stanghellini describes the clinician as extracting the meaning 
structures of the patient’s experience from ‘the vantage point from which he sees the patient’s 
situation’ (Stanghellini, 2019: 962). Despite being a patient-centred approach, the person with 
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psychiatric illness begins to appear fairly passive in the therapeutic process as Stanghellini’s 
picture of the PHD interview takes shape. While Stanghellini describes the methodology that 
the clinician must employ in great depth, the patient simply recounts their phenomenal 
experience as best they can. The clinician, not the patient, draws out an interpretive 
framework for the patient’s experience because ‘by unfolding the structures of a text, we can 
understand an author better than the author himself’ (ibid). By overstating the first-person 
knowledge produced by the empathetic approach, the clinician may place herself as equally 
knowledgeable about the patient’s phenomenal field as the patient themself. With the 
‘vantage point’ of being a healthcare professional, the authority for meaning-making is then 
placed with the clinician. The concern then is that, despite the clinician’s best intentions, the 
dominant interpretive framework takes precedence over the patient’s personal understanding.  
To avoid further perpetuating the hermeneutical injustice that this method sought to 
overcome, I propose that we incorporate Carel’s ‘phenomenological toolkit’ into the PHD 
therapeutic interview (Carel, 2012; 2016). Stanghellini’s phenomenological ‘toolbox’ shares 
many similarities with Carel’s ‘phenomenological toolkit’: both advocate employing the 
epoche, drawing out the meaning structures of illness and examining the patient’s being-in-
the-world. The key difference (for our present purposes) is that Carel’s phenomenological 
toolkit is first and foremost ‘a patient resource’ that is secondly ‘aimed at training clinicians’ 
(Carel, 2016: 199). Carel frames the hermeneutical process, which she terms ‘thematising’, as 
a collaborative effort between patient, clinician and family members, whereby the patient 
draws out the meaning structures of their illness through workshops:  
The small-group structure of the workshop and the fact that participants all suffer from an 
illness, or aim to care for ill persons, provide a safe environment that will allow participants 
to share the idiosyncrasies of their experiences with no pressure for these to fit into a pre-
given mould (Carel, 2016: 202).  
Carel’s ‘phenomenological toolkit’ avoids the pitfalls of the PHD interview, as the patient 
gets the final word on the interpretation of her illness. As such, we bypass a perpetuation of 
dominant frameworks and the suppression of dissonant voices. By applying Carel’s 
collaborative approach to Stanghellini’s therapeutic interview, the patient is given the tools to 
exercise hermeneutical resistance: to overturn the clinical interpretive framework and 
produce her own hermeneutical resources in its place. In addition, the collective response to 
the hermeneutical process, shifting from the patient-doctor collaboration to a group of first-
person perspectives on psychiatric illness, places greater privilege on the first-person 
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perspective.63 In what follows, I explore the phenomenological benefits of hermeneutical 
resistance in psychiatric healthcare.  
 
5.3.4. Recovering Speech Expression through Hermeneutical Resistance  
 
Through the phenomenological method and the guidance of the healthcare professional, the 
patient discovers novel ways of understanding and expressing her illness, thus forging a path 
across the hermeneutical lacuna that silenced her. As established in the third chapter, we 
ought to understand this act of hermeneutical resistance as Merleau-Pontian ‘speaking 
speech’. Recall, speaking speech is the creative way we transform the well-worn 
hermeneutical resources sedimented in the linguistic institution to make a new and original 
speech act: 
One can have no idea of the power of language until one has taken stock of that working or 
constitutive language which emerges when the constituted language, suddenly off centre and 
out of equilibrium, reorganizes itself to teach the reader - and even the author - what he never 
knew how to think or say. (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 15). 
Through the PHD interview, the patient draws on the phenomenological narrative of their 
temporal, spatial, and interpersonal experience of psychiatric illness to fill the empty space 
with meaningful content. For instance, when Mancini and Stanghellini conducted the PHD 
interview on borderline personality disorder patients, they pried three core meaning structures 
(or ‘values’) from the patient’s narratives of lived experience: recognition, authenticity and 
immediacy (Mancini & Stanghellini, 2020). Let us focus on the latter theme of immediacy. 
During the interviews, patients frequently made remarks concerning a pressing desire for 
immediacy: ‘He’s never there! Always busy with his “duties” as he calls them! I feel empty 
without him. I spend my days crying... He absolutely has to move in with me!’ (Mancini & 
Stanghellini, 2020: 51). Through phenomenological unfolding, one can see that the patient 
holds only a loose sense of past and future; but in contrast, they experience an urgent threat to 
their existence in the present moment. While at the start of the interview, the patient could 
only express vague distress and impatience in regards to moving in with a boyfriend, the 
 
63 It is also worth noting that this collaborative, group effort towards the development of hermeneutical 
resources is the means by which hermeneutical resistance appears to be most effective. In Fricker’s 
paradigmatic examples of Carmita Wood and Wendy Sandford, it is through collaborative workshops that the 
terms to describe their experiences emerged.  
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patient can now express ‘immediacy’ as one of her core values and articulate the weight she 
places on the ‘now’ as part of her temporal lived experience. Through the expression of a 
complex and vital subject that had otherwise been passed over in silence, the patient has 
exercised ‘speaking speech’.  
If the therapeutic interview is a success, the patient will leave the interview with the 
hermeneutical resources required to grasp her experience of psychiatric illness. In discussing 
the benefits of ‘the talking cure’ (talking therapy more generally), Aho and Guigon observe 
that ‘the dialogical interplay in which two people engage in bringing to light what is initially 
inchoate and confused can be seen as a creative act in which new possibilities of 
understanding and self-formulation are allowed to emerge into the light’(Aho & Guignon, 
2011: 305). We can understand this as an act of speaking speech. By ‘donning already 
available significations’, the patient carves out new and alternative meanings of her 
psychiatric illness experience and can convey these experiences to others, most significantly 
to the healthcare professionals, who can now offer her the appropriate care: ‘the available 
significations suddenly intertwine according to an unknown law, and once and for all a new 
cultural being has begun to exist’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 189). We can understand this new 
‘cultural being’ as a creative speech expression and an original interpretive framework that 
makes ‘certain experiences and behaviours become more understandable and salient’ 
(Bortolan, 2019: 1060). Through such ‘speaking speech’, the patient is met with the ‘life-
changing flash of enlightenment’ that is hermeneutical justice, as she can finally make sense 
of her experience (Fricker, 2007: 153). An ability to grasp one’s illness is a fundamental 
aspect of the recovery process in psychiatric healthcare, and in this sense, phenomenological 
psychopathology is an essential tool for psychiatric patients. However, I argue that the ‘click, 
aha!’ moment of hermeneutical resistance facilitated by therapeutic interview goes further 
still. I propose that in reclaiming the capacity for speech expression, the psychiatric patient 
has recovered a crucial aspect of their body schema.  
Recall Young’s conception of the female body schema as being in an inhibited state, 
hampered by the patriarchal society of the 1980s (Young, 2005). In response, Chisholm 
sought to modernise Young’s depiction of female body comportment and develop an account 
of the free bodily movement and phenomenological transcendence of the 21st-century woman 
(Chisholm, 2008). Where Young’s essay centres upon the female body in an act of 
‘throwing’, Chisholm situates the female body in an act of climbing. Chisholm’s example is 
inspired by free-climber Lynn Hill, who rejects the dominant mode of climbing instituted by 
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men and thus designed for a male body. Instead, she cultivates a style of climbing suited to 
her own, female bodily comportment: ‘As a girl among men, Hill has to invent a makeshift 
style that alters or surmounts set routes, methods, and limits of reach. It is a girl’s reach that 
she adapts to free climb routes previously mapped and bolted by men’ (Chisholm, 2008: 21). 
Rather than attempting to adjust her body schema to that of a man’s, Hill throws herself into 
her environment according to a female bodily comportment. For instance, as Hill herself 
writes of her colleague, ‘John’s size and power enabled him to make long reaches and 
explosive lunge moves that were completely out of my range. I, on the other hand, often 
found small intermediate holds that John couldn’t even imagine gripping’ (Hill, 143).  
Young describes the female bodily comportment in an act of ‘throwing’ as follows: 
girls do not bring their whole bodies into the motion as much as boys do. They do not reach 
back, twist, move backward, step, and lean forward. Rather, the girls tend to remain relatively 
immobile except for the arms, and even the arms are not extended as far as they could be 
(Young, 2005: 32). 
 In contrast, Hill learns to overcome the spurious ‘limits’ (which is, in fact, mere difference) 
of the female body, and use her unique body schema to her advantage, ‘surging toward 
objects that make themselves perceivably graspable, maneuverable, and reachable’ 
(Chisholm, 2008: 21). By rejecting the prescribed bodily comportment for physical activities 
(bodily comportment that is ill-suited to the female body), Chisholm concludes that women 
like Hill overcome the supposedly fated breakdown between body and world that 
characterises female embodiment. For Hill, ‘the rock beckons and the body reaches, and in 
this synthesis of external world and body intentionality, the climber elaborates her 
environment in movement that mimes the surface she climbs’ (Chisholm, 2008: 22).  
I suggest that an analogy can be drawn between the woman who defies the inhibited feminine 
styles of bodily comportment and the psychiatric patient who exercises hermeneutical 
resistance against the instituted, ill-fitting modes of speech expression. In the words of 
Merleau-Ponty, ‘the writer or speaker is first mute straining towards what he wants to 
convey, toward what he is going to say.  Then suddenly a flood of words comes to save this 
muteness’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1976: 6). Like the free-climbing Lynn Hill who skilfully propels 
her body into higher and higher ascent, reaching, grasping, and hauling across the treacherous 
terrain, the person with psychiatric illness renounces the limitations of her language and 
throws herself into a defiant act of speech expression by reaching, grasping and hauling 
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newly developed hermeneutical resources. Through ‘speaking speech’, she restores the 
negative space in her body’s representation so that her actual and habitual body are in 
accordance with one another. In doing so, she can now respond to the call of her environment 
to exercise a fundamental aspect of her body schema, the capacity for speech expression, that 
had heretofore been suppressed. As ‘the virtue of expression is to recover for us the life of 
our thought’, in this instance, it is the anomalous psychiatric illness experience that was 
bound to the person’s mind (and even then wasn’t accessible as anything more than a ‘vague 
fever’) that becomes concrete, tangible and is brought into existence as a meaningful entity 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 5). Once this ‘internal’ experience, striving for expression, finally 
comes to fruition through speech, the person with psychiatric illness achieves a more 
cohesive being-in-the-world. 
To be clear, it would be overly optimistic to assume that speech expression alone could 
alleviate the ‘unworlding’ of psychiatric illness entirely. Recall, a drastically altered being-in-
the-world is an essential feature of psychiatric illness. In particular, the literature on the 
phenomenology of psychiatric illness has revealed that the person with psychiatric illness 
experiences a breakdown in their capacity to perform intentional actions, as objects in the 
world that were once part of the subject’s habitual activity no longer offer the affordances 
they once did. For example, the pen no longer beckons the subject to write, or the bike no 
longer beckons the subject to ride it. As they no longer offer the affordances they once did, 
these objects lose the meaning they once possessed: ‘the world is no longer experienced as 
presenting an interrelated network of things with determinate meanings and interactive 
possibilities. Instead, things are saturated with a pervasive sense of strangeness’ (Krueger, 
2020: 605).  
Consequently, there is an alienation between self and world for the person with psychiatric 
illness, as the familiar ‘taken for granted’ aspects of the world become uncanny. As 
previously discussed, it is this transformed being-in-the-world that hampers the subject’s 
capacity for speech expression in the first place. Speech expression is just one aspect of the 
system of interconnected capacities that make up the body schema; reclaiming one aspect of 
the body schema would not reverse the overall experience of body-world breakdown. 
Nevertheless, as fundamentally linguistic beings, recovering the subject’s capacity for speech 
expression is a crucial step towards restoring their being-in-the-world. Speech expression 
underpins the subject’s relationship with the world as ‘language is the double of being, and 
we cannot conceive of an object or idea that comes into the world without words’ (Merleau-
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Ponty, 1976: 5-6). Thus, recovery of speech expression is necessary (although not sufficient) 
to restore one’s being-in-the-world.  Once the patient’s capacity for speech expression is 
restored, there is hope of paving the way toward a coherent and more comfortable lived 
experience, whereby their interactions with objects and others become as inconspicuous and 
natural as before. 
This section has identified three distinct benefits of the phenomenological psychopathology 
approach to the therapeutic interview. First, it targets hermeneutical injustice in psychiatric 
healthcare by rejecting the dominant clinical framework of psychiatric illness in favour of a 
patient-centred approach to meaning-making. Second, in allowing the patient to cultivate 
hermeneutical resources regarding their illness experience, the therapeutic interview 
instigates an understanding of one’s illness that is vital for the recovery process. In turn, such 
hermeneutical resistance expels the cognitive dissonance between the patient’s own 
understanding and the interpretive framework reinforced by psychiatry. Third, the therapeutic 
approach goes some way towards recovering the patient’s sense of being-in-the-world, as it 
takes a vital step towards restoring the body schema.  
5.4. Conclusion  
 
The literature on the phenomenology of psychiatric illness has opened a space for new ways 
of understanding the disrupted being-in-the-world suffered by those with psychiatric illness. 
My aim for this chapter has been to draw attention to the way epistemic policies and 
strategies in psychiatric healthcare have the power to either ameliorate or exacerbate the 
experience of ‘unworlding’ for the person with psychiatric illness. Specifically, I have 
focused on the impact of hermeneutical silencing in psychiatric healthcare.  
Hermeneutical silencing emerges in psychiatric healthcare in two ways: 1) through epistemic 
isolation or 2) their voice is omitted from the interpretive framework. In a case of epistemic 
isolation, vital information is withheld from psychiatric patients by the healthcare 
professional.  Patients reported being led through their psychiatric treatment without knowing 
their treatment plan, what their diagnosis meant or, in some cases, even what their diagnosis 
is. As such, an ignorance is imposed on the psychiatric patient so that they cannot make sense 
of their illness experience. In the second case, a hermeneutical lacuna emerges in a slightly 
different way. Here, even if information is not withheld from the patient, the interpretive 
framework obstructs them from understanding their illness-experience because it champions 
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the third-person perspective of the healthcare professional. As such, the patient’s own 
understanding of their illness is omitted from the collective, clinical understanding of their 
condition.  
Hermeneutical silencing, in turn, elicits an embodied dissonance or, as it is known in the 
phenomenology of psychiatric illness, ‘unworlding’. The person with psychiatric illness 
experiences the hermeneutical lacuna as an unexpected absence in their field of experience. 
Although the intention towards speech expression boils beneath the surface as the person 
longs to put into words their experience of psychiatric illness, this intention cannot be 
transformed into action as the necessary hermeneutical resources are missing. Consequently, 
the person’s movement through the world is stunted due to this gap in one’s system of 
anticipation.  In the case of empty speech expression, the person with psychiatric illness 
attempts to bypass this gap by adopting the hermeneutical resources devised by psychiatric 
experts in an attempt at expression. Although there is a speaking subject in this instance, the 
person with psychiatric illness performs only an inauthentic and ‘empty’ speech gesture, as 
the dominant, clinical framework fails to express their illness experience. Such speech 
expression does not accomplish the thought of the person with psychiatric illness, and as 
such, she too is unable to throw herself into the world.  
On these grounds, I conclude that hermeneutical silencing, entrenched in the practices of 
psychiatric healthcare, contributes to, and perhaps even intensifies, the experience of 
‘unworlding’ for the person with psychiatric illness. However, I argue that the same 
methodology that illuminated this phenomenological harm can be used to go some way 
towards remedying the ill person’s disrupted being-in-the-world. In line with Medina, I 
suggest that an act of hermeneutical resistance can be used to combat hermeneutical 
silencing. The act of hermeneutical resistance that I put forward is a modified version of 
Stanghellini’s phenomenological approach to the therapeutic interview. First, the 
implementation of this method would thwart hermeneutical marginalisation, as the 
therapeutic interview invites the patient to participate in the pooling of knowledge. Second, it 
would encourage the patient to develop new ways of expressing one’s experience of 
psychiatric illness, casting aside the sedimented tropes and clinical vocabulary. In doing so, 
the patient performs what Merleau-Ponty refers to as ‘speaking speech’, whereby the subject 
draws upon the well of sedimented language to forge novel and creative hermeneutical 
resources. Through a phenomenological and patient-centred approach to the interview 
process, the patient has regained a fundamental aspect of the body schema, without which she 
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is unable to project herself into the world. It is my hope that, in recovering one’s capacity for 



























What are the words you do not yet have? What do you need to say? What are the 
tyrannies you swallow day by day and attempt to make your own, until you will sicken 
and die of them, still in silence? (Lorde, 1977: 41). 
 
If we are nothing else, we are essentially speaking subjects. To speak is to orientate ourselves 
within a meaningful world. Speech is an action: through speech we promise, we joke, we 
explain, we convince, we apologise, we predict, we warn and so on. It is through speech that 
we can communicate with others and make sense of our own experiences. Thus, in this sense, 
we live through language. In many ways, our complex language-use is what sets us apart 
from the other animals. It is perhaps for this reason that the study of language has received so 
much philosophical attention; through the examination of language, we uncover something 
that is at the core of what it is to be human. However, we are not only linguistic animals but, 
as famously observed by Aristotle, political animals. In our hands, ‘language is also a 
political instrument, means, and proof of power’ (Baldwin, 1997: 5). To rob someone of the 
capacity for speech expression, whether intentional or as a result of ignorance, is a powerful 
strategy of oppression. It is to deprive a marginalised group of something that makes them 
essentially human.  
This dissertation has developed a form of silencing that has not received the attention it 
deserves. This form of silencing occurs when there is an absence in the interpretive 
framework where the words to describe a significant area of a marginalised knower’s life 
ought to be. Fricker establishes this as a case of hermeneutical injustice, but, as I have shown,  
she does not take this concept far enough. In this instance, the word of the marginalised 
knower is not merely ignored or dismissed as epistemically suspect, as in the case of 
testimonial injustice. Due to gaps in the interpretive framework, the subject is effectively 
silenced. As they cannot put their experience into words, they cannot express it- not only to 
others but also to themselves.  By applying a phenomenological lens, we can see that the 
harm goes deeper still. Through hermeneutical silencing, there is a disruption in the body-
world synthesis, as the would-be speaker has lost an essential capacity of the body schema: 
speech expression. As a result, I have identified a form of epistemic silencing that elicits not 
only a ‘cognitive dissonance’ but an ‘embodied dissonance’. Through this account, I hope to 
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have dragged out from the shadows a particularly insidious form of silencing that has long 
been gagging some of the most marginalised voices in our society.  
With a robust account of hermeneutical silencing established, the concept can now help us 
form a complete picture of the epistemic oppression that occurs in other social domains. 
There are a regrettably large number of marginalised groups of people, whose suffering could 
be better understood through this framework. As a group that suffer from acute 
stigmatisation, I chose to apply hermeneutical silencing to the domain of psychiatric  
healthcare. Reforms in the Mental Health Act in 2021 call for an urgent need to ‘redress the 
balance of power between patient and professionals’ in psychiatry.64 Through this 
dissertation, I have demonstrated that to achieve a real shift in the balance of power, one must 
first correct the unequal credibility economy that underlies this asymmetrical relationship. 
Until then, psychiatric patients will continue to be subjected to testimonial injustice, wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance, and, significantly, hermeneutical silencing. As psychiatric practice 
is essentially hermeneutical, I have shown that hermeneutical silencing is particularly 
obstructive to effective psychiatric treatment. Without the hermeneutical resources that 
enable patients to express their experiences, psychiatric reforms cannot even begin to 
‘enhance the patient’s voice’, as the Reformed Mental Health Act proposes to do. I hope this 
dissertation will encourage further interdisciplinary research into methods of interviewing in 
mental healthcare, with a move toward insight orientated rather than symptom orientated 
interviews. I predict this would lead to greater epistemic authority for people with psychiatric 
illness and, consequently, a more prominent voice for them in mental healthcare.  
In this concluding chapter, I offer some remarks concerning the potential application of this 
framework to other areas of epistemic injustice in psychiatric healthcare. To develop a robust 
account of hermeneutical silencing and demonstrate how it can be applied to the domain of 
psychiatric healthcare, I intentionally took a broad approach. Yet, in doing so, I was unable to 
do full justice to nuances in the way epistemic injustice operates in this domain that is worthy 
of closer examination. Thus, in future research, I hope to achieve a more focused 
investigation of the complex ways in which credibility deficit can arise in psychiatric 
healthcare by exploring areas such as 1) how epistemic injustice arises in neurocognitive 
disorders; 2) cases of epistemic injustice in which the ill person lacks the capacity for speech 
 
64 See Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. 2021. Reforming the Mental Health Act. [online] Available at: 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/951398/ment
al-health-act-white-paper-web-accessible.pdf> [Accessed 15 February 2021]. 
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by virtue of their illness; 3) the different kinds of identity prejudice attached to psychiatric 
illness; 4) the overlapping and intersectional identity prejudices that motivate a reduced 
epistemic status; 5)  the psychiatric setting one finds oneself in (institutionalised or 
otherwise), and 6) the epistemic privileges that may be afforded to family members of the ill 
person. Such future research would aim to achieve further clarity about the epistemic harms 
suffered by those with psychiatric illness, which have previously not achieved the attention 
they deserve. 
6.1. Future Research on Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatric Healthcare 
 
6.1.1. Epistemic harms in Neurocognitive Disorders 
 
First, there is more to be said about the different ways in which epistemic injustice functions 
in individual psychiatric illnesses. One need not look far in the burgeoning field of epistemic 
injustice to find rich accounts of its prevalence in depression (Jackson, 2017), 
dementia (Jongsma, Spaeth, and Schicktanz, 2017), (Young et al., 2020), borderline 
personality disorder (Kyratsous & Sanati, 2016), (Watts, 2017), autism (Jongsma, 
Spaeth, and Schicktanz, 2017) and psychosis (Sanati & Kyratsous, 2015). Nevertheless, 
many other forms of psychiatric illness have not yet been addressed in the field and would 
benefit from being examined through the lens of epistemic injustice. Such unexplored 
psychiatric illnesses include trauma and stressor-related disorders (such as post-traumatic 
stress disorder), anxiety disorders, dissociative disorders, feeding and eating disorders, 
elimination disorders, sleep-wake disorders, sexual dysfunction, substance-related and 
addictive disorders, other neurodevelopmental disorders (such as attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder) and obsessive-compulsive disorders. While in this dissertation 
it was not possible to subject each diagnostic category to the robust epistemic inquiry it 
deserves, I propose that such a project would offer new ways of understanding the distinctive 
contours of these epistemic lives. 
For instance, one distinction missed by an overarching look at psychiatric illness is that 
testimony plays a different role in the treatment and diagnosis of certain psychiatric illnesses 
compared to others. Certain psychiatric illnesses can only be diagnosed through testimony, as 
empirical investigation has thus far failed to identify a disease process for them.  In these 
cases, understanding the nature of a psychiatric illness is notably harder for both the patient 
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and the healthcare professional as they can only access its symptoms through testimony. By 
contrast, neurocognitive disorders, such as dementia, amnesia and disorders due to traumatic 
brain injury, can be diagnosed using neurological practices. 
Due to the different weight placed on testimony in each domain, the distinction between 
neurocognitive disorders and non-neurocognitive disorders is significant to an investigation 
into epistemic injustice. Although epistemic injustice may disrupt the speech expression of 
patients with neurocognitive disorders and may even lead to their silencing, the underlying 
mechanisms may differ from those relating to psychiatric patients whose first-person reports 
are the sole means of diagnosis.65 In the case of neurocognitive disorders, the clinician 
largely bases their diagnosis upon neurological evidence. This is not to say that the patient’s 
speech expression is not significant in the case of neurocognitive disorders. The credibility 
attached to their speech expression still holds vital importance for the dignity of the patient 
and their recovery process. However, I propose that the epistemic malfunction may operate 
differently in neurocognitive disorders. For instance, due to the supporting neurological 
evidence, the epistemic injustice that occurs in neurocognitive disorders may be closer to the 
epistemic injustice experienced in somatic illness.66 Moreover, perhaps the patient's speech 
expression may be even more likely to be afforded a credibility deficit, as the clinician may 
suppose that the neurological evidence ‘can do the talking’ for the patient. More significantly, 
the person with neurocognitive disorder may be more vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice, 
as the clinician may assume that no contribution to the neurological interpretive framework is 
necessary from the patient (thus causing hermeneutical lacuna). For this reason, an 
investigation into the contrasting epistemic operations in neurocognitive disorders compared 
to other psychiatric illnesses would provide greater insight into the different ways in which 
epistemic injustice can arise.  
 
6.1.2. Non-verbal Testimonial Injustice 
 
A further problem to address is the credibility deficit suffered by those physically unable to 
speak at all by virtue of their illness. Persistent difficulties in the use of language (including 
spoken, written, or sign language) is a common feature of many neurocognitive disorders, 
 
65 See Young et al (2020) And Dohmen (2016). 
66 See Kidd & Carel, (2017).  
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such as what the DSM-5 refers to as ‘Intellectual disability’, some forms of autism and 
dementia. While Young et al. (2019: 79) address the epistemic injustice that arises from the 
prejudicial assumption that people with dementia cannot speak (regardless of their actual 
ability), they fail to address whether or not epistemic injustice arises in cases where the 
patient really has lost the capacity of speech. Such psychiatric patients are seemingly 
automatically excluded from epistemic practices as their illness prevents them from 
participation, regardless of whether they are subjected to an identity prejudice or not. So, can 
people who are physically incapable of speaking still be said to suffer an epistemic injustice?  
I suggest the framework I have developed in this dissertation can go some way toward 
answering this question.  
In this dissertation, I have championed speech expression as a fundamental means of 
communication (a claim that I stand by), but it is important to remember that it is not the only 
means of communication. Non-verbal communication is a vital, though often overlooked, 
form of communication in psychiatric healthcare. For instance, Petherbridge (2019) 
emphasises the significance of ‘dynamic intercorporeal engagement’ in dementia treatment, 
whereby patients communicate through non-verbal embodied gestures. She bolsters this 
claim by appealing to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion on embodied gestures, arguing that non-
verbal communication is an essential form of bodily expression and a fundamental means of 
engaging with the world and, importantly, with other people. After all, speech expression is 
not the only gesture that constitutes the body schema. As discussed in chapter one, for 
Merleau-Ponty, thought is also accomplished through physical gestures. Consider a person 
who lacks verbal expression shaking her fist in anger: ‘the gesture does not make me think of 
anger, it is the anger itself’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 190 original italics).  
In line with Petherbridge’s account, I suggest that psychiatric patients who have lost their 
capacity for speech can suffer an epistemic injustice if their non-verbal expression is ignored 
or dismissed as meaningless. Consider Petherbridge’s example of successful non-verbal 
expression from a dementia patient (Wilson) to a practitioner (Feil):  
Wilson clasps Feil’s arm and pushes her down as if motioning her to sit. Feil bends and then 
sits down in order to attempt to be at eye-level with Wilson. Upon seeing a tear on Wilson’s 
cheek, Feil gently touches Wilson’s face as a means of communicating with her and Wilson 
opens her eyes and looks at Feil. Feil asks Wilson whether she will let her in a little at which 
point Wilson begins rhythmically banging the arm of the chair with her hand. Feil begins to 
sing gospel songs that she knows have been especially meaningful to Wilson earlier in her life 
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whilst gently stroking Wilson’s arm. As Feil sings, Wilson moves her hand against the chair 
in rhythm to Feil’s singing. (Petherbridge, 2019: 317).  
Now, imagine if Feil, instead of recognising Wilson’s non-verbal expressions as a form of 
communication, had disregarded her gestures as meaningless behavioural patterns from 
someone who lacks the cognitive capacity for communication. Tragically, this is a sanist 
attitude commonly attached to dementia patients who cannot express themselves verbally 
(Petherbridge, 2019). I suggest that in this instance, Wilson would be subject to an epistemic 
injustice. The wrong Wilson would experience would be distinctly epistemic because she 
would be undermined in her status as a ‘knower’, or, in other words, as someone who can 
participate in knowledge exchanging practices. Moreover, this form of injustice operates 
much like testimonial injustice, as her communication receives a deflated level of credibility. 
Perhaps then, the remit of testimonial injustice should be expanded to include all 
communicative practices, whether verbal or non-verbal, to encompass epistemic injustices 
inflicted upon those whose sole source of communication is non-verbal.  
If I am correct in assuming that non-verbal expression can be met with an epistemic injustice, 
what would my phenomenological approach to epistemic injustice add to such an account? I 
would argue that if non-verbal expression is dismissed as unintelligible, the marginalised 
knower experiences a disruption in their being-in-the-world. As in hermeneutical silencing, 
the ill person has been deprived of an important capacity of the body schema. This 
breakdown in the body schema occurs when the person’s gesture is dismissed as senseless 
movement, and therefore does not achieve its communicative effect. By drawing on the 
framework developed in my dissertation, we could better understand both non-verbal 
epistemic injustices and the lived experience of language-impaired people.  
 
6.1.3. Different Identity Prejudices in Psychiatric Illness 
 
It may also be worth taking a closer look at the different kinds of identity prejudice that 
motivate epistemic injustice in psychiatric illness. I touch upon this in my discussion of the 
trivialisation of certain psychiatric illness through underlying positive identity prejudices that 
reduce certain psychiatric illnesses to personality traits. As in the case of trivialisation, 
identity prejudices may cause epistemic injustice to manifest in disparate ways. For instance, 
a particular identity prejudice is attributed to psychiatric illnesses traditionally perceived to be 
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‘caused by the patient’, such as eating disorders and addictive disorders. Patients with alcohol 
dependence are more likely to be considered ‘difficult, annoying, less in need of admission, 
uncompliant, having a poor prognosis and more likely to be discharged from follow up’ by 
healthcare professionals (Thornicroft, 2006: 94). This lack of sympathy is also reflected in 
studies of healthcare professionals’ attitudes toward patients with an eating disorder: ‘These 
patients are perceived to be able to control their own conditions, based on societal beliefs that 
body weight and shape are controlled by individuals’ (Seah et al., 2017: 134). Such people 
are frequently considered less deserving of attention by healthcare professionals and are 
therefore less likely to be listened to as attentively than other patients. In this instance, the 
credibility deficit that arises is not motivated by the perception that the ill person’s 
judgements are clouded by ‘madness’. Rather, the credibility deficit is grounded in the 
misconception that their illness is a morally questionable lifestyle choice. For example, 
people with addictions are commonly considered selfish, lazy, and pleasure-seeking (Pickard, 
2017), while people with eating disorders are often considered similarly selfish, attention-
seeking and vain (Bannatyne & Stapleton, 2018). Thus, the credibility deficit in such cases is 
prompted by what is perceived to be a bad moral character.  
 
6.1.4. Identity Prejudice and Intersectionality  
 
When we start to reflect on the underlying stigma that motivates epistemic injustice in 
psychiatric illness, we are confronted by the overlapping identity prejudices at work. While 
the literature has focused on the sanist identity prejudices that drive epistemic injustice in 
psychiatric illness, it would be worth exploring in greater depth the intersection of sanism 
with sexism, racism, classism, ageism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia (and so on) that 
may equally drive epistemic injustices in psychiatric healthcare. For instance, those 
diagnosed with dementia are likely to encounter overlapping identity prejudices directed 
toward both psychiatric illness and old age, as 93% of those affected with dementia are over 
75 (Young et al., 2020: 79) (DSM-5, 2013: 612). Similarly, those with borderline personality 
disorder, where 75% of those diagnosed are women, are likely to encounter overlapping 
identity prejudices attached to both psychiatric illness and being a woman (DSM-5, 2013: 
666). Indeed, a wealth of literature suggests that being a woman makes it all the more likely 
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the patient’s testimony will be considered ‘manipulative’ or ‘attention-seeking’, as these 
negative stereotypes are already directed toward women (Wirth-Cauchon, 2001).  
In contrast, involuntary detention rates under the Mental Health Act ‘were higher for males 
(91.8 per 100,000 population) than females (84.4 per 100,000 population)’.67 Regarding race, 
statistics show that in 2019-2020 Black people had the highest rates of involuntary detention 
and were ten times more likely to be involuntarily detained under the Mental Health act than 
a White person.68 The category ‘Any Other Ethnic Group’ had the second-highest detention 
rate (468.3 detentions per 100,000 population), followed by the ‘Any Other Mixed 
Background’ category (369.4 detentions per 100,000 population). Regarding those financially 
disadvantaged, the statistics revealed that people from the most deprived areas of England 
were around three and a half times more likely to be involuntarily detained.69 As people who 
are detained under the Mental Health Act are considered ‘at risk of harm to themselves or 
others’, the disparity in these detention rates are likely to be motivated by identity prejudices 
that perceive certain groups, such as men of colour and men from deprived areas, to be more 
prone to violence (Harrison & Esqueda, 2001). In line with Berenstain (2020), I suggest that 
future research in epistemic injustice requires us to avoid ‘single-axis frameworks’.   
 
6.1.5. Degrees of Epistemic Authority in Psychiatric Healthcare 
 
As for the epistemic privilege afforded to the healthcare professional, further research is 
needed to explore the different degrees to which this privilege occurs in different psychiatric 
roles. Through this dissertation, I used the broad term ‘healthcare professional’ to encompass 
many different roles: nurses, case-workers, councillors, occupational therapists, psychiatrists, 
psychologist, social workers etc. Yet, it is likely that there are hierarchies in the healthcare 
system itself, which might entail different levels of epistemic privilege being afforded to each 
role. For instance, healthcare professionals who work with the involuntarily detained are 
likely to hold a unique kind of epistemic authority over the patient. Involuntary 
 
67 See Poupart and Foster (2020).  
68 ‘At 810.5 detentions per 100,000 people, this was over ten times the rate for the White British group (70.5 
detentions per 100,000 people) in 2019-20. (Poupart & Foster, 2020).  
69Detentions in the most deprived areas had the highest rates of detention (147.9 detentions per 100,000 
population). This was around three and a half times higher than the rate of detention in the least deprived areas 
(42.8 detentions per 100,000 population). (Poupart & Foster, 2020).  
189 
 
hospitalisation has long been fraught with controversy due to the loss of choice, autonomy 
and control for those detained. I do not suggest that involuntary hospitalisation is entirely 
detrimental to the person with psychiatric illness. Indeed, the purpose of involuntary 
detainment is to protect the patient and those around them from harm. However, the disparity 
between the epistemic status of the clinician and the patient is likely to be heightened in this 
environment.  
Mirroring the prisoner-warden dynamic described by Foucault (Foucault, 2001), in modern 
mental institutions, patients frequently compare their involuntary detainment to ‘being placed 
in jail’(Plahouras et al., 2020: 6). For example, people who were involuntarily hospitalised 
for eating disorders may perceive themselves to be ‘“criminals” who “eat to get out” or “do 
their time” and often become “repeat offenders”’ (Bannatyne & Stapleton, 2018: 329). In 
contrast, the clinician was perceived as the jailor, who rewarded and punished their behaviour 
and effectively held the key to their freedom (ibid). Given this relationship, patients 
frequently report ‘not being listened to and not being heard’ and feeling ‘out of control during 
their hospitalisation due to not receiving sufficient information and not being involved in 
decisions’ (Hoof & Goossensen, 2014: 431).  An example of the latter can be found in the 
following patient report:  
They talk about me behind my back, then they tell me what the team decided, the second 
time, they did not even have a ward round thing, the nurses just came up and said ‘right you 
are sectioned again’ I thought What?, it was a bit of a liberty. (cited in Plahouras et al., 2020: 
6).  
In the case of involuntary hospitalisation, the clinician's epistemic privilege thus appears to 
be amplified, whereas the epistemic status of those detained is vulnerable to being further 
diminished. If such extreme forms of epistemic injustice take place, I suggest that epistemic 
silencing is even more likely to occur in this setting. For instance, due to unequal 
participation in the interpretive framework, hermeneutical lacunas will doubtless open up for 
the detained person. What’s more, these lacunas may persist for longer periods of time as the 
detained individual is more likely to be epistemically isolated from hermeneutical resources 
outside the institution. For this reason, a closer examination of epistemic practices within 
different roles and within different psychiatric environments would shed light on how 
epistemic authority can occur at different intensities within psychiatric healthcare.  
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6.1.6. The Epistemic Privilege of Family Members 
 
It would also be worth examining the epistemic privilege afforded to family members and 
close friends of the ill person within the psychiatric healthcare system. Young et al. briefly 
gesture towards this epistemic privilege in the case of dementia, where family members ‘are 
given primary rights and opportunity to influence policy and practice relating to dementia 
care’ (Young et al., 2019: 82). A further instance of the epistemic privilege afforded to family 
members can be found in an example previously discussed from the work of Sanati and 
Kyratsous (2015). They present the case of the psychosis patient J.N, whose fears about her 
husband’s fidelity were assumed to be the product of delusional jealousy (Sanati & 
Kyratsous, 2015: 482). Although it was revealed that her husband had indeed been unfaithful, 
her justified emotional outbursts were perceived to be a symptom of her psychosis. However, 
what Sanati and Kyratsous fail to highlight is the credibility excess attributed to J.N’s 
husband, who further supported her diagnosis of delusional jealousy by telling the mental 
health professional, ‘this is how she behaves when she becomes ill’ (ibid). Despite J.N’s 
claims that her husband wanted everyone to believe she was ‘crazy’, they considered him a 
reliable informant (as both a ‘sane’ person and a man). As such, they afforded him with an 
epistemic privilege regarding his wife’s diagnosis, thus further perpetuating her credibility 
deficit.70 I propose that future work on epistemic injustice in psychiatric healthcare ought to 
explore the epistemic privilege not only of the healthcare professional but of the family 
members and close friends, who are sometimes afforded a credibility excess over the ill 
person.  
 
6.2. Final Remarks 
 
In 2016, The Government and NHS England supported the implementations of a series of 
recommendations put forward by ‘The Five Year Forward View for Mental Health’, devised 
by the independent Mental Health Taskforce (2016). The Government and NHS England 
committed to achieving the proposed mental health outcomes by 2020/2021. The key theme 
emphasised by the taskforce is a need for people in the mental health system to feel heard. 
 
70 It is also worth noting that J.N is described as ‘a young Ghanaian lady in her mid-20s’, yet Sanati and 
Kyratsous fail to highlight how the epistemic injustice she experiences may not only be a product of prejudice 
attached to her psychiatric illness, but also her identity as a black woman (ibid). 
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The taskforce proposed that by 2020/2021, people in the mental health system ought to be 
able to make the following assertions: ‘services and professionals listen to me and do not 
make assumptions about me’, ‘I am not stigmatised by services and professionals as a result 
of my health symptoms’, ‘people take me seriously and trust my judgement’ and ‘my 
behaviour is seen in the light of communication and expression, not just as a clinical 
problem’ (2016). Through this dissertation, I hope to have demonstrated that such positive 
service-user experiences can only be achieved by redressing the unequal epistemic climate 
that grounds the mental health system. We can better understand the causal mechanisms 
behind the credibility deficit endured by service users through the concept of epistemic 
injustice and we can better understand the full extent of the harm such credibility deficit 
inflicts upon service users through a phenomenological approach. Only when we have 
grasped the full extent of the cause and effect of such credibility deficit can we begin to find 
practical ways of eliminating it from the mental health system.  
To achieve a mental health system where patients feel listened to, taken seriously, and 
confident that their testimony will not be skewed by prejudice, the healthcare professional is 
required to reflect upon and quell implicit prejudicial assumptions and apply reflexive 
listening practices toward their patient’s testimonies (Crichton et al. 2016). However, this 
dissertation shows that such reflexive strategies are not enough to ensure that the patient is 
heard. If the patient does not have the appropriate hermeneutical resources, it does not matter 
how hard the healthcare professional listens; the patient would lack to language to 
communicate successfully. By placing the patient at the centre of interpretive practices, they 
can participate in the meaning-making process and devise hermeneutical resources to better 
communicate their experiences. Through such hermeneutical resistance, the voice of the 
patient is restored. Restoring the voice of the psychiatric patient is not only essential for their 
communication with the healthcare professional; through successful speech expression, the 
psychiatric patient has recovered ‘the fundamental activity by which man projects himself 
towards a “world”’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 197). So long as we fail to implement these 
changes, ‘the experience of madness remains silent in the composure of a knowledge which, 
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